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Summary
In recent years interest in the economic analysis of trade unions in developing countries has waned due to
declining union density. Nevertheless, trade unions are still an important institution in many developing
countries. Mexico, like many industrialised countries witnessed a decline in union density over the 1980s.
However, unlike most industrialised countries, the rate of decline has slowed down in the last decade.
This can be potentially accounted by the changing nature of unions in Mexico, and in particular the
growth of independent unionism. The resurgence in unionisation rates naturally leads to the question:
What are Mexican unions currently doing?
This thesis investigates this question. Firstly, I provide a recapitulation of the history of trade unions
in Mexico, and their relationship to the state. This history between ‘official’ unions and the state explains
how the legal framework governing unions developed.
Second, I turn my attention to the question what do unions do to wages in Mexico? In particular
I investigate the union pay gap for the recent period 2005–2015. The raw wage gap is found to range
between 18–22%. Estimates of the adjusted wage gap using a well-known decomposition suggest that
union wage premium lies between 5.1–12.9%. Further estimates are invariant to application of selectivity
corrected decomposition. The effect of unions on the wage distribution is considered, and the ‘sword-of-
justice’ effect is found to exist in Mexico. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that whilst
unions are marginalised in the labour market, they still play an important role.
Third, I ask: Are there any gains to joining unions? I provide evidence on the worker compensation
gains (losses) made by males upon joining (leaving) a union for the period 2005q1–2016q1. The transitions
between a non-union and a union status are investigated using a difference-in-difference estimator. I find
that joining and leaving a union is associated with small wage gains and losses, similar to what the
literature reports for most industrialised nations. This chapter also contributes to the wider literature
by providing the first estimates of the gain (loss) associated with joining (leaving) a union with respect
to non-wage benefits. The findings show joining (leaving) a union increases (decreases) the probability
of being in receipt of legally guaranteed benefits such as bonuses, paid holidays and pensions.
Fourth, I examine the relationship between union strike petitions, a legal mechanism by which unions
signal the desire to negotiate, and the business cycle. I focus on the time period 1990–2012, a period of
legal and electoral institutional change in Mexico as the country democratised after the 70 year rule of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party. I find that strike threats are counter-cyclical, unlike the established
literature on actual strikes. I explore the causal relationship between elections and the rate of strike
threats using a sharp regression discontinuity design and using information on close municipal elections.
I find a causal effect from close electoral wins of right- and left-wing mayors on strike threats two years
after an election. Victories for the right (left) party lead to an increase the number of strike threats two
years after narrow wins. When disaggregating these effects by type of union it emerges that ‘officialist
unions’ are behind the increased threats. I then provide evidence that this increase in strike threats
stimulates electoral turnout in the following election. The evidence provided in this chapter suggests
that whilst unions act in accordance with the cycle, they also behave contrary to the interests of their
rank-and-file to satisfy political goals.
Finally, I conclude that the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that although union density may
be in decline, and officialist unions may not act in accordance to their rank-and-file’s wishes, unions still
have an important role to play in voicing worker’s preferences and ensuring that employers comply with
the law. In the last chapter I discuss further insights from the present research, detail the limitations,
and outline an agenda for further research on the themes explored in this thesis.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates the behaviour of trade unions in Mexico over the period 2005–2016.
Although research exists on the effects of unions on the labour market for developing countries,
and Mexico in particular, little of it covers the past two decades. These last two decades have
seen a decline in union density, and changes to the legal and political institutions in Mexico.
Thus, in the spirit of Freeman and Medoff (1984), it seems relevant to ask: “What do Mexican
unions do?” This thesis focuses on assessing the role of unions in both economic and political
terms.
As Freeman (2010) acknowledges, while unions in developing countries are weak, on aggreg-
ate, unions may be more engaged in political behaviour than their counterparts in developed
countries. Levitsky and Mainwaring (2006) suggest that unions in Latin America have a poor
track record in being involved in democratic struggles, and often have been co-opted into the
ruling elite’s power structures. In this respect, the focus on Mexican unions has potential policy
relevance for the rest of Latin America.
Mexico was ruled by an authoritarian regime for 71 years, which originated in the Mexican
Revolution (1910–1920) and ended at the watershed 2000 presidential elections. Labour legisla-
tion, such as the 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo (FLL)1 is favourable to unions, but at the same
time places restrictions on the formation and practices of unions. For example, the law prohibits
employing replacement workers during officially recognised strikes, as well as requiring employers
to automatically deduct union fees from a workers paycheque and distribute them directly to
union officers. However, unions are subject to a stringent regime of union certification, which
although in theory is straightforward is often in practice subject to purposeful administrative
1Federal Labour Law
2delays and political influence (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012c).
The post-revolutionary period saw the formation and concentration of union power into a
few large trades unions congresses, which were co-opted by the ruling party. This relationship
was one of the central pillars by which the ruling party maintained power. The success of
the state–union relationship during the period 1938–1970 thrived in part due to the pursuit of
import substitution policies by successive Mexican governments. However, the 1980s debt crisis,
and the subsequent structural changes introduced led to an erosion of union importance on the
national stage. ‘Officialist’ unions changed their language from the struggle for higher wages, to
that which sought to ameliorate the ‘social wage’ (Middlebrook, 1995). The decline of political
power, coupled with the privatisations of government owned enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s,
had a marked effect upon ‘officialist’ unions. This decline in ‘official’ union power coincided with
the declining unionisation rates, the democratisation of the country and various institutional
reforms. The result of this was a rift in labour politics between what Bensusa´n and Middlebrook
(2012c) call ‘social trade unionism’ and ‘movement trade unionism’. The social trade unionists
are a group of unions who distance themselves from government control, successfully negotiate
contracts with employers as well as hold a commitment to internal democracy.2 The movement
trade unionists are seen to be the more belligerent wing of modern Mexican trade unionism.
They have close ties to other social movements and are more likely to use strike in their conflicts
with employers.3 A major contribution of this thesis to the economics literature will be in the
investigation of the role of independent unionisation in Mexico and the political component of
union behaviour which has hitherto remained an unexplored issue.
1.1 Structure and overview
This thesis is comprised of four substantive chapters. The first provides context for the research,
and is followed by three empirical chapters that analyse the role of unions in Mexico.
Chapter 2 recounts the history of Mexican unionism from 1910 to the present day. It outlines
the coevolution between ‘officialist’ trade unions and the Partido Revolucio´nario Institucional
(PRI)4, which ruled Mexico for 71 years. It details how the trade unions were co-opted into
the PRI party, and were utilised to mobilise votes for the PRI. Whilst ‘officialist’ unions were
beneficiaries of this post-revolutionary regime, in particular in terms of favourable labour legis-
2e.g. the Mexican Telephone Worker’s Union, amongst others.
3Notably, the Frente Autentico de Trabajo (FAT), teachers’ unions and unions of university employees.
4Institutional Revolutionary Party
3lation, they were also subject to stringent legislation that placed restrictions on the formation
and behaviour of unions, and a strict regime of oversight over strikes. Perverse institutions
were developed by the PRI to maintain control over its corporatist–authoritarian regime. La-
bour legislation was explicitly drafted to ensure that unions were favourable to government, and
actively discouraged the formation of independent unionism.
Unions in Mexico have been facing declines in membership similar to those witnessed in
other developing countries. The 1980s debt crisis left ‘officialist’ unions weakened, as the state
was forced to switch economic strategy towards export-oriented manufacturing. This decline in
fortunes for unions was also shared by the PRI party. The aftermath of the 1988 presidential
elections, where the PRI were widely regarded to have won through fraudulent means, created
the impetus for reform and the creation of ‘good’ institutions, such as an independent judiciary,
which would eventually lead to Mexican democratisation. These political developments, coupled
with a shift in government economic policy, meant that unions lost importance for the PRI, and
thus became politically marginalised. The purpose of this chapter is to serve as a contextual-
isation to the politics and legislation which will be the subject of inquiry in the three empirical
chapters.
Given the present discussion, it is clear that unions in Mexico have not historically behaved
as other union movements have in developed countries. As such, in the spirit of Freeman and
Medoff (1984), I ask: What do Mexican unions do to wages? In Chapter 3 I provide new
evidence on the union wage gap over the last decade. The empirical work exploits the Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo (ENOE) survey. The analysis is divided into two parts: In the
first, the magnitude of the union wage gap is investigated using the well known Oaxaca (1973)–
Blinder (1973) decomposition. The potential issue of union selection is addressed through the
application of a Lee (1978) endogenous switching model. Further estimates of the Union wage
mark-up are obtained by exploiting the panel nature of the ENOE survey, to obtain an individual
fixed-effects regression. I then give a synthesis of all of these competing estimates. In the final
part of the analysis, I ask: ‘Did unions wield a ‘sword-of-justice’ across the wage distribution
over the last decade?’ This is explored through the application of a variance decomposition and
the use of quantile regression models.
Chapter 4 further exploits the panel nature of the ENOE dataset. In this chapter I ask:
‘Are there any gains (losses) to joining (leaving) a union?’ The chapter provides evidence on the
worker compensation gains (losses) made by males upon joining (leaving) a union. If one believes
4that that workers are only likely to join effective unions, then perhaps, these estimates may be
regarded as the gains to independent unionisation. I estimate the gains and losses associated with
transitioning between non-union and union status using a difference-in-difference estimator. The
findings suggest that joining and leaving a union is associated with no wage gains and small wage
losses respectively. This is in contrast to what is reported in the literature for most industrialised
nations. This chapter also contributes to the wider literature by providing the first estimates of
the gain (loss) associated with joining (leaving) a union with respect to non-wage benefits. The
findings reveal joining (leaving) a union increases (decreases) the probability of being in receipt
of legally guaranteed benefits such as bonuses, paid holidays and pensions. This suggests that
although union density may be in decline, unions still have an important role to play in voicing
workers preferences with respect to compensation and ensuring that employers are compliant
with the law.
The investigation on unions thus far has only considered the role unions exert as economic
agents in the labour market. However, given the long history entwining ‘officialist’ unions and the
PRI, it is important to investigate whether the period of democratisation Mexico experienced
in the 1990s, where the “rules of the game” were tightened up, had any effect upon unions.
Chapter 5 seeks to explore this question by exploiting Mexican administrative data on all strike
threats between 1991–2012, a period of political institutional improvement. I document the
pro-cyclicality of strike threats, confirming their role in contract bargaining. While legally strike
threats, in the form of petitions to strike, may only deal with intra-firm complaints, I find an
association between threats and electoral years. This chapter asks: Are strike threats partially
caused by the political cycle? Using municipal electoral data, I employ a regression discontinuity
approach, and investigate for the existence of a causal effect from close elections of right- and
left-wing mayors on strike threats two years after an election. I further supplement these findings
by testing if increases in petitions have an effect upon subsequent electoral turnout. To test this
hypothesis, a differences-in-differences model is employed to estimate electoral turnout in narrow
win municipalities. I find that electoral turnout is stimulated by strike threats, in the context of
tight electoral rules surrounding campaigning, these findings may be interpreted as confirmation
of illegal campaigning.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides an overview of all of the conclusions from the preceding empirical
work. I draw further conclusions from the whole of the work, as well as reflect on limitations
from the research, and I outline an agenda for future research on the role of unions in Mexico.
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The Rise and Fall of the Dinosaurs
Unions, Legislation, Political actors and Institutional
change in Mexico
2.1 Introduction
In 1990 the renowned writer Mario Vargas Llosa remarked that Mexico lived under ‘the per-
fect dictatorship’ (Krauze, 2012). This regime was enabled by legislation and the institutions
developed in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920). These power structures
allowed the Partido Revolucio´nario Institucional (PRI) to rule the country almost unopposed
for 71 years. Trade unions served as one of the pillars that allowed the continued existence of the
corporatist–authoritarian regime. This was achieved through the co-opting of the labour move-
ment into the new post-revolutionary institutions of the PRI. The largest post-revolutionary
union, the Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico (CTM)1 was formally a part of the PRI,
as the ‘official’ labour segment. It is for this reason that those unions which formally dealt
with the. PRI, and by extension the state, are often called ‘officialist’ unions. This chapter
will provide context on the history of the labour movement in Mexico, and will outline the
institutional framework within which the empirical analysis of this thesis is situated.
The central proposition that I discuss in this chapter relates to how the post-revolution state
co-evolved with organised labour. The interaction between the PRI and trades unions led to the
creation of perverse institutions, which helped the PRI rule the country, the legacy of which pre-
1Confederation of Mexican workers
6vails to this day. The old authoritarian–corporatist state was dismantled in the 1990s and there
was a series of reforms, which focused in reshaping the formal political, electoral and judicial
institutions in the country. Amongst these reforms a comprehensive labour reform was widely
discussed for much of the 1990s, and even after the watershed 2000 elections. Nevertheless, no
reform materialised until the dying days of the Caldero´n2 presidency in 2012. The passage of
these reforms by a ‘lame duck’ president, with the support of an incoming PRI president meant
that significant compromises in the text of the law were made. In particular some of the chapters
which saw the fewest changes were those relating to union regulation.
This chapter is structured as follows, Section 2.2 explains the evolution of the labour move-
ment in Mexico from the dying days of the dictatorship of General Porfirio Dı´az (1876–1911)
through the revolution and the subsequent Constitution of 1917. These events laid the ground-
work for the hegemony of power of the CTM over labour relations, which would last until the
reforms instituted in the 1980s eroded the importance of organised labour in the PRI. Section
2.3 relates the key concepts in the Federal Labour Law for understanding the analysis conducted
in this thesis. Section 2.4 gives a brief account of the judicial and political reforms undertaken
in Mexico in the 1990s. Finally, Section 2.5 contains a summary of the narrative.
2.2 A brief history of Mexico, unions and legal institutions
2.2.1 Pre-revolution institutions and labour conflicts (1860s–1910)
The Mexican constitution of 1857 offered workers the rights to negotiate and withdraw from
labour contracts as well as forming workers associations. A liberal reading of these clauses
would suggest that these rights implied the right to strike. At this time Mexico was ruled
by Porfirio Dı´az, a military dictator, who was in power almost continuously from 1867–1911.
Strictly speaking, Dı´az was temporary president in November-December 1876, where he resigned
and left a puppet president. He was then elected in 1877, the following election was won by his
hand-picked successor, and he won further elections in 1884, 1888, 1892, 1896, 1900, 1904 and
1910. The success of the early labour movement was permitted by the Dı´az government due to
their laissez-faire approach to the economy and labour matters. However, in the later days of
the regime the growth plans heavily relied on foreign investment which meant that unions and
strikes were discouraged, and in some cases repressed. This de facto suppression of organised
2President, who was elected in 2006 under the Partido Accio´n Nacional (PAN) banner. For a chronology of
Mexican Presidents since the Revolution see Appendix A.
7labour activities led to a decline in union membership.
There were two major flashpoints of strike repression during this period. The Cananea and
Rio Blanco strikes which were violently put down by the Dı´az government. Unsurprisingly, the
quelling of these strikes led to further unrest. This would be one of the many contributing
factors that led to the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.
2.2.2 Labour, the Revolution, and Institutions (1910–1917)
During the 1910 election campaign, Francisco Madero campaigned against the incumbent Dı´az
who had held power for 45 years, under the slogan Sufragio effectivo, no reeleccio´n.3 Madero
was was arrested for sedition and jailed, and Dı´az declared the winner of a fraudulent election.
Madero escaped prison and went into exile in the USA where he called for an uprising against the
Dı´az government. The revolution initially focused on the northern part of the country. When
the rebels took control of Ciudad Jua´rez, Dı´az resigned and went into exile in France.
After Dı´az resigned, the interim president called for a further election. In 1911 Madero was
elected President of Mexico and his government tried to gain support from labour organisations
by relaxing the interpretation of the law and allowing workers to unionise and strike. In 1913
a counter-revolutionary coup d’e´tat against the government succeeded in assassinating Madero
and installing Victoriano Huerta as the president. The governor of the state of Coahuila, Venus-
tiano Carranza, organised the Constitutionalist movement, the counter-counter-revolutionary
movement, which aimed to remove Huerta from power. For the next five years the country
would be in a state of civil war, with fighting taking place in every state.
During this period, the strategic importance of the newly unionised industries (railroads,
ports, petroleum) led to revolutionary leaders seeking an alliances with the various labour move-
ments. As the revolution began to fade in 1915 the organised labour movement was rewarded
for their loyalty to the Constitutionalist movement by the eventual victor Carranza. Union
officials were given a place at the table when drafting the 1917 Constitution ensuring that union
interests would be enshrined in law. Article 123 of the Constitution deals with working hours
and workplace conditions, occupational health and safety, minimum wages and overtime pay,
educational facilities for workers, labour unions and the right to strike, work contracts, Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Commissions, and consumer cooperatives (Middlebrook, 1995). However,
the constituent assembly notably refused to make a labour law subject to federal jurisdiction,
3Translated as: Effective suffrage, no re-election. Ironically, that slogan was Dı´az’s own from his first election
campaign of 1877.
8insisting to leave it at the discretion of each individual state to regulate labour. This omission
led to divergence of labour law at a state level, which proved problematic for industries such as
the railways that by their very nature spanned more than one state.
2.2.3 Post-Revolutionary Government and union collusion (1918–1928)
In the immediate post-revolutionary period unions, and in particular Confederacio´n Regional
Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the Mexican Regional Labour Confederation, played a key role.
The Partido Laborista Mexicano (PLM)4, the political wing of CROM, successfully ran two
electoral campaigns that saw two consecutive presidents elected Alvaro´ Obrego´n (1920–1924),
and Plutarco El´ıas Calles (1924–1928). It was during this period that the labour institutions
which oversee the labour market were ‘rehearsed’. The importance of unions was such that
Obrego´n during his candidacy signed a secret pact with CROM who promised to provide support
for Obregon’s bid in exchange for political influence through the creation of a labour ministry
which CROM would influence and as well as the promise of reforms which codify Article 123 of
the Constitution (Carr, 1976).
The success displayed by CROM in gaining political influence was largely due to its moderate
stance and its attempts to distance itself from direct action, opting for more strategic interven-
tions. This approach appealed to those in power, in particular as the labour movement had
been crucial during the revolutionary years. Indeed, CROM’s support would prove vital for the
Post-Revolutionary governments, quashing a potential military uprising by playing a diplomatic
role liaising with foreign unions and the USA Government.
The mutually beneficial relationship between CROM and Obregon’s successor President
Calles, is evidenced by the CROM’s appointment of Calles as the honorary president of CROM.
The loyalty of CROM during the military uprising and their electoral importance was rewarded
by the appointment of Luis Morones, their secretary-general, as Minister for Industry, Commerce
and Labour in the Calles administration (1924–1928) (Lastra Lastra, 2002a). In exchange for
Morones’s support in stabilising worker–employer relations, and limiting strikes he gained the
ability to increase CROM’s membership, influence and power at the expense of other competing
trade unions congresses. The labour ministry consolidated CROM’s power by changing practices
on the regulation on the formation of unions and internal union affairs, the practice of assigning
collective bargaining monopolies to the first union to organise a workplace, and the routine
4Mexican Labour Party
9approval of ‘closed shop’, or exclusion clauses in collective bargaining contracts. This last
practice ensured that unions did not need to mobilise or retain the support of rank-and-file,
as loss of one’s union membership would lead to the loss of one’s job.
These practices, notably the introduction of exclusion clauses were undoubtedly unconstitu-
tional, violating Article 123’s freedom of association. Nevertheless these were codified into law
and remained in statute until 2001. Under Morones the union leadership was also empowered
with the ability to unilaterally seek binding sanctions on workers undertaking strike action,
through issuing petitions to the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. Thus, if workers ob-
tained a legally sanctioned strike, their leadership may opt to go against their own rank-and-file
and apply to the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission for strikes to be shut down, assuming
the leadership got something in return. These are some examples of the coercive powers that
were available to union leaderships. The ‘closed shop’ provisions of the 1920s would later facil-
itate the creation of ‘ghost unions’, unions formed unbeknownst to workers, where workers are
automatically enrolled to prevent further union organisation at an establishment. As under the
Ley Federal del Trabajo (FLL) the first union to register in an establishment gains a monopoly
over the collective bargaining rights.
The role of ‘official’ trades unions congress would not be held by CROM for long. In 1927
the Constitution was amended to allow non-consecutive presidential re-election, paving the way
for Obrego´n’s re-election. This amendment, seen as a betrayal of revolutionary ideals, led to a
rift between CROM and Obrego´n. During the election campaign many elected PLM members
of congress quit as they sympathised with Obrego´n. When Obrego´n won the election, Morones
bitter with the result, held a rally in which he suggested that ‘something’ might happen to
Obrego´n. Obrego´n was assassinated within days of winning the election, before he could assume
the presidency. It was widely assumed at the time that CROM were behind his assassination.
Due to suspicions of CROM’s involvement in the assassination there was an purge of CROM
supporters within the government (Lastra Lastra, 2002a). The aftermath of the Obrego´n as-
sassination, led Calles to distance himself from CROM, and thus the PLM, and break away to
form Partido Nacional Revolucio´nario (PNR), the National Revolutionary Party, which would
go on to rule the country for 71 years. It is widely accepted that the presidents that followed
(Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio and Rodriguez) were Calles’s puppets. Congress instated Emilio Por-
tes Gil (1928–1930) as the new interim president. CROM’s control over labour relations can
be regarded as the mould which future labour relations between the state and trades unions
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congresses would follow and would tie the trades unions and the state for the next 60 years
(Lastra Lastra, 2002a).
2.2.4 The Federal Labour Law and the birth of CTM (1928–1936)
The Ortiz Rubio presidency (1930–1932) saw the passage of the 1931 Ley Federal del Trabajo
(FLL)5 included various clauses which were very favourable to unions, such as, monopoly over
contract bargaining and exclusion clauses, provisions which prohibit employing replacement
workers during officially recognised strikes, and requiring employers to automatically deduct
union fees from workers’ paycheques to distribute directly to union officers. However, whilst
union officials stood to gain handsomely from this reform there were other methods of control
which were imposed by this law. The law allows a group of 20 workers to unionise without seeking
prior authorisation, but the new union may not take part in any negotiations until registered
with a state-level Arbitration and Conciliation Commission, or the Secretar´ıa de Trabajo y
Previsio´n Social (STPS)’s associational registry. Legally, the registration procedures are simple,
but are subject to ‘purposeful’ delay and political influence (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012c,
p.14).
The benefits of mobilising organised labour on behalf of the government became obvious
under the Calles administration, and the subsequent ‘puppet’ presidencies. A substitute ‘official’
trades union was sought by the government as soon as the CROM was marginalised. This role
would eventually be filled by the Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico (CTM). One of the
founders of the CTM was Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a former member of CROM. During
the mid-1930s Toledano spearheaded a movement calling for the creation of a ‘national labour
front’ to replace CROM. In 1934 PNR nominated La´zaro Ca´rdenas del R´ıo to the presidency
of Mexico. Given the dominance of PNR in elections, both through legitimate and illegitimate
means, nomination to contest an election under this party virtually guaranteed an electoral
win. Ca´rdenas had previously been Governor of the state of Michoaca´n and had undertaken a
series of reforms in which worker and peasant organisations had been vital. In his inaugural
address to Congress “he referred to the labour movements’ lack of centralised organisation as
one of its principal problems” (Middlebrook, 1995). Thus, in 1935, shortly after Ca´rdenas
took power, a series of strikes by reinvigorated unions in key foreign-owned industries broke
out, leading to a showdown between the conservative wing of the PNR and Ca´rdenas. Calles’s
5Federal Labour Law, not known by its acronym in Spanish, hence preference for English.
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proclamation that the the strikes amounted to ‘treason’, was seen by unions and Ca´rdenas
sympathisers to be an attempt to regain power and prevent Ca´rdenas’ socio-economic reforms.
The pressing concern that CROM and Calles would take control from these newly reinvigorated
labour movements was the catalyst for the creation of the CTM. In June 1935, at the behest of
Ca´rdenas the most important labour organisations met to form the Comite´ Nacional de Defensa
Proletaria (CNDP), creating a power base which allowed Ca´rdenas to consolidate his political
might and further enabling him to purge the PNR and government of Calles supporters. This
support for Ca´rdenas was rewarded by government support for unionisation, increased resources
for inspectors who enforced the FLL, as well as a crackdown on employer-controlled unions.
These actions resulted in increases in unionisation throughout the remainder of 1930s. In 1936
Ca´rdenas declared that it was “in the national interest to provide the support necessary to
create a single organisation of industrial workers that would end the inter-union strife that [was]
equally pernicious to the interest of workers, employers and the government.” (Middlebrook,
1995, p.88) Shortly after this speech the CNDP organised a ‘national unification congress’ whose
aims would be to create a single national union. With that, the CTM was born.
2.2.5 CTM hegemony over labour relations (1938–1982)
In 1938, Ca´rdenas, renamed the PNR the Partido de la Revolucio´n Mexicana (PRM).6 The
change of party name reflected a restructuring of the party across four sectors: peasants, CTM,
the popular sector7, and the military. This rearrangement of the internal organisation of the
ruling party ensured that the future of the PRM and the CTM would be intertwined. CTM
leaders agreed to being co-opted by the Ca´rdenas government due to the attractiveness of his
nationalistic economic policies, such as the nationalisation of the petroleum industry, and the
change of administration of the railways to one which was worker-led. The benefits from forming
part of the ‘labour’ sector of the PRM enabled the continued existence of groups such as CTM.
Middlebrook (1995, p.100) provides evidence that in the CTM accounts in their early years
donations accounting for two-thirds of their running costs were received from sources, which
were late confirmed by senior CTM officials to have originated from the federal government.
These monies were channelled via the PRM, and its successor the PRI. Other benefits from being
formally allied with the ruling party were seen in terms of ‘political subsidies’. These ranged
from the weakening of non co-opted unions that may have threatened the legitimacy of the
6Party of the Mexican Revolution
7Business leaders, middle class professionals amongst others.
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‘officialist’ unions, to protecting the union bosses from rank-and-file challenges. There were also
opportunities for pro-government labour organisers to find themselves elected to political office.
This gave the ‘officialist’ union leadership the opportunity attempt to change the legislation
furthering their interests, similar to CROM’s behaviour in the early 1920s.
The change of government from Ca´rdenas to his conservative successor Manuel A´vila Ca-
macho (1940–1946) led to a rift in the CTM between those individuals who wished to continue
to remain under state patronage and those who supported Lombardo Toledano, the Secretary
General of the CTM, who sought to distance CTM from PRI. This rift led to the eventual
removal of Toledano from his post and the instatement of Fidel Vela´zquez as the new Secretary
General. He would remain the leader of the CTM until his death in 1997.
The relationship between the State and the CTM continued from the 1940s through to the
1970s. The success of this was predicated on the economic policy of Mexico which, due to
the outbreak of WWII, followed import substitution. During this period the CTM was able to
continue its activities and successfully lobbied for higher minimum wages, Herna´ndez Laos (2006)
provides evidence that these wage increases were likely based on rising labour productivity.
The 1950s and 1960s also saw further co-opting of unions by the State. CTM in an attempt to
stave off rising demand for independent unions ensured that large trade unions congresses united
under the PRI banner. In January 1955, they formed the Worker’s Unity Block, which aimed at
organising co-operation between various unions. This served as a precursor to the Congreso del
Trabajo (CT), the Labour Congress, which in February 1966 formally united the four largest
trades unions congresses. The creation of the CT effectively implied that the majority of unions
in the country were now affiliated with the ruling PRI party.
The 1982 debt crisis challenged the state–‘officialist’ union relationship. The increase in debt
interest rates, coupled with an overvalued currency and a large fiscal deficit led to capital flight.
Initially the crisis saw a contraction of the economy by 0.6% and was primarily manifested by an
increase in annualised rates of inflation by 98.9%. The de la Madrid (1982–1988) administration
was forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for liquidity. In turn the govern-
ment agreed to a three year stabilisation programme. The intended targets were to reduce the
current account deficit and reducing inflation. The stabilisation programme took two phases,
the first entailed abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime which led to a real depreciation of
160%. This led to GDP reduction of 4.2%. The second phase of the adjustment focused on
correcting prices. This was partially done through setting priced to expected inflation rates,
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and as such meant that the official minimum wage became a ceiling for wage increases, rather
than a starting point for wage negotiations. As the state was the largest employer at that time
this controlled wage inflation. These adjustments were followed by lowering trade barriers uni-
laterally, as well as the privatisation of many state owned enterprises.8 The preparations for
the privatisation often included wage cuts, loss of non-wage benefits and contract changes which
reduced the power of unions.
The response from the CTM to the crisis was to back the de la Madrid administration’s
plan. This led to severe discontent amongst the union rank-and-file, manifesting as an increasing
number of strike petitions to Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions. The government took
a hard line, and in industries that fell under federal jurisdiction this was reflected in an average
strike approval of 1.8% (Middlebrook, 1995). Thus, whilst there was a historic high in strike
petitions there were fewer strikes than would be expected, and a large number of petitions
were deemed either illegal, or illegitimate by Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions. This
was possible as the board of these commissions both at Federal and ‘local’ level is comprised
of representatives from government, business and unions. The president of the Commission,
appointed by the Government, acts as the tie breaker in the case that union leaders and business
owners disagree. The ‘officialist’ unions were faced with growing discontent from their members,
and a government who refused to bow to their demands. The unions changed their demands;
instead of focusing on wages, CTM and the CT lobbied to save what they termed the ‘social
wage’, the non-wage benefits their workers received. They were successful in their demands. The
non-wage benefits bargained nationally included access to government subsidised union-owned
stores where their members could purchase discounted goods.
The collapse of the Mexican stock market in November 1987 led to a near-breakdown of
relation between the state and labour organisations. Unions and the CTM wanted to avoid
further cuts to public expenditure. These would inevitably affect their funding, as well as public
sector jobs which were unionised. These concerns and the erosion of wages led the unions to
threaten a general strike. After lengthy negotiations the ‘Pacto de Solidaridad Economica’9
was signed by representatives from the Government, peasant, labour and business sectors. The
agreement was placed to rein in inflation, and to this extent it succeeded. The CT and unions
ensured that they gained something from this pact, and were rewarded with increased access to
8Middlebrook (1995) notes that at the beginning of the de la Madrid administration there were 1,155 state
owned enterprises and investment funds, by the end of his term this number had significantly reduced to 412.
9Economic Solidarity Pact
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subsidised housing, food and credits. However, these concessions compensated workers little for
what they lost as a result of the government’s wage policy (Herna´ndez Laos, 2006).
2.2.6 The ‘era of the Dinosaurs’ and the rise of independent unions (1988–
Present)
The privatisation of government owned enterprises was continued by de la Madrid’s successor
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994). The effect of this on ‘official’ unions was marked, as it
weakened their traditional advantages of lobbying government and using their influence in polit-
ics to win concessions in terms of wages, working conditions and fringe benefits. Tulio Esquinca
and Melgoza Valdivia (2006) demonstrate that once these reforms were in place the next target
was the so-called contratos-ley which set common working conditions and wages in various sec-
tors.10 Furthermore, business interests lobbied for changes to the FLL to allow more flexibility
in hiring practices, as well as further restrictions to strikes. The reform to the FLL did not come
to pass, and the unions used what political capital they had to prevent it. However, the Salinas
administration achieved these aims without needing to redraw the FLL. The way these policies
were achieved was through the common use of ‘ghost unions’, unions which were unknown to
rank-and-file members but exploited the ‘closed shop’ provisions by preventing other unions
from organising in a particular workplace. During this period there was also a proliferation
of ‘employer protection contracts’, in which unaccountable union bosses agreed with employers
to uphold their stance; in other words, control the union on behalf of the firm (Bensusa´n and
Middlebrook, 2012c).
The government’s approach towards labour relations in the early to mid 1990s coincided
with a broad decline of unionisation. It was during this time period that the derogatory term
of ‘dinosaur’ entered Mexican popular parlance to refer to union and PRI leadership which was
primarily composed of elderly individuals, such as Fidel Vela´zquez, who had been running the
CTM since 1941. The perceived ineffectiveness of ‘officialist’ labour during the 1980s and early
1990s led to a rift in labour politics. Bensusa´n and Middlebrook (2012c) separate the factions
into ‘social’ trade unionism and ‘movement’ trade unionism. ‘Social’ trade unionists distance
themselves from government control, successfully negotiate contracts with employers as well as
hold a commitment to internal democracy. The ‘movement’ trade unionists are seen to be the
more belligerent wing of modern Mexican trade unionism. They have close ties to other social
10viz. Radio, Television, textile, rubber and sugar industries.
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movements and are more likely to strike.
Perhaps the watershed moment for these alternative currents in organised labour came with
the death of Fidel Vela´zquez in 1997. During the aftermath of his death the Union of National
Workers (UNT) formed and presented itself as a party-agnostic rival to the CTM. Initially
this union was quite successful in gaining new members, however, lately this trend seems to
have stalled. The rise of independent unionism, whilst related to the death of ‘dinosaurs’ such
as Vela´zquez, may also be attributed to shifts in Government economic strategy. The 1980s
and 1990s saw the movement towards an export oriented economy as well as structural changes
within the PRI. Both of these weakened the role of ‘officialist’ unions, and the increased political
competition which will be outlined in Section 2.4 meant that independent unionism became
relatively more attractive to workers.
Finally, another feature of organised labour in the last decade has been one of fragment-
ing movements. Independent unionism has either remained politically aloof, or in the case of
northern ‘white unions’, have supported PAN.11 ‘White unions’ are those that seek to work
with employers, and are often formed with the express consent of the business, and will not
be combative towards the employer. They are a regional phenomenon in Mexico, and have
been predominantly in the North, but since 2000 have begun to spread. (see Ramı´rez Sa´nchez,
2011) Other independent unions have sought to ally themselves with the Partido Revolucio´nario
Democra´tico (PRD)12.
2.2.7 Mexican unions today
The behaviour of private sector unions in the last decade will be the subject of inquiry of
this thesis. As the previous discussion has outlined unionisation in Mexico has faced several
structural changes from the transformation from a corporatist state-controlled unionisation to
the rise of independent unions. Thus, it becomes salient to ask, how has the rate of unionisation
changed over the last decade? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is controversial. There
are three main sources from which to derive union density.
First, are administrative records from STPS, the Secretariat for Labour and Social Welfare,
and the Local Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions. Although there is a legal requirement
for unions to keep their affiliate registry up-to-date with STPS and local Arbitration and Con-
11National Action Party, the Christian Democratic party of Mexico. For more details on Mexican politics see
subsection 2.4.1.
12Revolutionary Democratic Party, the left-wing offshoot of the PRI.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of working age male private union density in Mexico 1984–2016
Note: Author’s own calculation with ENIGH and ENOE.
ciliation Commissions, in practice this is rarely the case. As the raw numbers are not queried,
unions themselves are likely to inflate these numbers to appear stronger than they are (de la
Garza Toledo, 2006).
Second, there are establishment-level surveys. The Mexican statistics agency (INEGI) runs
ENESTYC, the National survey on labour, wages, technology and training in the manufactur-
ing sector; which collects union membership numbers. This survey is only available for the
manufacturing sector, and is also run infrequently, over the past two decades there have only
been five editions. Another challenge of this survey regards ‘ghost unions’. If an establishment
has a ‘ghost union’ then the unionisation rate will be inflated by these illegitimate, and illegal
practices.
Third, there are two household surveys which contain information on unionisation rates.
The Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) and Encuesta Nacional
de Ocupacio´n y Empleo (ENOE).13 ENIGH has temporal coverage from 1984 to the present,
with a biennial basis, Zapata (2005) and de la Garza Toledo (2006, 2012) suggest that it may
not be representative of unionised workers. ENOE, is a quarterly labour force survey that has a
complex survey design which is probabilistic, stratified, conglomerated and dual-phased. Start-
13These are the Household income and expenditure survey and the National Survey of Employment and Occu-
pation, respectively.
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ing in the first quarter of 2005, it has a rotating panel design where households are interviewed
for five consecutive quarters before being replaced to ensure that the sample remains nation-
ally representative. However, the union question is only asked in the extended questionnaire,
and thus far there have been thirteen editions of the expanded questionnaire.14 It should be
noted that the nature of the union question does not allow me to identify the specific union
an individual belongs to. I have harmonised the ENIGH and ENOE surveys to contain only
the sub-population of analysis for this thesis. Figure 2.1 plots union density for the period
1984–2016, where the density is defined as the rate of unionisation amongst working age males
in employment in the private sector. The figure captures the decline in unionisation that has
been suggested by the preceding discussion.
It is interesting to note that the male density follows the trends reported by Tulio Esquinca
and Melgoza Valdivia (2006). The early 2000s saw increases in the rate of unionisation. As
suggested earlier in this section, the most likely explanation for this increase is credible altern-
ative to ‘official’ unions. In more recent years, it seems that the gains made from independent
unionisation in the early part of the 2000s had been lost by 2006. Since then union density has
continued to decline.
2.3 Labour legislation, unions and strikes
2.3.1 The FLL and Unions
Labour regulation is dictated by the Constitution of 1917. Article 123 of the Constitution deals
with working hours and workplace conditions, occupational health and safety, minimum wages
and overtime pay, educational facilities for workers, labour unions and the right to strike, work
contracts, labour Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions, and consumer cooperatives. Whilst
the Constitution gives a general outline of a workers rights, these are further detailed in the FLL.
The FLL was first introduced in 1931, and received minor changes in the 1970s and 1980s. More
recently there has been a labour law reform which came into effect in 2013, although as noted
earlier, these reforms changed few things concerning unions and union regulation.
Some of the clauses in the FLL are very favourable to unions. For example, the law prohibits
employing replacement workers during officially recognised strikes, as well as requiring employers
to automatically deduct union fees from workers’ pay-cheques and distribute them directly to
14These are 2005q1–2006q1, 2007q2, 2008q2, 2009q1, 2010q1, 2011q1, 2012q1, 2013q1, 2014q1, 2015q1, and
2016q1.
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union officers. As noted earlier, this requirement, along with exclusion clauses, allowed for
perverse institutions such as ‘ghost unions’ to develop. These unions may be unknown to
workers, deduct membership dues and, in general, be an approach by which business owners
may deny workers their legal right to unionise, and ask for a collectively bargained contract. A
landmark 2001 legal ruling by the Supreme Court found exclusion clauses to violate the freedom
of association guaranteed in Article 123 of the Constitution (Lastra Lastra, 2002b).15 However,
‘ghost unions’ persist, but a worker who becomes aware of them may opt to leave such a union.
However, in practice this would almost certainly involve leaving one’s job, as employers are
under no obligation to renegotiate contracts. In theory, workers in such a firm are able to form
another union, and attempt to wrest the collective bargaining monopoly from the ‘ghost union’
through lengthy legal procedures.
Another example of union favourable legislation is Article 359 of the FLL which states that
collective contracts as agreed between management and unions may include ‘closed shop’ clauses.
However, these may not be used against workers who do not wish to unionise, and can apply
to all workers after the contract has been agreed. So, workers who join a firm after a union
contract has been imposed may be subjected to the contract. The current legal framework
does not generate incentives for democratic unionisation to exist. Indeed, ‘officialist’ unions are
beneficiaries from the legal framework as numerous clauses are favourable to both large unions,
and undemocratic unions at the expense of smaller independent democratic unions. The law
also places restrictions on union formation and internal practices.
The procedures for setting up a union are as follows. A group of at least twenty workers
has the legal right to form a union without prior authorisation. Note that the law envisages
unions to be founded at an establishment-level. However, gremial16 unions are also allowed.
All unions may associate with larger organisations. A new ‘union’ cannot begin operations
such as negotiating a collective contract with an employer or engage in other activities such as
strikes until it is officially registered by an Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. The FLL
places regulation of unions are under the jurisdiction of STPS. However, this only applies to
certain unions, and in general is not a straightforward matter. Public sector unions, and those
in certain key sectors are subject to federal oversight and thus face oversight from STPS and
are subject to the Federal Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. However, the majority
of firms, fall under local jurisdiction and thus are subject to state-level oversight under ‘local’
15This ruling however was only possible due to the Judiciary reforms outlined in section 2.4.
16Guild unions. These are allowed to span multiple workplaces but may only contain a single occupation.
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Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions. These commissions exist in every state, and in most
municipalities, and it is these Local Conciliation and Arbitration Commissions that are the
subject of investigation in Chapter 5.
Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions are tripartite institutions. The Commission is
comprised of a president who is designated by the government and has both voting and tie
breaking powers. The remaining members are representatives of large unions and employer
organisations. Registration procedures are straightforward, but are subject to ‘purposeful ad-
ministrative delay’ and political influence (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012c). Once a union has
successfully registered with the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission the union is entitled
to be involved in collective bargaining. However, the first union to organise labour in a firm
receives the monopoly over these negotiations. Other unions may mount legal challenges over
this, and usually the monopoly is awarded to the union which represents most workers, but this
too is subject to lengthy legal proceedings (Fairris, 2007). It should be noted that independent
unions are unlikely to sit in most Arbitration Commissions.
The FLL also regulates the internal workings of unions, it requires that unions have statues
and freely elect their officers but the law falls short of explicitly calling for secret ballots. Instead
elections of union members are stipulated by law to occur during plenary sessions. This lack
of anonymity coupled with exclusion clauses led to a democratic deficit within large unions.
This lack of internal democracy allows for union leadership to become unaccountable to the
rank-and-file members (Middlebrook, 1995; Fairris, 2006; Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012a).
An important tool that unions use to exert power is strike action, which is heavily regulated
under the FLL. A union who intends to strike must first make their grievances known in writing
to their employers. A copy of their grievance letter must then be sent to the relevant Arbitration
and Conciliation Commission. The letter must specify when work will be stopped if the griev-
ances are not resolved. The FLL states that this period, termed the ‘pre-strike period’, must last
at least a six working days for private sector firms. This grievance letter is termed a ‘petition
to strike’. The Commission will then call for a conciliation meeting and during the meeting
representatives for the union and the employer will attempt to solve the issue. If the workers, or
their representatives, do not turn up to this conciliation attempt, then the strike will be determ-
ined invalid by the Commission and as such illegal. It should be noted that the Commission is
legally allowed to call this meeting at any time of day and during any day of the week (Art.928
FLL). If the mediation efforts fail and the prerequisites are met then formal strike action may
20
commence. The mechanism through which the renewal of a collective bargaining contract is sig-
nalled is a petition to strike (Barba Garc´ıa, 2004). Thus far, the procedure for strikes has been
presented as a mechanical process. In reality this procedure, whilst straightforward is subject to
significant levels of discretion by the state governor (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012b). Under
the framework of the law the only valid reasons for threatening a strike are related to intra-firm
complaints. Legally, there is no scope for strikes to be threatened over wider political issues.
2.3.2 The FLL and Worker rights and entitlements
The FLL defines the working conditions that a worker may expect in employment. It also lays
out the requirements of employers with respect to their workers. It should be noted that whilst
the FLL applies equally to all workers, public sector workers, known as subsection ‘A’ workers,
who are not included in the analysis of this thesis, are subject to a different subsection of FLL
chapters than private sector workers. For all private sector workers, subsection ‘B’ of the law is
applied. Thus, a worker who is employed by someone else is subject to labour management law
regardless of having a written contract and all provisions of the FLL apply. The FLL describes
this relationship, and the obligations and responsibilities of each party.
The FLL also outlines a number of mandatory non-wage benefits that must be provided
directly by an employer. These include, but are not limited to: Aguinaldo, or Bonus. This is
a mandatory annual payment that must be equivalent to a minimum of 15 working days salary
(Clause V Art.89 FLL). If the worker did not complete a full year at the firm they are entitled
to the pro rata equivalent. If a worker leaves their employment17 prior to the bonus being paid
out, usually in December, they are entitled as part of their severance payments to take the
proportion of the bonus earned.
Chapter IV of the FLL entitles workers to six days of paid holiday once they have been
employed for a year, and each additional year at the firm secures another day of paid leave.
Once twelve days has been reached an additional two days are accrued every five years with the
firm. It should be noted that this does not include national holidays18, which are considered
paid leave days, regardless of one’s seniority at the firm.
The FLL and the Law of Social Security stipulate that all workers in an worker-employer
relationship must be registered with the Instuto Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS)19.20 This
17Regardless of choosing to leave, being made redundant, or being fired.
18There are usually six legally mandated public holidays per year.
19Mexican Institute of Social Security
20Workers subject to subsection ‘A’ of the law have similar, albeit separate social security institutions. Rather
21
allows workers to obtain certain benefits such as Health Care,21 and Pensions.
As a result of the 1980s debt crisis the Mexican pensions system was migrated to a defined
contribution system. Workers enrolled with social security have 7.75% of their base salary
deducted and paid to IMSS, with employers expected to contribute for each worker the equivalent
of 5.15% of their salary towards pension contributions and finally the state ‘tops-up’ pension
payments with 5.5% of the minimum wage in Mexico city and 0.225% of each salary towards
pension contributions. Of the worker contributions, 2 percentage points are destined towards a
retirement fund, and 3.15 percentage points towards a pension fund. These differ as workers may
voluntarily retire prior to the old age retirement pension, but will be unable to access this money
until later in life. Finally, as part of clause XII of Article 123 of the Constitution employers
are responsible for worker housing. Until the 1970s that clause was not enforced, in 1973
the Echeverr´ıa administration (1970–1976) sought to meet this constitutional requirement, and
founded the Instituto Nacional del Fondo de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT)22.
It is a compulsory scheme were employers must pay the equivalent of 5% of a worker’s salary.
These funds were originally solely for a state provided housing provident fund. It has now
developed into a full credit scheme that serves as the basis for Latin America’s largest mortgage
fund. Prior to the 1990s CTM controlled INFONAVIT disbursements and union membership
was a near requirement for obtaining INFONAVIT credits (see Middlebrook, 1995, p.296). The
Salinas administration reformed this, inflicting a further blow to ‘officialist’ unions. INFONAVIT
credit eligibility is now based on a transparent points system relating to a number of worker
characteristics including total number of contribution-years, the size of their contribution, their
firm tenure, etc. INFONAVIT contributions are considered part of pensions as affiliates are both
the source of the deposit fund, and as such earn some return for their money being invested, as
well as a source for generating household equity.
Workers may also voluntarily top-up these funds. Pension contributions whilst paid to IMSS
are managed by Administradoras de Fondos de Retiro (AFORES).23 The pension reform of 1997
was modelled in the Chilean 1980s reform, as such pensions were made into defined contribution
accounts that are worker specific, and they follow the worker regardless of where they are
employed. Pension contributions prior to 1997 were made by employers to their preferred pension
than being registered with IMSS they are registered with the Public sector analogue Instituto de Seguridad Social
y Servicios de Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE).
21This is provided by the IMSS directly. In theory, any formal worker should have access to subsidised health
care.
22National Institute for the Worker housing fund
23Retirement Fund Administrators
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fund, in their designated bank; since 1997 all pension contributions go to a default ‘concentrated
account’. Workers may opt-out of this account into different private AFORES which will invest
their retirement contributions.
It is also worthwhile to note that although in many respects Mexico saw a series of insti-
tutional changes throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as will be detailed briefly in the following
section, labour legislation did not change until 2013. There were minor procedural reforms to
the text of the FLL in the 1970s and 1980s, but neither of these affected the articles regarding
the oversight of unions. For much of the 1980s and 1990s there was national discussion of re-
forming and making radical changes in the FLL, but none of these came to pass. In 2012, during
the dying days of the Caldero´n Presidency, a reform to the FLL was agreed and was allowed
passage through both Congress and Senate by a PRI majority. Notable changes include the
removal of the most excessive clauses such as Article 359, in recognition of the 2001 Supreme
Court judgement of freedom of union association. Equally, Unions managed to negotiate such
that strike days may also be remunerated, up to a maximum of one month (Clause VII Art.429
FLL).
2.4 Mexican Politics, Political and institutional reform
2.4.1 Main political actors
Mexico is a multi-party federal democracy, with three main political parties. These are the PAN,
PRI, and PRD. Though there are other political parties, these three account for the majority
of seats at all levels of government during the period under analysis for this thesis. Mexico
has three levels of government. As a federal state there is the national Government, led by the
President, elected every six years. There is the legislative branch, or Congress, which consists of
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the upper and lower legislative chambers, respectively.
Both of these hold elections every three years, where in each election half of each chamber is
replaced. Until 2016, when Mexico city was given State status, Mexico was made up of 31
autonomous States. Each of these states elect a Governor who serves a six year term. Each state
has its own unicameral legislative branch which holds triennial elections. The final elected level
of government is the Municipality, these elect Municipal Presidents triennially, and represent
the smallest administrative unit of government. It is worthwhile to note that the constitution
enshrined the Maderista ideal of no re-election. The result of this requirement, is that until the
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2015 politico-electoral reform, for all political offices there was absolutely no re-election. This
means that at every political level there is no continuity amongst individuals, and the political
party itself is very important as only they maintain continuity and select candidates. Prior
to the 1990s to all extents and purposes that meant the most important elections were those
internal to the PRI. One final point is that politicians may move between different government
levels.
PRI is the longest lived party of the three. As outlined in section 2.2, the PRI ruled Mexico
for 71 years, under the name of the PNR and PRM. It emerged as a party at the conclusion of
the Mexican Revolution. The constitutional requirement that there is no re-election meant that
for 71 years there has been a lack of continuity of politicians within roles. Politicians within the
PRI were originally drawn from the ranks of the Military. Over time the political class from the
PRI became more corrupt. The PRI maintained control of the country through ‘democratic’
elections which are widely acknowledged to have been fraudulent. As Gillingham (2012) outlines
the PRI’s strategy to maintaining power was both case-specific but in general had four broad
features. Firstly there was a general permissiveness in allowing for the existence of opposition
parties such as PAN, as it lent it credibility in the international stage (Camp, 2003). Second,
they effectively played a ‘meta-game’ of adjusting legislation, both electoral and other related
laws to benefit the party and those factions which support them (Gillingham, 2012). Thirdly,
as has been discussed earlier, one of the pillars of this structure was the co-opting of organised
labour and the creation of ‘officialist’ unions. Finally, total electoral control was also achieved
through intimidation, disenfranchisement and co-opting of opposition actors. Further electoral
manipulation was achieved through control on the key actors and events of the election day
itself. Examples of this control range from the Secretario de Gobernacio´n,24 who was in charge
of the pre-1988 electoral institutions, to the members of the public involved in vote counting.
Naturally, the sophistication of corrupt practices, and perhaps the brazen nature of the electoral
manipulation increased over time.
The high watermark of PRI corruption and the beginning of the end for the ‘era of the
dinosaurs’ was the 1988 elections. Prior to this electoral process a PRI member, Cuahute´moc
Ca´rdenas Solo´rzano25 broke away from the party, as they had ‘strayed’ from the revolutionary
ideals that underpinned PRI ideology. He sought to run for presidency. However, at the time
electoral law was such that only ‘officially’ recognised political parties may nominate candid-
24Interior Minister, equivalent in remit to Home Office Secretary.
25The son of former president Lazaro Ca´rdenas
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ates.26 Ca´rdenas convinced smaller leftist parties, that had previously lent PRI legitimacy by
running as a type of permanent opposition, to unite as a coalition with him as their candidate.
The election campaign was closely fought, and on election day the results from exit polls demon-
strated how unexpectedly a majority of voters had swung away from the PRI, despite all of the
control institutions at its disposal. The Government was forced to announce that the computer
system for tabulating votes had ‘crashed’. The official results announced that Carlos Salinas de
Gortari had won. This is now known to have been a fraudulent result27 (Camp, 2012).28 How-
ever, Mexican civil society did not believe the result, and all non-PRI parties publicly questioned
the result.
Nevertheless, the electoral result stood. However, the PRI was plunged into a weak position.
The electoral results for Congress suggested that the PRI had lost its majority for the first
time, and the next largest party was PAN. Lujambio (2001)29 reports that PAN officials at the
time agreed not to contest the outcome, conditional on meaningful electoral reform, and the
recognition of all legitimate electoral victories. This deal was certainly helped by the fact that
the proposed policies of the Salinas administration were closer politically to those proposed by
PAN, with a strong bent on shifting Mexico further into an export-oriented economy, whereas the
policy mix suggested by a potential Ca´rdenas administration would have represented a return
to the state controlled import substitution policies (Bruhn, 2012).
PAN was founded in 1939, as a reactionary oppositional party against the perceived radical
left-wing policies of the Lazaro Ca´rdenas PRM government by the former Dean of the Univer-
sidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico (UNAM)30. The movement gained members from those
supporting catholic conservativism, and those who fought in the Cristero War (1926—1929)
against the State in its secularist, anti-clerical policies. PAN remained as a marginalised polit-
ical movement for much of the 1950s. However, it adopted a strategy of contesting elections at
all levels despite the widespread fraud, in particular ensuring candidates were run for Municipal
President. PRI maintained the of illusion of democracy by allowing some electoral victories to
their opponents (Lujambio, 2001). It was through these hard fought victories that the PAN
26This would remain the case until a 2008 Inter-American court of Human Rights decreed the Governments
change legislation to allow independent candidates.
27Former president de la Madrid’s autobiography confirms the fraud. The ballots were burned after the election
to cover up the scandal.
28The unanticipated margin of the election, meant that during the ‘manual’ vote count that followed the PRI
rushed some of the most brazen vote-stuffing of urns (Bruhn, 2012).
29An academic who was member of PAN, and later went on to serve as secretary of Health in the Caldero´n
administration until his death in 2011.
30Autonomous National University of Mexico
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maintained its national relevance. The increased political competition due to international pres-
sure led to the successful election of a PAN governor in the State of Baja California Norte in
1989. The electoral reforms outlined in the following subsection paved the way to the 2000
presidential election, where PAN gained control of the presidency, breaking the 71 year rule of
PRI. Although, PAN may politically be described as a Christian Democratic party, which ideo-
logically covers the centre-right, its policies towards unions have not been adversarial. Indeed,
they were known for being actively associated with ‘white unions’. Furthermore, the years of
political opposition against a party which relied on union friendly policies meant that they too
needed to adopt policies which were broadly friendly to unions. This was particularly the case
after the election of Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006) a former Coca-Cola executive and PAN’s
presidential candidate. After the watershed elections of 2000, there was a concern that pro-PRI
industrial action would paralyse the country. Consideration for these concerns meant that that
the policies adopted by the first PAN administration could not radically dismantle the structures
that had sustained the previous corporatist–authoritarian regime (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook,
2012a). Finally, it is of note that PAN won a further presidential election in 2006 under Fe-
lipe Caldero´n Hinojosa (2006–2012) thus maintaining continuity in the democratic transition.
However, much of the Caldero´n administration (2006–2012) would be overshadowed by the 2008
global economic downturn, and the escalating violence of the Drug War.
The final political actor that will be considered in this chapter is the PRD.31 This political
party is the smallest and youngest party considered here. The PRD was founded by Cuahute´moc
Ca´rdenas and is the result of the broad left alliance which saw him nominated for the 1988
elections. The PRD is less electorally successful than either other political actor considered
thus far; they have never reached the presidency, nor have they controlled either chamber of
Congress. The PRD has been successful in winning municipal presidencies, the office of Mayor
of Mexico City and a few governorships. In the 2006 presidential elections, the former Mayor
of Mexico City, Andre´s Manue´l Lo´pez Obrador narrowly lost the election to the PAN candidate
Caldero´n. In the weeks that followed the PRD and Lo´pez Obrador would go on to claim that
there were electoral irregularities which led to this result, they were directly echoing the 1988
results. However, the electoral reforms enacted in the 1990s, as outlined in the following section,
suggest that this ‘fraud’ is unlikely to have happened. Lo´pez Obrador ran for president once
more in the 2012 presidential elections, and again came in second by a narrow margin. Once
31Party of the Democratic Revolution
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more he claimed there were electoral irregularities, and the subsequent fallout within his party
meant he broke away from them. Nevertheless, the role of the left in Mexican democratisation
was crucial. The Ca´rdenas bid for the presidency in 1988 was the key moment, which created
the preconditions for subsequent democratisation.
2.4.2 COFIPE, IFE and State Electoral authorities
The controversy over the 1988 presidential election result led to the passing of the Co´digo Federal
de Institucio´nes y Procedimientos Electorales (COFIPE)32 in 1990, which created the Instituto
Federal Electoral (IFE).33 This was initially envisioned as another dependency of government,
which fell under the oversight of Congress and the Executive branch.34 This remained the case
until the reforms of 1996, which made it independent of any branch of government. Whilst
COFIPE focused on strengthening the role of the electoral institutions in Mexico, it only dealt
with elections at a federal level. Nevertheless, these changes in the nature of elections led to
increases in political competitiveness for Congress and Senate positions, which in turn led to
further reforms to COFIPE in 1993, 1996, and 2007. Of importance for this thesis is the reform
of 1996, which required all electoral authorities to become independent of the state and have
their own legal personality separate from the state. This in effect converted the previously
existing state electoral authorities into a variety of electoral institutes, which oversaw elections
for Governor and Municipal President.
One of the final pieces of reform which is key for this analysis is the strengthening of the
Judiciary. Prior to the 1990s the Judicial branch of government was not particularly independ-
ent of oversight from the executive or legislative branches. The PRI faced with the increased
likelihood of losing the following presidential election of 1994 undertook a series of ambitious
reforms as a sort of ‘Ulysses pact’ (see Eisenstadt and Yelle, 2012). In particular these reforms in-
cluded gave the judiciary oversight over electoral matters, by creating the Tribunal Electoral del
Poder Jucidial de la Federacio´n (TEPJF).35 It was tasked with ensuring election disputes were
resolved. A further judicial reform in 1994, ensured that the Judiciary branch of Government
was strengthened with the introduction of independent councils ensuring rigorous standards.
Finkel (2005) suggests that the strengthening of the Judiciary was a type of ‘insurance policy’
to ensure that the institutional changes such as the COFIPE would be irreversible, even under
32Federal code of Procedures and Electoral Institutions
33Federal Electoral Institute
34Indeed, the first President of IFE was the then secretary for Gobernacio´n, Fernando Gutie´rrez Barrios.
35Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judiciary Power.
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a different political administration. Once granted independence, the Judiciary went to great
lengths to express its independence by showing it held no loyalty to the PRI party. A prominent
example is the 1998 ruling on the unconstitutionality of electoral rules in the state of Quintana
Roo, which would have handed the PRI control of the state legislature.36 It was these types of
state level judicial battles, coupled with the COFIPE 1996 reform, which laid the groundwork
for the watershed elections of 2000 when the PRI lost the presidency to the PAN party.
2.5 Discussion
This chapter has outlined the entwined history between organised labour and the PRI party,
which ruled Mexico for 71 years. As has been outlined, unions were co-opted into the PRI
party formally. This was a double edged sword; ‘officialist’ unions were beneficiaries as post-
revolutionary labour legislation was written to benefit unions. However, the legislation also
placed restrictions on the formation and behaviour of unions, as well as a strict regime of
oversight over strikes. These perverse institutions were utilised by the PRI to maintain control
over its corporatist–authoritarian regime. Labour legislation was explicitly drafted to ensure that
unions were favourable to government, and actively discouraged the formation of independent
unionism.
The result of the 1988 presidential election, which is widely acknowledged to be fraudulent,
led to the creation of institutions which would eventually lead to Mexican democratisation.
These political developments coupled with the shifting government economic policy meant that
unions lost importance to the PRI, and thus became marginalised. The creation of strong insti-
tutions in the form of independent judiciary and electoral authorities ensured Mexico continued
its democratic transition. The remainder of this thesis will analyse how these institutional
changes have affected the behaviour of unions.
36This was due to the PRI’s introduction of a clause of governability, where the party to gain the largest share
of the vote would be allocated the most seats in the assembly, so for example a party winning with 20% of the
popular vote would be given over 50% of the seats in the assembly.
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Appendix A
Chronology of Mexican Presidents
Table A.1: List of Mexican Presidents (1917–Present)
Name Years Party Notes
Venustiano Carranza 1917–1920 PLC Held power since 1914 as head of
Constitutional Army. Was formally
elected in 1917, killed in Rebellion
spearheaded by A´lvaro Obrego´n
Adolfo de la Huerta 1920 Interim President, came in through
a coup d’e´tat. Headed failed milit-
ary uprising in 1928.
A´lvaro Obrego´n 1920-1924 PLM Assassinated days after second
electoral win in 1928.
Plutarco El´ıas Calles 1924–1928 PLM At end of presidency founded PNR
PNR, PRM, and PRI rule
Emilio Portes Gil 1928–1930 PNR Appointed as Interim Presid-
ent after assassination of A´lvaro
Obrego´n, puppet of Calles.
Pascual Ortiz Rubio 1930–1932 PNR Won 1929 elections, resigned due to
Calles interventions in government
Abelardo L. Rodr´ıguez 1932–1934 PNR Interim president appointed by
Congress, puppet of Calles.
La´zaro Ca´rdenas 1934–1940 PNR Won 1934 elections, outman-
oeuvred Calles, began process
of nationalising key industries.
Rebranded PNR into PRM, and
subsumed unions into party.
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. . . continued
Name Years Party Notes
Manuel A´vila Camacho 1940–1946 PRM Rebranded PRM into PRI, intro-
duced IMSS.
Miguel Alema´n Valde´s 1946–1952 PRI
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 1952–1958 PRI
Adolfo Lo´pez Mateos 1958–1964 PRI
Gustavo Dı´az Ordaz 1964–1970 PRI
Luis Echeverr´ıa 1970–1976 PRI
Jose´ Lo´pez Portillo 1976–1982 PRI
Miguel de la Madrid 1982–1988 PRI Implemented IMF structural ad-
justment programmes
Carlos Salinas de Gortari 1988–1994 PRI Contentions election followed by
further privatisations, economic lib-
eralisation, some electoral reform
Ernesto Zedillo 1994–2000 PRI Judiciary Reform, further electoral
reforms
Democratisation
Vicente Fox 2000–2006 PAN Winner of watershed 2000 election,
breaking 71 years of PRI rule
Felipe Caldero´n 2006–2012 PAN Ramped up Mexican drug war, fur-
ther electoral reform, FLL reform.
Enrique Pen˜a Nieto 2012–Present PRI
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Chapter 3
What have Mexican unions done to
wages over the last decade?
3.1 Introduction
This chapter estimates the union wage premium for Mexico. Until very recently, Mexican labour
legislation remained virtually unchanged since the introduction of the Ley Federal del Trabajo
(FLL) in the 1930s. In the past three decades Mexico has unilaterally opened up to international
trade, faced a currency crisis and joined the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Over the period 1982–2016 the Mexican economy experienced six recessions.1 The effects of
these macroeconomic events on labour market institutions has not been fully explored. This
chapter aims to elucidate the role of Mexican unions on the wage bargaining process during
a period of macroeconomic change and uncertainty with a particular emphasis on the period
2005–2016. A key objective of the chapter is to provide a clear indication of the trends in the
union premium over this period.
The analysis in this chapter utilises a novel dataset which has not been used to date in the
literature to interrogate the union wage gap in Mexico. The analysis employs the Encuesta
Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo (ENOE)2, a richly detailed labour force survey conducted on
a quarterly basis. The analysis is split along two questions, the first asks “What have Mexican
unions done to wages in the last decade?”, whilst the second asks “Did unions in Mexico wield
1The 1982 debt crisis, the side effects of the structural adjustment programmes, the 1994 Peso crisis, the
manufacturing crash related to the 2000 dotcom bust, the 2008 recession induced by the global financial crisis,
a subsequent recession and a recession in 2016. These are the officially measured turning peak–trough turning
points of the OECD Composite coincident indicator, which is the official measure of the economic cycle in Mexico.
2National Employment and Occupation survey
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a ‘sword-of-justice’ across the wage distribution over the last decade?”
The first question is assessed through a temporal analysis which focuses on a representative
quarter for each year and applies the well known Blinder (1973) / Oaxaca (1973) decomposition
to quantify the union wage gap. A set of instruments is exploited to account for the endogen-
ous nature of the wage gap using a Lee (1978) endogenous switching model3, and a selectivity
corrected decomposition is computed. The estimates of the union wage gap are further comple-
mented by evidence from individual fixed-effects regressions. I then provide a synthesis of all of
the competing estimates.
The effect of unions on the wage distribution is investigated by using a variance decom-
position methodology, analogous to the mean decomposition. The effect of unions across the
conditional wage distribution is then investigated by the application of quantile regression tech-
niques.
This chapter is arranged in the following way. Section 3.2 provides a brief background on
unions in Mexico as well as a review of the existing literature on union wage gaps in Latin
America and other developed countries. Sections 3.3 contains a discussion of suitable datasets,
and the data the present study utilises. Section 3.4 outlines the econometric methodology.
Section 3.5 presents the results, and finally Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background and Literature Review
It is well documented that in Mexico there was a corporatist system which allied unions with
the Partido Revolucio´nario Institucional (PRI).4 This alliance gave ‘officialist’ unions a great
deal of political influence and was aided by a legislative framework which prevented the growth
of independent unions (Middlebrook, 1995).
The legislative framework under which unions in Mexico are regulated is laid out both in
the Constitution and the FLL.5 Some of the clauses in the law are very favourable to unions.
For example, it prohibits employing replacement workers during officially recognised strikes, as
well as requiring employers to automatically deduct union fees from workers’ pay-cheques and
distribute them directly to union officers. Whilst ‘official’ unions benefited from this law, they
were also subject to regulation regarding the formation and practices of trade unions. The pro-
3Not to be confused with the Lee (1983) multinomial selection correction procedure.
4Translated in English as Institutional Revolutionary Party.
5The Federal Labour Law was first introduced in 1931, and was subject to minor amendments in the 1970s
and 1980s. More recently there has been a labour law reform which came into effect in 2013.
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cedures for establishing a union are as follows. A group of at least twenty workers has the legal
right to form a union without prior authorisation. This union cannot negotiate a collective con-
tract with an employer or engage in other activities such as strikes until it is officially registered
by an Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. This is a tripartite arrangement where the
president of the board is designated by the government, and there are representatives of both
union and employer organisations. Registration procedures are straightforward, but are subject
to ‘purposeful administrative delay’ and political influence (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012c).
Once a union has successfully registered with the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission the
union is entitled to be involved in collective bargaining. However, the first union to organise
labour in a firm enjoys the monopoly control over these negotiations. Other unions may mount
legal challenges on this, and usually the monopoly is awarded to the union which represents the
majority of workers (Fairris, 2007).
The FLL also regulates the internal workings of unions. It requires that unions have statutes
and freely elect their officers but the law falls short of explicitly calling for secret ballots. Indeed,
the election of union officers is stipulated by law to occur during plenary sessions. This lack
of internal democracy allows for union bosses to become unaccountable to the rank-and-file
members (Middlebrook, 1995).
An important tool that unions use to exert their power is strike action, which is heavily
regulated under the FLL. A union which intends to strike must first make its grievance known
in writing to its employers. This grievance letter is termed a petition to strike. A copy of their
grievance letter must then be sent to the local Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. The
letter must specify when work will be stopped if the grievances are not resolved. The FLL states
that this period termed the pre-strike period must last at least six working days. The Arbitration
and Conciliation Commission, may call for a mediation meeting in which representatives of the
union and the employer attempt to resolve the issue. If the workers do not turn up to this
conciliation attempt, then the strike will be determined invalid by the Commission and as such
illegal. If the mediation efforts fail and the prerequisites are met then formal strike action
may commence. It should be noted that the mechanism by which the renewal of a collective
bargaining contract is signalled is through a petition to strike (Barba Garc´ıa, 2004).
Figure 3.1 plots the Mexican union density rate over the period 1984–2016. In this figure
the shaded areas denote recessionary periods as defined by the Mexican statistics agency. These
recessions are determined by the composite coincident indicators methodology devised by the
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of union density in Mexico 1984–2016
Note: Author’s own calculation with Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos
de los Hogares (ENIGH) and ENOE. Shaded areas are recessions (see text).
OECD.6 From this plot it should be clear that the effect of the business cycle on the density
of union members is weakly negative.7 In the past three decades there has been a declining
trend in unionisation rates, which began in the 1990s. This is likely related to the break in the
alliance between the state and ‘official’ unions during the 1980s, and the wave of privatisations
that subsequently followed. Since the 1980s there has also been an increase in ‘ghost’ unions.
These are unions established by management as a way of preventing further unionisation from
occurring (Middlebrook, 1995; Bensusa´n, 2007; Fairris, 2006).
It is interesting to note that Tulio Esquinca and Melgoza Valdivia (2006) report a larger
rate of unionisation in the early 2000s. One possible explanation for this is the rise of a cred-
ible alternative to ‘official’ unions. In more recent years, it seems that the gains made from
independent unionisation in the early part of this century had been eroded by 2008. Since then
union density has continued to decline.
Putting these figures into an international context, the trend is broadly similar to that noted
for other Latin American countries and in particular Chile (Landerretche et al., 2011; Rios-
Avila and Hirsch, 2014). The pattern observed for developed countries has also exhibited a slow
6The composite index for Mexico is comprised of Monthly changes in manufacturing employment, Employment
in manufacturing , Finished goods stocks (manufacturing), Production (manufacturing), Yield of 10-year US
federal Government securities , Cost managing deposits for banks, Real effective exchange rates
7This is confirmed by a naive regression including a dummy for recession years and an interaction with a time
trend.
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decline, with the 1980s providing a watershed moment when deunionisation began. Mexico’s
trajectory is therefore not unique. However, there are some notable features in Figure 3.1. In
particular, union density rates do not respond to recessions in a systematic fashion.
Focusing on the most recent period of union decline it is relevant to ask what has happened
to wage determination in the union sector over this period, and it is this question on which the
remainder of this chapter attempts to inform.
3.2.1 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature on union/nonunion wage gaps for developed countries.8 Overall
there is a consensus amongst labour economists that the union wage gap for the USA is in the
range of 10–20% (Fuchs et al., 1998). Lewis (1986b) surveys the research for the USA from
1968–1979 and finds that after adjusting for differences in characteristics the union wage gap
ranges from 9.6–16.4%. Jarrell and Stanley (1990) take the studies that Lewis surveyed and
perform a meta–analysis for the USA from 1968–1979. They find that the union wage gap
ranges between 8.9–12.4%. Similar magnitudes have been found for other developed countries
(Pencavel, 1974; Stewart, 1983; Robinson and Tomes, 1984; Callan and Reilly, 1993).
Union status, however, is not randomly determined (Robinson, 1989). Numerous studies
have attempted to address this issue with selection methods such as those proposed by Lee
(1978), Heckman (1979), or Lee (1983) with varying degrees of success (Lewis, 1986a). The
studies have struggled to ascertain in which direction the bias is likely to be. Budd and Na
(2000) exploit instruments related to the ability of unions to influence the USA state-level
political process and find that, once selection is controlled for, the wage premium is greater. In
contrast, Booth and Bryan (2004) use British data from an employer-employee linked survey,
and detect positive selection into unions, once this is accounted for the union wage premium
disappears. Main and Reilly (1992) use British data to estimate the union wage gap for females,
controlling for selection into unions and employment status. Once this is taken into account
the wage gap is found to be smaller. The identification of selection effects in this literature is
difficult. Unsurprisingly, this has been due to the difficulty in finding instruments that shift the
probability of joining a union but not the wage level.
More recent studies for developed countries have focused on trying to find causal estimates
of the union wage gap using regression discontinuity design procedures. DiNardo and Lee (2004)
8For an exhaustive review of the earlier literature see Lewis (1963, 1986a)
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Table 3.1: Selected Studies on the Wage Gap
Author Year of Data Country Wage Gap Estimate
Aggregate Data Studies
Throop (1968) 1950 & 1960 USA 10–30%
Pencavel (1974) 1964 UK 0–10%
Microeconometric individual level studies using mean analysis
Johnson and Youmans (1971) 1965–1966 USA 34%
Stewart (1983) 1975 UK 7.7
Callan and Reilly (1993) 1987 Ireland 20.5%
Microeconometric individual level studies using quantile regression
Manquilef-Ba¨chler et al. (2009) 1991 & 2003 UK 0–20%
Rios-Avila and Hirsch (2014) 2007 & 2008 USA 3.6–21%
Developing countries
Schultz and Mwabu (1998)† 1993 S. Africa 19–145%
Fields and Yoo (2000) 1986 & 1993 S. Korea 3–6%
Menezes-Filho et al. (2005)‡ 1988–1998 Brazil 12%
Landerretche et al. (2013)† 2002–2009 Chile 20%
Panagides and Patrinos (1994) 1989 Mexico 10.4%
Fairris (2003) 1984 & 1996 Mexico 12–18%
? Lower and upper bounds given by 10th and 90th percentile estimates, respectively.
† denotes a quantile regression study, ‡ reflects enterprise-level data.
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focus on the results of contested union elections in enterprises and they find that there are short-
run differences in terms of wages between those that narrowly voted in unions versus those that
rejected them. This approach was then developed further by Frandsen (2012) who matched the
election data with confidential household information. He concludes that unions exert a strong
effect on wages for those at the lower ends of the pay distribution, where a union win increases
wages at the bottom decile by as much as 0.30 log points.
Estimates for union wage differentials and the impact on wage dispersion were recently
surveyed by Freeman (2010) as part of an overview of labour markets in developing countries.
The evidence for Africa predominantly focused on wage effects. The wage premium in South
Africa for unions is found to range between 8–40% at the mean. Schultz and Mwabu (1998)
estimate the union wage gap across the conditional wage distribution in South Africa, and find
that the wage gap for Africans is greater at the lower ends of the pay distribution and, not
surprisingly, decreases with movement up the wage distribution. Their findings suggest those at
the bottom end of the distribution workers have seen their wages increase by 145%, whilst those
in the top decile experience a more modest 19% advantage. Butcher and Rouse (2001) replicate
the Schultz and Mwabu study with different data and apply more controls. They find that the
wage premium monotonically decreases along the wage distribution. This suggests the existence
of a ‘sword-of-justice’ effect, wherein unions compress the pay distribution. Their estimates
suggest that those at the lower ends of the distribution earn an extra 32%, whilst those at the
top enjoy a more modest premium of just 6.7%. Finally, the mean wage gap is found to be
20%. Thus, on the whole, both studies conclude that the wage distribution is compressed by the
presence of unions. Hofmeyr and Lucas (2001) apply a series of selection correction techniques
to the analysis of the mean wage gap. They find, that dependent on the type of correction
mechanism, the wage gap for urban African males increased over the period 1985–1993 from
8% to 20%. Blunch and Verner (2004) report an estimated wage gap of about 6% for Ghana.
Baah (2005) reports that the Ghana wage gap increased ranges between 7.8 and 12.6 percentage
points in 1992 and 1999. Both studies conclude that unions in Ghana decrease the dispersion of
wages. It is worth noting that all of these studies relate to the union wage gap for the formal
sector. Coverage of union wage effects in the informal sector is, to the best of my knowledge,
non-existent, primarily because unions do not organise in these sectors.
Asian estimates of the union wage gap vary by country. Bhandari (2008) reports evidence
for a small sample of Indian workers and his findings suggest a wage gap of 6% for contract
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workers, while permanent workers secure a wage gap of 25%. The wage gap for South Korea is
found to be small, Fields and Yoo (2000) study the evolution of the gap over a period of rapid
union growth. They report that despite these increases in density, and hence bargaining ability,
the gap simply rose from 3% to 6%. Park (2008) finds an all-worker wage differential of 5%, and
when disaggregated by gender finds the gap to be 12% and 2% for women and men, respectively.
Turning to the Latin American literature, Arbache and Carneiro (1999) report a wage
premium of 5–7% in the manufacturing sector for Brazil. In contrast, Menezes-Filho et al.
(2005) detect a union wage effect of 12% for Brazil, using establishment-level data. The Ur-
uguayan dictatorship of 1973–1984 outlawed collective bargaining. Casoni et al. (2005) provide
evidence for Uruguay in the period subsequent to the return of democracy, finding that unions
increased wages by up to 7.5%. Landerretche et al. (2011, 2013) report evidence for the union
wage differential for Chile using panel data for 2002–2009. They correct for endogeneity of union
status and find that the corrected union wage gap ranges between 18.6–24%. Rios-Avila and
Hirsch (2012, 2014) study the union wage effect for Bolivia and Chile across the wage distri-
bution and apply the Firpo et al. (2009) decomposition technique, which allows the effects of
subsets of variables to be isolated.9 They find that the Chilean union wage gap is immutable
across the wage distribution at about 20%, whilst the Bolivian raw union wage gap is found to
be between 20-35% across the wage distribution. They find in both cases that the wage structure
accounts for about half of the gap, and also note that unions reduce wage dispersion. Panagides
and Patrinos (1994) report the union wage gap in Mexico. They apply a Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position and determine that the all-worker union/nonunion wage gap for 1989 is 10.4%. Fairris
(2003) reports the treatment component of a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and finds that the
adjusted union mark-up declined from 19% in 1984 to 14% in 1996.
This brief summary of the academic literature on the union wage gap has shown the following
stylized facts: First, there is a union wage gap. The raw mean wage gap is found to range
between 10–70%, when adjusted for observable characteristics it reduces to a more modest 3–
30%. Second, it appears that the union-mark-up is associated with union density, although
increases in one will not translate in a one-for-one relationship. Third, there are concerns about
the non-random nature of union status. In general, the literature has not come to a consensus
on the direction of bias due to selection, and it appears to be context specific. Finally, unions
are found to have a ‘sword-of-justice’ effect across the wage distribution. They compress the
9However, even with this approach there remains an identification problem; where estimates for sub-groups of
variables are sensitive to the base group used in estimation.
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wage distribution by ensuring that wage gains are greatest for those at the bottom end of the
distribution, whilst those at the upper end enjoy a more modest advantage. The remainder of
this chapter will now focus on interrogating these stylized facts for Mexico over the last decade.
3.3 Data
In this section the sample data and variables used in the analysis are discussed in depth and
some descriptive statistics presented.
3.3.1 Data and sample construction
Previous studies on the economic impacts of unions in Mexico have exploited the ENIGH.
These are household surveys for which data are available on a biennial basis.10 The survey has
a complex design that is probabilistic, stratified, and multi-staged. Although this is a household
income-expenditure survey it has been favoured by researchers over the traditional labour force
surveys for being the only one which includes a question on union membership.
There are numerous caveats with ENIGH,11 and the insufficient coverage of labour market
data is a large concern with this survey. Furthermore, Zapata (2005) and de la Garza Toledo
(2006, 2012) suggest that it may not be representative of unionised workers. For this reason I
use the ENOE. The temporal coverage of this survey begins in the first quarter of 2005. The
survey is conducted quarterly and its coverage includes 120,260 households. It has a rotating
panel design which ensures that a single household is interviewed five consecutive quarters
before being replaced. This replacement is done to ensure that the sample remains nationally
representative.
This survey includes a question on union membership in the expanded questionnaire. The
specific question that individuals were asked was: “En este empleo pertenece a algu´n sindic-
ato?”.12 During the first five quarters of ENOE’s existence households were interviewed using
the expanded questionnaire, subsequent applications of the expanded questionnaire have been
restricted to once every four quarters. The survey also covers a set of questions on hours worked,
contract types, education levels, benefits, occupational and workplace questions.
10It is worthwhile to note that there are data available from 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004,
2005, and every two years thereafter.
11The Mexican Household Survey of Income and Expenditure.
12‘In this job do you belong to a union?’ Note that this question is asked separately for main jobs and any
other jobs that an individual may hold.
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Thus far, there have been sixteen editions of the expanded questionnaire.13 As mentioned
previously this interviews approximately 120,620 households, providing an effective sample of
about 425,000 individuals per quarter. The literature suggests that wage determination by
unions within the public sector is markedly different to that in the private sector (Ehrenberg
and Schwarz, 1986). For this reason I restrict the analysis to wage earners in the private sector,
who are of legal working age (16–65). Thus, self-employed individuals, workers in the armed
forces, and domestic service workers are excluded from our sample. Females were not included
in the analysis as it was deemed that in order to correct for the well known selection bias into
the labour market as emphasised by Heckman (1979), there would be insufficient instruments
to correctly identify these effects. Thus, the remaining sample size ranges from 163,000–180,000
per quarter.
3.3.2 Identification Strategy
As explained in subsection 3.2.1, the established literature on unions has struggled to find
a set of instruments which allow a researcher to obtain an estimate of the union wage gap
uncontaminated by the endogeneity of union status. This chapter contributes to this literature
by proposing and exploiting a theoretically exogenous instrument for the Mexican context. I
supplement the microdata from ENOE with administrative data on strike petitions at a local
jurisdiction level. These data are the basis for instrumenting union status. The data were
obtained from Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica (INEGI)14 who collect
them on behalf of local Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions and cover the time period
1991–2014. The data track the incidence of strike petitions on a monthly basis for the whole
of Mexico. These data contain for each municipality and for each sector the number of strike
petitions. Note that all wage strike threats were excluded from the analysis. The petitions
considered for this instrument are those dealing with contract negotiations (but not wages) and
those complaining about intra-firm working conditions. The data allow me to identify to which
unions congress each petition refers, unfortunately, the survey data do not allow me to match
this through to the individual on a union by union basis. I aggregate these to be the mean rate
of petitions per 10,000 of the local municipal population by independent unions and ‘officialist’
unions. Thus, for the sth sector in the mth municipality in the tth quarter the for the uth type
13These are 2005q1–2006q2, 2007q2, 2008q2, 2009q1, 2010q1, 2011q1, 2012q1, 2013q1, 2014q1, 2015q1, and
2016q1.
14The Mexican statistics agency.
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of union the instrument is defined as follows:
Petition rateusmjt =
∑j=J
j=1 Petitionusmjt−4
Populationmjt−4
Although the contract negotiations outlined here are free of any wage increases, I lag the
petition rates by one calendar year in order to avoid potential correlations with actual wage
negotiations. Despite the rate being lagged, the selection corrections exercises outlined in Section
3.4, only covers the years 2005q1–2015q1 due to data constraints.
The story behind the use of this instrument relies on some of the recent events in the Mexican
labour market as outlined in Section 3.2 and in Chapter 2. The last decade has been characterised
by the rise of independent unions. These unions have challenged the near hegemonic control that
‘officialist’ unions have had on the Mexican labour market. Given the close relationship between
the state and ‘officialist’ unions, it is likely that the rate of strike threats were artificially low
during the period prior to independent unionism, as unions were unlikely to dissent from the
government line. One such example of this is the economic solidarity pact of 1987. However, the
increased competition from independent unions would be reflected in increased strike threats, by
both independent and ‘officialist’ unions as they competed for better contracts and conditions
for workers. Individuals seeking to join a union are likely to seek out signals of the quality of the
potential union. Individuals may be aware that various unions exist but may be unwilling to join
unless they are perceived to act in worker’s interests. Workers are likely to make the decision
to join based on a union’s bargaining record. It is likely that this signal will be contained in the
rate of strike petitions. This is due to the instrumental role of petitions to strike in contract
negotiations as proscribed by the FLL.
Petitions at a sectoral-municipal level are intended to capture the intensity of labour relations
at a local level. Where, a municipality with relatively high rates of strike petitions in a given
industry is likely to have a union which is seeking to improve the lot of their workers. Thus, a
marginal worker who is amenable to the idea of joining a union may be influenced to organise
if they perceive unions to be effective. The instrument is the lagged rate of petitions for both
‘officialist’ and independent unions in the previous calendar year for a given sector in a given
municipality. Workers are likely to be motivated to organise themselves if they see that unions
in their area and industry have been performing their duties in the recent past. However, it is
unlikely unionisation is a frictionless enterprise. For this reason I do not use the effects of current
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petition rates. One potential limitation of these data is relates to legal jurisdiction. Industries
within a given state may not all fall under local jurisdiction, as some industries under the FLL
are deemed to fall under Federal oversight. This implies that the strike petitions used in this
chapter exclude these petitions given data constraints.
Thus, I propose that the average union joiner will likely seek to enter into a ‘good’ union as
identified by them. If the historical behaviour of ‘officialist’ unions implies that they will have
artificially low petitions rate, and as revealed in Chapter 5 a petitions rate that is influenced
by politics, then we might expect that as the rate of petitions for ‘officialist’ unions increase,
the probability of an individual joining will decrease. If the historical narrative in Chapter
2, is considered, it is suggestive that amongst the loose grouping independent unions there are
numerous unions such as the ‘movement’ unionists who are perceived to behave in the interests of
their rank-and-file, or ‘white unions’ which seek to work with management to improve conditions
for all parties involved. It is likely that the petitions to strike of these unions would be perceived
by a potential union entrant as a positive signal, and thus the probability of becoming a ‘joiner’
is likely to be positively related to these petitions.
3.3.3 Variables and Summary Statistics
In order to capture the wage determination process of union and nonunion individuals standard
human capital controls, among others, were selected. ENOE allows us to distinguish the age
of the respondent, their educational qualifications, occupation, the region of residence, and the
hours worked. The survey allows individuals to report their wages as they prefer, be that weekly,
daily, monthly, annually as well as per unit. The data give sufficient information to allow for
these to be transformed to hourly wages, which will be definition of wages used throughout this
chapter. Wages were deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by INEGI and are
expressed in December 2010 prices.
Table 3.3 presents some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis disaggreg-
ated by union status for the period 2005–2016. It is obvious that the mean proportions presented
in this table may be insufficient for disentangling the structural differences between these two
sectors, which may in turn reflect the changing structural composition of the economy.
It is worthwhile to note that union members are generally prime age workers. However, over
the period surveyed there appears to be little unionisation among those individuals just starting
their careers. Thus, if unions are unsuccessful in recruiting younger members as their current
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Table 3.2: Variable Description: ENOE 2005q1–2016q1
Variable Description
Individual Demographic variables
Primary =1 if Primary is maximum level of education, 0 otherwise.
Secondary =1 if Secondary is maximum level of education, 0 otherwise.
Preparatory =1 if Preparatory is maximum level of education, 0 otherwise.
Tertiary =1 if University or Postgraduate level education is maximum attained, 0 otherwise.
Age Individual’s age
Age2 Age squared
Married =1 if individual is Married, 0 otherwise.
Labour variables
Tenure Individual’s tenure in their current job in years.
Tenure2 Tenure squared
Temporary Contract =1 if individual’s work contract is less than 1 year, 0 otherwise.
No Contract =1 if individual has no work contract, 0 otherwise.
Micro Business =1 if individual’s firm size is less than 10 people, 0 otherwise.
Medium Business =1 if individual’s firm size is between 11 and 50 people, 0 otherwise.
Union =1 if individual is a member of a union.
Controls
State Controls 32 dummies for each state in the Mexican republic.
Industry Controls 1 digit NAICS industry dummies. (viz. Agriculture, Extractive Industries, Manufacturing,
Construction, Commerce, Amenities services, Transport, Professional services,
Social Services, and Other services)
Note: All derived from ENOE.
membership ages unions will become further marginalised.
Union members are primarily comprised of individuals with slightly higher levels of education
than the nonunion sector, and are comprised of a large proportion who have secondary education
as their maximum qualification. This is in stark contrast to the educational composition reported
by Tulio Esquinca and Melgoza Valdivia (2006) who find that in 1992 the majority of unionised
workers only had primary and secondary education with very few individuals with tertiary
education.
It is well known that unions have a strong preference for linking wage determination to
seniority at the firm. This is likely to be the case with Mexican unions and is evinced by the
tenure figures where 12.8% of union members have been in their job between 15 and 25 years.
Unsurprisingly, union discourse suggests that their membership would be primarily composed of
permanent workers and the data confirm this. However, it is interesting to note that they have
successfully organised some of the most vulnerable workers, particularly those without contracts.
Finally, it should come as little surprise that unions are dominant in firms where there is more
than 50 workers.
Recall that Figure 3.1 showed the evolution of union density in Mexico. It presents the
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Non Unionised Unionised Total
Age
Under 25 29.4 18.7 28.6
25–44 49.6 59.7 50.4
45–55 13.6 17.0 13.9
55 and over 7.3 4.6 7.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education
Primary 29.4 15.3 28.4
Secondary 35.6 40.8 36.0
Preparatory 19.4 25.6 19.8
University 15.7 18.4 15.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Marital Status
Single, or Otherwise 52.4 36.4 51.3
Married 47.6 63.6 48.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Tenure
Less than 1 year 13.3 4.5 12.7
1–3 years 43.9 34.7 43.3
4–6 years 16.6 18.1 16.7
7–15 years 17.0 24.2 17.5
15–25 years 6.3 12.8 6.7
26+ years 2.9 5.7 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Contract length
No Contract 61.5 7.2 57.7
<2 Months 1.0 3.2 1.2
2–6 Months 2.9 5.3 3.1
6–12 Months 2.1 2.1 2.1
Until end of project 1.5 1.2 1.4
Permanent 31.0 81.1 34.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Business Size
Micro 54.9 4.8 51.4
Small 22.8 13.9 22.2
Medium 13.4 26.1 14.3
Large 8.8 55.1 12.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sample size 517,687 39,356 557,043
Note: Data are derived from ENOE for 2005q1–2016q1 and
represent means for the sample used in estimation.
unionisation rates as reported by both ENIGH and ENOE, and the shaded areas are the reces-
sionary periods. It is clear from this that union density in Mexico has been in decline since the
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1980s, with the exception of their brief resurgence in the early 2000s.15 The period captured by
ENOE, shown by the solid line, reveals a steady decline in unionisation rates for working age
males. In 2005 union membership totalled 10.7% of all private sector workers, since then it has
contracted by one-fifth to a union membership rate of 8.4% in 2016.
Figure 3.2: The evolution of the raw union wage gap, Mexico 2005q1–2016q1
Note:Author’s own calculation using ENIGH and ENOE.
The raw differences in wages between the sectors are presented in Figure 3.2. It is interesting
to note that whilst the gap is relatively stable over the time period under analysis, it has not
always been so. The aftermath of the debt crisis and the privatisations of state-owned enterprises
can explain the halving of the wage gap between 1984 and 1989. Since then, there seems to have
been a short-lived increase in the gap during the currency crisis period in the 1990s. However,
it has since remained relatively stable, oscillating between 18–22 per cent over this period.
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of the mean wage between 2005 and 2016. This provides
suggestive evidence that the stability in the wage gap is indicative of weak union power. Members
appear to be subject to the same wage trends as non-members.
The systematic differences between sectors are confirmed by the time pooled kernel densities
15For comparison, in Chile in the 1990s the union density rate ranged between 18–20% and by the early 2000s
this had fallen to 12–14% (Landerretche et al., 2011, 2013). The rates of unionisation in Bolivia are reported by
Rios-Avila and Hirsch (2014) to be on average, 12.9% for the 2000s. In Uruguay union density rose to 60% upon
the legalisation of unions, but had fallen to approximately 18% by 1997. Thus, the Mexican experience in the
rates of union membership reflects the broader trends for Latin America.
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Figure 3.3: The evolution of the mean wage by sector, Mexico 2005q1–2016q1
Note: Author’s own calculation using ENOE.
shown in Figure 3.4. The union sector’s wages are clearly greatest at the mean.16 Although this
may reflect no more than the fact that the wage gaps reported earlier are indicative of systematic
differences between the two sectors.
Figure 3.4: Kernel density of ln(wages/hour) by union status, Mexico 2005q1–2016q1
Note: Author’s own calculation using ENOE.
16See Appendix B which reports the kernel densities for 2006, 2010 and 2016. These confirm that the same
pattern evidenced in the time pooled sample can be seen in the year specific plots.
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Figure 3.5: Strike petitions, Mexico 1991q1–2014q4
(a) Independent Unions
(b) ‘Officialist Unions’
Note:Author’s own calculation using administrative data from local arbitration
and conciliation boards.
Finally, Figure 3.5a is a cloropleth map of the mean of the sectoral mean petition rate by
municipality, where for each type of union the mean and coefficient of variation are reported. It
should be noted that the areas marked in white are municipalities for which there are no petitions
over the time period 1991–2014.17 One possible explanation for these gaps in the data is that all
of the industries within these areas are legally under Federal jurisdiction. Figure 3.5b shows the
coefficient of variation in the sectoral mean for each municipality. It should be remarked that
there is a high degree of variation between sectors in each location. There are also considerable
levels of variation within each state. As anticipated, there are fewer municipality-sectoral years
available for independent unions.
17Whilst these may seem alarmingly large, they are mainly due to geographically large municipalities, which
do not contain many individuals.
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3.4 Methodology
The objective of this chapter is to obtain the effect of unionisation on wages. To this end, this
chapter employs a number of different empirical approaches. Firstly, I follow the traditional
approach in the literature to investigate the research question beginning with a set of sectoral
specific wage equations:
ws = X
′
sβs + ηs
 s = u, if U = 1;s = n, if U = 0. (3.1)
where Xu and Xn are (k×n) matrices of characteristics and β is a (k×1) vector of unknown
parameters which capture the effect of the various covariates on the natural log of the wage w,
and η is a (n× 1) vector of random error terms specific to union and nonunion individuals. Ui
is binary variable which takes the value of 1 if an individual is a union, and 0 otherwise.
This framework allows the application of the well known decomposition approach of Blinder
(1973) and Oaxaca (1973):
w¯u − w¯n = (Xu −Xn)′βˆn + X′u(βˆu − βˆn) (3.2)
This is a decomposition where the first term of equation (3.2) gives the wage differences due
to endowments, and the second due to differences in the coefficients (i.e., treatment).
This approach is potentially affected by an “index number problem”. Therefore, one can
reformulate equation (3.2) under the assumption that the union wage structure prevails in the
absence of unequal treatment as:
w¯u − w¯n = (Xu −Xn)′βˆu + X′n(βˆu − βˆn) (3.3)
Although the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition is a standard tool in economic analysis there
is a thin literature on the construction of the sampling variances of each of the terms of the
decomposition. Oaxaca and Ransom (1998) and Greene (2008, pp. 55–56) provide some meth-
ods to obtain the sampling variances for both terms. Jann (2008) challenges the assumptions
underlying these previous estimates, noting that the assumption that the regressors are fixed is
likely violated in most applications.
It is worth noting that the estimates of the unexplained component of equations (3.2) and
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(3.3) are in fact estimators for the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) and Average
Treatment Effect on the Non-treated (ATEN) (Black et al., 2006; Melly, 2006; Fortin et al., 2011;
S loczyn´ski, 2013, 2015b).
The variance suggested by Oaxaca and Ransom (1998) are derived using the delta method.
Where the sampling variance for the endowment effect in (3.2) is
Vˆ([Xu −Xn]′βˆn) = ([Xu −Xn]′βˆn] + 1)2(Xu −Xn)′Vˆ(βˆn)(Xu −Xn) (3.4)
and the variance for the the treatment is given by
Vˆ(X
′
u[βˆu − βˆn]) = ([(X′uβˆu − βˆn] + 1)2Xn′[Vˆ(βˆu) + V(βˆn)]Xn (3.5)
where Vˆ(βˆ) is the estimated variance-covariance matrix obtained from regression.
The application of the delta method in this case assumes that the variables are asymptotically
normally distributed, and that X is fixed, this is unlikely to be the case and can be shown to bias
the standard errors. Jann (2008) derives standard errors consistent with X being stochastic.
Thus, the sampling variances for the decomposition are:
Vˆ([Xu −Xn]′βˆn) ≈ (Xu −Xn)′Vˆ(βˆn)(Xu −Xn) + βˆ′n[Vˆ(Xu) + Vˆ(Xn)]βˆn (3.6)
and
Vˆ(X
′
u[βˆu − βˆn]) ≈ X′u[Vˆ(βˆu) + Vˆ(βˆn)]Xb + (βˆu − βˆn)′Vˆ(Xu)(βˆu − βˆn) (3.7)
where an estimator for V(X) is given by [(X− 1X′)′(X− 1X′)]/[n(n− 1)], that is the cross-
product of the centered-data matrix adjusted for the number of observations in each group.
Note that these are reported as approximations as they ignore a small asymptotically vanishing
term (Tr[Vˆ(X)Vˆ(βˆ)]). The expressions (3.6) and (3.7) imply that the stochastic nature of X
downwards biases the sampling variance for the endowment effect.
3.4.1 Alternative Oaxaca Decomposition Counterfactuals
The Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are subject to the well known ‘index-number’ problem
(Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999). There is a possibility that neither the union nor nonunion wage
structures would prevail in the absence of unions. Neumark (1988) suggests that an alternate
wage structure for an appropriate counterfactual is that of the pooled regression. Jann (2008)
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points out that this approach is likely to transfer some portion of the treatment effect to the
explained component of the decomposition, due to residual group difference spillover into the
constant term of the pooled equation. As such the appropriate counterfactual vector is one
which includes a dummy for union status which is then net out prior to the decomposition. This
new decomposition can be expressed as below:
w¯u − w¯n = (Xu −Xn)′βˆ? + [X′u(βˆu − βˆ?) + X′n(βˆ? − βˆn)] (3.8)
where βˆ? describes the vector that prevails in the absence of discrimination.
Cotton (1988) provides an alternate decomposition. He suggests that the optimum vector
weight is βˆ? = NnNu+Nn ·βu+ NuNu+Nn ·βn+ thus, this represents an average of what is the ‘benefit’
to unionisation, as well as the ‘cost’ of unionisation, in order to obtain the treatment and en-
dowment effects. S loczyn´ski (2013, 2015a) shows that the treatment effect in this decomposition
is equivalent to the following:
TECotton (1988) =
Nn
Nu +Nn
·X′n(βˆu − βˆ?) +
Nu
Nu +Nn
·X′u(βˆn − βˆ?) (3.9)
However, as outlined in a critique by Elder et al. (2010); S loczyn´ski (2013, 2015b) this ap-
proach gives undue weight to the smaller population of the two. S loczyn´ski (2013, 2015b) proves
that reversing the weights in the Cotton (1988) decomposition yields a consistent estimator of
the population Average Treatment Effect (ATE).
ATE =
Nu
Nu +Nn
·X′n(βˆu − βˆ?) +
Nn
Nu +Nn
·X′u(βˆn − βˆ?) (3.10)
For both decompositions in equations (3.9) and (3.10), an analogue can be derived for the
endowment effect. The analogue endowment effect for (3.9) is given by:
EECotton (1988) =
Nn
Nu +Nn
· (Xu −Xn)′βˆu + Nu
Nu +Nn
· (Xn −Xu)′βˆn (3.11)
and the analogue population Average Endowment Effect (AEE) for (3.10) is given by:
AEE =
Nu
Nu +Nn
· (Xu −Xn)′βˆu + Nn
Nu +Nn
· (Xn −Xu)′βˆn (3.12)
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Finally, the variance of the (3.10) can be shown to be given by:
Vˆ(ÂTE) =
(
Vˆ(U) · Vˆ
[
X
′
u∆βˆ
]
+
[
X
′
u∆βˆ
]2 · Vˆ(U) + U2 · Vˆ [X′u∆βˆ]+ (3.13)
Vˆ(N) · Vˆ
[
X
′
n∆βˆ
]
+
[
X
′
n∆βˆ
]2 · Vˆ(N) +N2 · Vˆ [X′n∆βˆ]) (3.14)
where U = NuNn+Nu and N =
Nu
Nn+Nu
, the proportions of the population of the union and nonunion
sectors, respectively. ∆βˆ = (βˆu − βˆn). Vˆ(.) is the variance operator, and the variance of the
treatment effects can be obtained as in equation (3.7). The variance of the proportions is as
follows: Vˆ(U) =
Nu
Nu+Nn
· Nu
Nu+Nn
Nnu
.
3.4.2 Endogenous Switching
One of the challenges outlined by the existing literature for developed countries is the endogenous
nature of union determination (Robinson, 1989). The identification challenge of finding a suitable
instrument that is correlated to an individual’s union status but uncorrelated with their wages
has proved to be challenging. If one finds such an instrument, then not only is it possible to
identify the effect upon an intercept shift, but use it to control for union selection in the wage
equations such as those estimated by equation (3.1).
I shall briefly motivate an endogenous switching regime, which will then allow for selection
into both the union and non-union sector, and in turn provide a Oaxaca-Blinder type decom-
position which accounts for the endogenous nature of union status. As outlined earlier in section
3.3 the rate of strike threats for both ‘officialist’ and independent unions will be exploited as
identifying instruments for unionisation.18
One can now model the union decision using a Probit as follows:
Pr(U = 1) = Φ(X′sβs + Z
′
iγs) (3.15)
where Φ(.) is the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) normal distribution, and as before X is
a matrix of individual level characteristics, and Z vector includes all the identifying instruments
for union status, namely the lag of ‘officialist’ and independent union petition rate for a given
industry in a given municipality.
18What follows is a brief summary of the Lee (1978) model. See Appendix D for a fuller motivation and
explanation behind the endogenous switching model.
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Now, in order to correct for union selection equation (3.1) into (D.1) become:
wui = X
′
iuβu + λ
′
u
(
−φ(Zˆi)
Φ(Zˆi)
)
+ ηu (3.16)
wni = X
′
inβn + λ
′
n
(
φ(Zˆi)
(1− Φ(Zˆi))
)
+ ηn (3.17)
Where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the pdf and CDF of the normal distribution and P = Pr(U = 1|Zi)
Thus, we now have sectoral wage equations that account for the selection into union status. This
effect will be given by the λ estimand, and where E(ηu|U = 1) = − φ(Zˆi)Φ(Zˆi) and E(ηn|U = 0) =
φ(Zˆi)
(1−Φ(Zˆi)) which are the inverse Mills ratio and the complement of the Mills ratio, respectively.
The estimated parameter λ = σ · ρ where σ is the variance of the error term of the selection
model, whilst ρ = corr(η, ψ). The approach adopted in this paper is to obtain the estimates
for the endogenous switching model by implementing estimation of equations (3.15), (3.16) and
(3.17) is to estimate these as a single equation using a Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) procedure. In practice this is done by using the programme implemented by Lokshin
and Sajaia (2004).
Selectivity Corrected Oaxaca Decomposition The inclusion of the selection terms now
pose a problem for the estimation of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. The decomposition
requires that the σ parameters be excluded from the βˆ vector of parameters and the x¯ vectors of
means as in equations (3.2) and (3.3). Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) propose various alternatives
for incorporating the selection effect into the decomposition. One of the most attractive is that
proposed by Duncan and Leigh (1980) and Reimers (1983) who suggest that the selection effect
are netted out and a new term be added to equation (3.2). The decomposition now becomes:
w¯u − w¯n = (Xu −Xn)′βˆn + X′u(βˆu − βˆn) + (θˆuλ¯u − θˆnλ¯n) (3.18)
where θˆs = ρˆsσˆs. The last term is the selectivity effect, or the sectoral differences due
to selectivity bias. It should be noted that the decomposition no longer refers to the wage
differential, as netting out the selectivity effect amounts to comparing the difference in wage
offers between union and nonunion sectors. Given the components of θs are not just identified,
but estimated as part of the log likelihood function then we may obtain the sampling variance
of the last term of the decomposition. The variance is as follows:
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V(θˆuλ¯u − θˆnλ¯n) =
([
Vλ¯uVρ
2
u
]
+
[
V(λ¯u)ρ
2
u
]
+
[
V(ρ2u)λ¯
2
u
]−
[
Vλ¯nVρ
2
n
]
+
[
V(λ¯n)ρ
2
n
]
+
[
V(ρ2n)λ¯
2
n
])
3.4.3 Panel Regressions
The ENOE survey is a panel dataset, this aspect of the data may be exploited to account for
unobserved heterogeneity of union members. This approach will be exploited as yet another way
to address the issue of endogeneity. As noted earlier the union question is only available in the
extended questionnaire which is run once per calendar year. Thus, a panel of individuals may
be constructed with a one year gap between interviews. In order to inform on the effects of the
recession on the wage gap I shall therefore estimate the following:
wit = αi + X
′
itβ + κUnionit + it (3.19)
where Xit is a (k × n) matrix of characteristics and αi is the individual-specific fixed effect.
The term αi is the unobserved individuals effect. If one believes that the correlation between
unobserved effects and union status is positive then, this would lead to an upward bias of the
estimate of κ.
The fixed effects estimate of the union effect, as given by the estimate for κ, is identified from
the variation due to those individuals who switch union status. The κ parameter in this estimate
may also be interpreted as the treatment effect from a differences-in-differences procedure. Due
to the nature of the fixed-effects estimator, and the data, κ will be an estimator of the ATET.
One particular downside of the specification outlined is that it makes the assumption that the
effects of switching union status are similar for joining a union and leaving a union. However,
if this assumption is violated, then estimated parameter will be an average of the two effects.
Whilst this is a restrictive assumption, a more sophisticated analysis of union joiners and leavers
is the focus of Chapter 4.
Nevertheless, the estimate from equation (3.19) may be contrasted with those obtained from
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and will serve to illustrate the short-run effects of changing union
status. I propose to estimate these effects for the time periods of 2005q1–2007q2, 2010q1–2012q1
for the non recessionary periods, the periods of the great recession 2008q2–2009q1 and the more
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recent post-labour reform period of 2013q1–2016q1.
3.4.4 Variance Decomposition
It is well known that unions compress the wage distribution (Freeman, 1980; Gosling and Machin,
1995; Card et al., 2008; Metcalf et al., 2001). Fairris (2003) finds that for Mexico the variance
of wages is reduced by unions. His findings suggest that the relative weakening of unions
between 1984 and 1996 accounts for an 11% increase in wage inequality in the formal sector.
Popli (2007) examines changes across the income distribution using the DiNardo et al. (1996)
semi-parametric decomposition to estimate how much the changes in wage variation are due to
changes in unionisation. She reports that when applying the characteristics of the 1984 union
density to the 2000 distribution, the counterfactual distribution has higher wages. Given the
continued decline in unionisation rates, even relative to 2000, it is important to assess the ability
of unions to compress the wage distribution over the past decade.
The most common approach that has been undertaken in the academic literature in assessing
the ‘sword-of-justice’ is through the implementation of variance decompositions. In this spirit
I propose to implement the Dolton and Makepeace (1985) variance decomposition, which is a
direct analogue of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition at the second moment of the distribution.
This decomposition takes the following form:
sˆ2n − sˆ2u ≈ σˆ2n − σˆ2u +
(
βˆn − βˆu
)′
V(Xu)
(
βˆn − βˆu
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Treatment
+ βˆ′n [V(Xn)−V(Xu)] βˆn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Endowment
(3.20)
where sˆ2 are the variances for log hourly wages in sector s to be decomposed. σ2 is the
estimated variance from the application of OLS in equation (3.1), and finally V(Xs) is the
variance-covariance matrix of worker characteristics in the sth sector.
3.4.5 Quantile Regression
To further explore the role of unions on the wage distribution, I propose to estimate the union
mark-up at different points of the wage distribution using quantile regression, namely at the
10th, 50th and 90th quantiles. (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Buchinsky, 1998) Given that Qθ(.)
denotes the conditional quantile operator at the θth quantile of interest, then Qθ(wi|Xi) = X′iβθi,
where βθi is the vector of parameters and uθi is the error term, whose distribution is unspecified
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but where Qθ(uθi|Xi) = 0 is assumed.
Therefore, I can now express a simple wage equation, where union status is denoted by an
intercept shift as follows:
Qθ(wi) = E
(
Xi|wi = Qθ(wi)
)′
βˆθ + κˆθE
(
Unioni|wi = Qθ(wi)
)
+ E
(
uθi|wi = Qθ(wi)
)
(3.21)
where the circumflex accent denotes the quantile regression estimates and E(.) is the expect-
ations operator. The parameter of interest is denoted by κˆθi which is the union mark up at
the θth quantile. It should be noted that the characteristics are evaluated conditionally at the
unconditional quantile log of the hourly wage, which differs from the unconditional, which was
utilised in the mean regression.
3.5 Results
This section presents the results from the estimation of wage equations and the findings with
respect to the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at the mean. The results from selectivity corrected
estimates are then explored along with those from the endogenous switching model, variance
decomposition, quantile regression and fixed effects regressions.
3.5.1 What do Mexican unions do to wages?
Wage equations
Tables C.1 and C.2 in the appendix provide the complete set of results from the wage equations.
The tables reveal that there is a statistically significant impact of education on labour market
earnings. The implicit annualised rates of return to education are plotted in Figure 3.6, which
reveals that the educational return profile of the mean individual differs across these two sectors.
Recalling that Table 3.3 revealed that a large proportion of union members hold secondary edu-
cation as their maximum qualification, the estimates for annualised rates of secondary education
suggest that unions raise the wages of these individuals relative to their nonunion counterparts.
As the fourth pane of Figure 3.6 evinces, rates of return to tertiary education and above are
below the rates in the nonunion sector, foreshadowing the results that will be explored in sub-
section 3.5.2. Another notable feature of the returns to education results over this time period is
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the remarkable lack of change on the rates of return, despite differing macroeconomic conditions,
which mitigate the oscillations observed. Rates of return to education increase monotonically
across the educational distribution.
Figure 3.6: Annualised rates of return to education by union status, Mexico 2005q1–2016q1
Note: Author’s own calculation using ENOE, results are calculations implicit
from underlying wage regressions are presented in Tables C.1 and C.2 in the
appendix.
The evidence on tenure presented in tables C.1 and C.2 suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that
unionised individuals accrue for each extra year in their job an extra half a percentage point
increase in their wages than nonunion members highlighting union preferences for seniority.
Although this gap is reduced over the time period under analysis, it does not reverse.
With regards to the dispersion of wages it is notable that the estimated variance of the union
sector is smaller than that of the nonunion sector. A simple application of a variance equality
test of the form F = σˆn/σˆu (where the null is equal variances) is rejected, in all instances. This
serves as another indication that unions play an important role in reducing dispersion in wages.
This is further discussed in subsection 3.5.2.
Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions
Table 3.4 reports the results for the Oaxaca-Blinder mean wage gap decomposition. It reports
the estimates of equation (3.3) where the union wage structure prevails in the absence of unequal
treatment.
57
It is notable that whilst this time period witnessed a marked decline in unionisation rates,
the unadjusted wage gap has remained relatively stable, despite being subject to two recessions
over this time. This is suggestive that union power with regards to wages has weakened such
that when wages decrease in the economy due to recessions, unions are unable to protect their
members.
Under the assumption that the union wage structure prevails in the absence of unequal
treatment it is clear that the larger portion of the gap is attributable to a composition effect
(i.e., the endowments of individuals who belong to the union sector). This finding conforms
to the literature in developed countries, and in particular, the ‘monopoly’ face of unionisation.
Thus, firms when faced with higher wages reduce employment, and increase the ‘quality’ of
workers.
It is remarkable that there are almost no differences in any of the treatment effects, during
the recessionary periods of 2008–2011 or 2013–2016. This may reflect the relative stagnation of
union membership power during the 2008 recession as evidenced in Figure 3.1. Over the whole
time period surveyed the treatment effect is found to range between 6.7% and 13.8%. With the
periods of 2011 and 2012 being notable years where, although there was technically no recession,
my findings suggest that on average union workers enjoyed no wage mark-up.
One issue with this approach is the potential for selection into union status. The following
sections will try to address these concerns.
I now turn my attention to the alternate scenarios where the nonunion wage structure pre-
vails, and the Neumark approach of using a pooled regression. It is clear from these exercises
that unionised individuals would see their wages remain the same or decrease if nonunion wage
determination prevailed and the differences in composition between sectors remained constant.
However, most of this is offset by the interaction term which suggests that between 19–22 per-
cent of the wage gap can be accounted by the fact that returns to union members tend to be
greater for those characteristics in which union members have higher means. This interaction
term is consistent with the idea that there is an element of persistence in the union wage gap.
Union members command higher wages in part due to the bargaining structures, but this is also
justified by the better composition of union members for the industries in which they compete.
Indeed, the findings suggested by the interaction and endowment effects are confirmed when
applying the method proposed by Neumark (1988). When the wage structure of neither sector
prevails it becomes readily apparent that there is no significant unequal treatment in the labour
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market in Mexico. The entire gap is attributed to the differences in individual characteristics
of individuals in the unionised sector. This finding is consistent with the marginalised role of
unions in the Mexican labour market with the notable exception being during the great recession
in 2008 where being a union member actually decreases ones wages by 3.1%.
Selectivity corrected wage equations
Table D.1 in the appendix reports the results from the endogenous switching exercise. The
identifying instrument set is comprised of the lag of both independent and ‘officialist’ union
petitions rate for each sector-municipality pair. These instruments are found to be relevant, and
are significant in the union selection equation, for most years with the only notable exception
being in 2008q2. The lack of predictive power of these instruments for this year can be thought
to be related to the relative lack of union petitions for the time period surrounding the great
recession. Due to the external macroeconomic disturbances, it is likely that for that quarter
individuals would not have sought to join a union, as they may have already faced precarious
work conditions. The estimates for 2007q2, 2009q1, and 2014q1 suggest that petitions by ‘offi-
cialist unions’ are negatively related to union membership, whilst the estimates for the period
2008q2, 2010q1, 2011q1, 2012q1 for ‘officialist unions’ are found to be insignificant. These find-
ing validate the hypothesis put forth in subsection 3.3.2, increases in petitions by type of union
have differing effects on potential union joiners. The petitions rate of ‘Officialist’ unions either
fails to identify union attachment, or acts as a negative predictor for the same. This suggests
that these petitions may be viewed as unattractive by potential union members. However, this
effect is not constant over the complete time span, and as such some caution must be taken
when interpreting the estimates for the wage equations.
It is noteworthy that the reported Likelihood Ratio test for the ρ estimates of correlation
between unobservables in the wage equation are zero for the period of the great recession of
2007q2–2009q1. During that time period there is no selection into either the union or nonunion
sectors. Looking at the sector-specific ρ terms, I find that there is selection into the nonunion
sector. The estimands of ρn suggest that, with the exception of the great recession, the unob-
servable characteristics which determine nonunion attachment are negatively related to wages.
The results are less clear for the union equation; selection is only a feature of the data for the
periods 2006q1, 2008q2 and 2013q1. Of these time periods the unobservables seem to be posit-
ively associated with union attachment. This is consistent with the notion that individuals with
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better unobservable characteristics are selecting into unions.
Selectivity Corrected Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions
Using the estimates from the Lee (1978) endogenous switching model, I computed the uncondi-
tional wage decomposition for the union mark-up. The results from this exercise are reported
in Table 3.5. The decomposition may no longer be interpreted as a decomposition of the mean
wage, but instead must be conceptualised as a decomposition of observed wage offers.
The observed wage difference is smaller than that of the mean wage, but once selectivity is
net out as suggested by Duncan and Leigh (1980) and Reimers (1983), the wage offer gap is
found to be larger than the mean wage gap.19 Regardless of which counterfactual is assumed
to prevail in the absence of unionisation, it is clear that the largest portion of the mark-up is
actually determined by worker characteristics, just as with the estimates in subsection 3.5.1.
These account for 8–20% of the wage-offer gap.
The unconditional union mark-up, or union treatment effect, is found to range between 15–
20%. It should be noted that the results for 2013 rather implausibly suggest that being in a
union is associated with a decline in wages of 85.7% relative to the nonunion sector. This is a
stark contrast to the near 12% suggested by Table 3.4. Under the alternative counterfactual,
where nonunion wages are assumed to prevail in the absence of unions, the findings for the union
mark-up are confirmed. The unconditional union wage offer mark-up is found to range between
7% and 10%. Note that in both of these estimates the union mark-up is absent during the great
recession. This may be contrasted with the findings for the current 2014–2015 recession where
the union wage gap is found to be positive.
19Note that the wage offer gap is computed by taking the difference between the selection component of the
decomposition and the observed wage difference.
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Panel Regression
Table 3.6 provides estimates of a pooled union fixed effects regression for Mexico. Once individual
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account the union wage gap is found to be roughly a third
of the OLS estimates. The wage gap is modestly sized at 2% for the duration of the ENOE
rotating panel. Breaking down the estimates into recessionary periods and non recessionary
periods reveals the period of the great recession of 2008–2009 and its aftermath yield no evidence
of a union pay gap.
Table 3.6: Individual fixed effects estimates of the union wage gap, Mexico 2005q1–2015q1
2005q1–2007q2 2008q2–2009q1 2010q1–2012q1 2013q1–2016q1 2005q1–2016q1
No Recession Recession No Recession Recession All
Union Member 0.019*** 0.012 0.015 0.042** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.004)
Age 0.031*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.008 0.042***
(0.006) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.005)
Age2 -0.032*** -0.079*** -0.054** -0.102*** -0.046***
(0.008) (0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.007)
Tenure 0.004*** 0.002 0.004 0.008*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Tenure2 -0.008*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.019*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002)
Contract < 2m -0.021*** -0.033* -0.020 -0.027 -0.022***
(0.005) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.004)
No Contract -0.039*** -0.034** -0.045*** -0.023* -0.039***
(0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.004)
Micro firm (<10) -0.049*** 0.001 -0.044 -0.047** -0.047***
(0.007) (0.023) (0.031) (0.020) (0.006)
Small firm (11–50) -0.013** 0.007 -0.021 -0.004 -0.013**
(0.006) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.005)
Medium firm (51–250) -0.005 0.033* 0.006 -0.012 -0.003
(0.005) (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.004)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
N 244,462 44,711 42,217 49,646 381,036
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, standard errors reported are clustered at the municipal level.
Squared terms have been scaled by 100.
Regressions include state time trends, national time trend, sectoral fixed effects and time trends, year fixed effects.
The evidence provided for these periods once again suggests that a union’s bargaining power
appears to have eroded in the Mexican context. It is also worth stating that unions appear to
be unable to shelter their workers from the state of the economy at large, particularly during
deep recessions.
As a final remark on these estimates, it is worth remembering that the identification of
the union wage effects are coming from those individuals ‘switching’ union status. This is
both a help and a hindrance. This procedure allows me to cancel out the individual specific
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unobserved heterogeneity, and in some respects it is hoped that some of the potential bias from
endogeneity is cancelled out. However, it also embodies a strong assumption. Identification of
the union ‘treatment effect’ is coming from those individuals who change their union status.
This implicitly assumes that there is symmetry in the effect, those individuals who leave union
status are assumed to have the same direction of effect. If this assumption is violated, then the
estimates will reflect a conflation of the ATET for both of the group of union joiners and leavers.
A more sophisticated treatment of union joiners and leavers is thus the focus of Chapter 4. A
second issue is concerns regarding whose union wage gap is measured. Union dialectic is based
on the notion of seniority and wages fitting jobs. If this is the case we would expect that the
union wage gap increases with seniority at the union. The application of a fixed effects estimator
in this instance would only ever yield the short run wage differences for those unionising. The
average tenure effects cannot be informed by this procedure.
Summary of union mark-up
Thus far, I have presented various methods by which to estimate the union wage mark-up.
However, there are two questions which are outstanding. First, how do these differ from the
established literature for Mexico? Second, how can one reconcile all of these estimates? I will
now address these two questions.
A preliminary interpretation of the previously presented estimates suggests that my estimates
are at odds with the existing literature for Mexico. Panagides and Patrinos (1994) reports that
using ENIGH the union wage gap is 10.4% for 1989. However, their estimate differs from what
I have reported in that they report the treatment effect as X
′
all
[
βˆu − βˆn
]
. This effectively
asks: “What is the union wage mark-up for a worker with the sample average characteristics?”
This estimate can be obtained by weighting the union and nonunion treatment effects by their
population proportions.20 If this exercise is performed on my reported estimates from tables 3.4
and 3.4, then the estimated treatment effect is found to be 7.7% and 10.4% for the first quarter
of 2005 and 2015, respectively. Comparing my estimates to Panagides and Patrinos suggests
that unions, despite the decline in density and perhaps bargaining ability, have commanded a
comparable mark-up to that of 1989.
Fairris (2003) does not report estimates for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Nevertheless,
20This can be expressed as follows: U ×
(
X
′
u
[
βˆn − βˆu
])
+ (1−U)×
(
X
′
n
[
βˆn − βˆu
])
, where U is the relevant
union proportion for a given year. This is the population averaged treatment effect as suggested by S loczyn´ski
(2013, 2015a).
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he provides counterfactual wages from which one is able to construct the treatment effect under
various assumptions. The Fairris implicit estimates for the union wage mark-up are 19% (-
17%) for 1984 and 14% (-12%) for 1996 under the assumption that the union (nonunion) wage
structure prevails in the absence of unequal treatment. These estimates can be compared to the
Panagides and Patrinos estimates as follows: 7.9% and 8.7% for 1989 and 1996, respectively.
The comparison with the previous literature suggests that despite reduced participation, unions
have retained a strong role in determining a stable wage gap between the mid 1980s and the
2000s.
Finally, I can now look towards reconciling all the estimates of the union wage mark-up
reported in this chapter. Four distinct findings emerge. These are related to the counterfactual
question posed by each estimator.
First, the treatment effect under the union wage structure prevailing, X
′
n∆βˆnu, asks: “What
is the union mark-up commensurate with the average non-union worker?” In this instance, the
results presented in Table 3.4 suggest that the counterfactual ‘gains’ to a worker joining a union
have remained stable over the previous decade. However, when comparing to the earlier period
of the 1980s and 1990s, there has been a decline of between 9–12 percentage points.
Second, the treatment effect under the nonunion wage structure prevailing, X
′
u∆βˆnu, asks:
“What is the loss associated with the average union member leaving?” The results presented
in Table 3.4 are less clear. For the period 2006–2009 there is a clear wage loss ranging between
2–4%, whilst for 2016 the average union leaver would see an increase in their wages by 2.4%.
Comparing this to Fairris we can see that the implied ‘loss’ to the average union member has
been declining since the 1980s and 1990s.
Third, the treatment effect estimate obtained from the application of an intercept shift model
has been proven by Elder et al. (2010) to be equivalent to the Cotton (1988) decomposition
treatment effect21 This estimate of the union wage mark-up has been critiqued by both Elder
et al. (2010) and S loczyn´ski (2015a) as it gives undue weight to the smaller population, in
this context the union individuals. It is also worthwhile to note that as the proportion of the
population in the nonunion sector increases, the implied estimate from this approach will diverge
from the population average estimate of the treatment effect (S loczyn´ski, 2013, 2015a). Thus,
in this context it would over estimate the penalty for ‘leaving’ a union. So, given the insights
21This can be expressed as follows: (1−U)×
(
X
′
u
[
βˆn − βˆu
])
+U ×
(
X
′
n
[
βˆn − βˆu
])
, where U is the relevant
union proportion for a given year.
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in this discussion, what can I conclude? If one is interested in measuring the effect of unions on
the labour market, then perhaps these estimates are not the most informative as the implicit
weightings on each treatment effect, (i.e., the averaged estimate of the ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ implicit in
joining a union) are weighted by the opposite population to that of interest. Thus, whilst these
estimates provide an indication of the effect of unions on the ‘switching’ population, however,
it is likely that these estimates are not symmetric and thus will overweight by the ‘leavers’
treatment effect. This suggests that a more careful treatment between those ‘switching’ statuses
can be achieved. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
Finally, what of the population average union mark-up? The estimate reported by Panagides
and Patrinos (1994) has been shown to represent a consistent estimator of the ATE (S loczyn´ski,
2013, 2015a). What has happened to this measure in the last decade? Stagnation. As already
suggested the implicit estimates from (Fairris, 2003), and those I report in tables 3.4, suggest a
different story from that previously reported. Despite the decline in membership the union wage
mark-up exists in Mexico, and has ranged between 4–10%. The explanation for the stagnation in
this measure, may be explained by the weighted nature of the ATE. Union density has declined,
and this has also coincided with the decline of the ATET, or X
′
u∆βnu, so as unions have become
weaker, so too has the penalty associated with leaving a union declined. Whilst, conversely
the magnitude of the nonunion population has risen, there has been a decline in the ATEN of
the nonunion members, or the counterfactual wage that the average nonunion member would
obtain if unionised. One final remark is related to the selectivity corrected ‘index number’
decompositions. The point estimates from the treatment effect under the assumption of union
wages prevailing in the absence of unequal treatment, in this context account for the selectivity
into the union sector, and thus ask: “What wage would a nonunion worker earn if they were
remunerated at the union level, and this were a random draw from the population?” Thus, these
results may be interpreted as an estimator for the population average treatment effects.
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3.5.2 ‘Sword-of-Justice’ effect
It is well known that unions compress the wage distribution. This has been termed by the
literature as the ‘sword-of-justice’ that unions wield across the wage distribution. This is partly
due to union preferences for ‘honest day’s pay for honest work’ remuneration. Thus, unions are
interested in ensuring returns are related to occupation and job based attributes, rather than
worker characteristics. There is ample evidence that this is the case for developed countries (see
Stewart, 1983; Callan and Reilly, 1993; Gosling and Machin, 1995; Metcalf et al., 2001; Card,
2004). Fairris (2003) reports that for Mexico, during 1989 and 1996, unions were associated
with a reduction in variance. Popli (2007) confirms these findings showing that declining union
density between 1984 and 2000 accounts for 28% of the increase in wage variation in the formal
sector. These findings suggest that the decline in union density has also been associated with a
lower ability on the part of unions to compress the wage distribution.
Variance Decomposition
As motivation for what follows, it should be noted that the evidence presented thus far in Tables
C.1 and C.2 indicates that the distribution of wages is systematically lower in the union sector
for all years, as evidenced by the systematically lower estimate of the σˆ2 for the union specific
equations. It seems prudent to investigate the effects of unions on the wage distribution in
Mexico for the past 11 years. The literature has predominantly investigated this through the
implementation of variance decompositions such as that proposed by Dolton and Makepeace
(1985); Card (2001); Card et al. (2008); DiNardo et al. (1996).
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Table 3.7: Variance decomposition of wage equations, Mexico 2005q1–2016q1
Year ∆sˆ2 Treatment Endowment
2005q1 0.076 0.048 -0.124
2006q1 0.093 0.088 -0.152
2007q2 0.071 0.041 -0.209
2008q2 0.076 0.044 -0.168
2009q1 0.085 0.125 -0.187
2010q1 0.077 0.063 -0.190
2011q1 0.068 0.087 -0.146
2012q1 0.072 0.144 -0.266
2013q1 0.073 0.122 -0.169
2014q1 0.082 0.144 -0.250
2015q1 0.072 0.210 -0.265
2016q1 0.063 0.790 -0.515
Notes: Follows the Dolton and Makepeace (1985) de-
composition. Underlying regressions are reported in
Tables C.1 and C.2 in the appendix. Regressions in-
clude state time trends, national time trend, sectoral
fixed effects and time trends, year fixed effects.
Table 3.8: Variance decomposition of selectivity corrected wage equations, Mexico 2005q1–2016q1
Year ∆sˆ2 Treatment Endowment
2005q1 0.061 0.057 -0.074
2006q1 0.079 0.107 -0.111
2007q2 0.062 0.045 -0.151
2008q2 0.064 0.052 -0.126
2009q1 0.077 0.149 -0.12
2010q1 0.076 0.077 -0.173
2011q1 0.059 0.086 -0.100
2012q1 0.069 0.142 -0.199
2013q1 0.06 0.056 -0.352
2014q1 0.077 0.182 -0.186
2015q1 0.065 0.210 -0.210
Notes: Follows the Dolton and Makepeace (1985) de-
composition. Underlying regressions are reported in
Table D.1 in the appendix. Regressions include state
time trends, national time trend, sectoral fixed effects
and time trends, year fixed effects.
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I now adopt the Dolton and Makepeace (1985) decomposition to investigate the ‘sword-of-
justice’ effect in Mexico. The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.7. The raw
differences in the standard deviations reported in the first column suggest that the difference
in dispersion has remained roughly constant throughout the time period surveyed. Despite this
the trends suggest that the raw difference does increase in recessionary periods. The results for
the ‘treatment’ component, or the structural differences due to the union sector, suggest that
they account for the bulk of the gap. The differences in worker characteristics suggest that if
non-union workers were endowed with union characteristics there would be sharp decline in the
variance by approximately 0.12 of a standard deviation in 2005, this rises to 0.52 of a standard
deviation by 2016. Unfortunately due to the non-linear nature of this decomposition both of
the effects do not sum to the raw differences in standard deviations.
A concern that one may raise to this approach as outlined earlier is the endogenous nature of
union status. The effect of selection into unionised jobs, just as with the mean decomposition,
is that the decomposition will be tainted by unobserved selection. Exploiting the estimated
variances from table D.1 allow me to address this issue. These estimates suggest once selectivity
is taken into account, wage dispersion, as measured by the estimate of σ between the union
and nonunion sector are found to be different from each other, with the union estimate being
systematically lower, with the exception of 2010 and 2013. These findings tentatively support the
view that the ‘sword-of-justice’ effect in Mexico is not determined by the unobservable selection
into both the union and nonunion sector. Thus, the decline in dispersion is likely associated
with union pay policies.
Union Quantile Regression Effects
I will now investigate the magnitude of the wage mark-up across the conditional pay distribution
through the estimation of the union wage gap using quantile regression techniques. This ap-
proach has the added advantage that it allows me to infer how the wage gap behaves at selected
conditional quantiles. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 3.9. Looking at the
results for the wage gap at the bottom end of the wage distribution, it is clear that unionised
individuals in Mexico enjoy a modest gap of 2–7%. The median wage gap is found to be zero
for periods prior to 2011, where the median gap is found to oscillate between 2–3%. Conversely,
union members at the upper ends of the wage distribution actually witness a decline in their
wages relative to nonunion members. This is found to be in the order of 4–7%.
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For the most recent recessionary period, 2013–present, unions have secured wage differentials
across the conditional pay distribution for those at the median and the bottom end of the wage
distribution. These findings confirm the story that has emerged throughout this paper. In
the past decade unions have remained relatively marginalised in the labour market. During
favourable macroeconomic periods they are able to bargain higher wages for their workers, and
they attempt to shield those at the bottom ends of the wage distribution as much as possible.
However, Mexican unions are unable to cut a swathe across the wage distribution to the same
extent as their counterparts in developed countries, and it is possible that this is associated
with the declines in union density witnessed in the last decade in the Mexican labour market.
However, this conjecture requires further investigation and research. Equally, as the estimates
of the union pay gap are determined by a simple intercept shift, it is likely that the critique of
Elder et al. (2010); S loczyn´ski (2015a) apply in these estimates, and this may to some extent
explain the effects at the upper ends of the income distribution.
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3.6 Conclusions
The empirical analysis undertaken in this chapter provided evidence on the magnitude of the
union wage gap in Mexico during the last decade, one which has witnessed continued deunion-
isation. This analysis was performed using a variety of different methods.
This chapter uses a rich labour force survey data from the Mexican labour market with a
sample size of 163,000–180,000 male private sector salaried workers aged 16-64. The real wage
(in 2010 Pesos) is calculated using the hourly wages net of any non-wage benefits that individuals
receive from their main job. This chapter sought to assess what unions have done to wages in
the last decade. This question was addressed in two approaches. The first was to look at the
union wage mark-up, whilst the second sought to determine whether unions compress the wage
distribution and thus confirm the existence of the ‘sword-of-justice’ effect.
I estimated various wage equations. From these estimates one can conclude that unions
alter change returns to human capital for their members. They increase those for secondary
education, whilst reduce those for tertiary education and above. This acts as an equalising force
within the labour market. Unionised individuals receive higher returns to an additional year in
the workplace, compared to their nonunionised counterparts. The mean raw wage gap estimated
during the period 2005–2016 was found to fluctuate in the range of 18–22 percent.
When applying the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder index number decomposition, the unex-
plained component of the decomposition is found to range between 6.7% and 13.8%, when
asking the question: “What would nonunion individuals earn if they unionised?” I then address
the concern of selection into unions by employing the lags between ‘officialist’ and independent
union strike threats as instruments in a Lee (1978) endogenous switching model. These are both
a set of plausible and theoretically exogenous instruments. However, I must acknowledge that
the instruments do not identify union attachment perfectly, however, in the years where these
work best, I find that there is no selection of unobservables into the union sector, indeed it seems
there is negative selection of unobservables into the private sector. Thus, when correcting for
this issue the implicit question being asked is now: “What would the gain be to a nonunion
individual joining a union, if they were randomly selected from the population?” This effect
is found to range between 15–20%. These findings are in contrast with the estimates derived
from individual fixed-effects panel estimation of the union wage gap. When estimating a model
with individual fixed effects the estimates range between 1.9–4.2%, but where the whole sample
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period wage mark-up is found to be 2%. I synthesize all of these findings, and suggest that they
are all mutually compatible, but ultimately all measure different elements of the wage mark-up.
I conclude that if one compares to earlier estimates, the average treatment effect has remained
constant since the 1980s.
The investigation then turns to the ‘sword-of-justice’ effect. I find that Mexican unions are
found to systematically compress dispersion in the wage distribution. This is corroborated by
the application of a Dolton and Makepeace (1985) variance decomposition, and these findings
are robust to correcting for endogeneity in the union sector. I then try to estimate how the wage
mark-up varies across the wage distribution and find that unions in Mexico, where possible,
increase the wages of those workers at the bottom end of the wage distribution, whilst those at
the upper ends of the wage distribution see a union penalty.
The estimates presented in this chapter suggest that unions in Mexico, despite having a
history of being co-opted by the state, do behave like unions in other developed countries. Sum-
ming up, all of the competing estimates of the union wage gap differ in terms of the hypothetical
question being asked. If one is interested on the wage gap for those currently in a union, then
it seems that this is small and 2–4%. If one is interested on the potential gains if nonunionised
individuals joined a union, then the estimates presented in this chapter suggest that the average
individual stands to gain between 6 and 14 per cent. However, I acknowledge that this may be
reflecting selection of unobservables in the labour market. However, fundamentally, this question
is similar to that posed by the ATE for the whole population. The union wage mark-up when
looked at through the prism of the average treatment effect has oscillated between 7–10.4%,
suggesting that it has remained remarkably constant over the last decade, and when compared
to the evidence provided by Panagides and Patrinos (1994), it is suggestive that this may be
true for much of the past two decades. Nevertheless, it does seem that it is salient disentangle
who benefits from unionisation, I propose to address this by asking: “What is the treatment
effect for those who unionise?”. This will be subject of the investigation in the next chapter.
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Appendix B
Kernel densities for selected years
Figure B.1: Kernel density of ln(wages/hours) by union status, Mexico 2005q1
Note: Author’s own calculation using ENOE.
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Figure B.2: Kernel density of ln(wages/hours) by union status, Mexico 2010q1
Note: Author’s own calculation using ENOE.
Figure B.3: Kernel density of ln(wages/hours) by union status, Mexico 2016q1
Note: Author’s own calculation using ENOE.
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Appendix C
OLS Wage Equation Estimates
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Appendix D
Endogenous Switching
This appendix outlines the motivation and derivation of the endogenous switching model. It
also reports the estimates for the Lee (1978) procedure.
Assuming that the utility function for the ith individual in sector s where, as in equation
(3.1) s = [n, u]. Where n and u denote nonunion and union status respectively. The benefits
associated with sector s are given as follows:
Ui(s, b) = α · (Wis + Z′iγs) + i(s, b) (D.1)
where as before W is the natural log of hourly wages and γ is a vector of individual char-
acteristics. It follows that increases in W would also increase an individuals utility. Thus, an
individual would choose to be in the union sector u if the following is true:
Ui(u, b) + C(u, b) ≥ Ui(n, b) + C(n, b) (D.2)
So, the union sector is associated with benefits b, and these are preferred so long as the value
added C to the individual by unionisation is greater than that which would be available in the
nonunion sector s. Naturally, what follows from this is that union status may not be random.
Estimation of equation (3.1) would be biased. Now, the exact monetary value of unionisation in
(D.2) is unobserved in this empirical application. However, I assume that these are related to
the type of wage bargaining approach that a specific union make take. As discussed earlier in
section 3.3 and the previous subsection, it may be that the bargaining behaviour of a union as
measured by the petitions rate for independent unions and ‘officialist’ may be such an identifying
instrument. Then what follows is an endogenous switching regime such as that shown in Lee
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(1978).
Where substituting the sector independent version of equation (3.1) into (D.1) yields a utility
reduced form where the sector specific subscripts have been suppressed:
Ui(s, b) = α · (x′sβs) + Z′iγs + ψi(s) (D.3)
where ψi = α · ηi + (s)
yielding
U?α(x′sβs + Z
′
iγs) + ψi (D.4)
However, we do not observe the latent state of U?, assuming that ψi(s) ∼ N(0, σ2s), yields
the following estimable probit model:
Pr(U = 1) = Φ(x′sβs + Z
′
iγs) (D.5)
where the Z vector includes all the identifying instruments for union status, namely the lag
of ‘officialist’ and independent union petition rate for a given industry in a given municipality.
Now, in order to correct for union selection equation (3.1) into (D.1) become:
wui = x
′
iuβu + λ
′
u
(
−φ(Zˆi)
Φ(Zˆi)
)
+ ηu (D.6)
wni = x
′
inβn + λ
′
n
(
φ(Zˆi)
(1− Φ(Zˆi))
)
+ ηn (D.7)
Where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the pdf and CDF of the normal distribution and P = Pr(U = 1|Zi)
Thus, we now have sector specific wage equations that account for the selection into union status
this effect will be given by λ estimands, and where E(ηu|U = 1) = − φ(Zˆi)Φ(Zˆi) and E(ηn|U = 0) =
φ(Zˆi)
(1−Φ(Zˆi)) which are the inverse Mills ratio and the complement of the Mills ratio, respectively.
The estimated parameter λ = σ · ρ where σ is the variance of the error term of the selection
model, whilst ρ = corr(η, ψ). As in Heckman’s original model, it is worthwhile noting that the
standard errors from the two-step approach outlined above will be incorrect. As Lee (1978)
points out there has to be a correction to the variance covariance matrix to account for the
inclusion of the estimated selectivity coefficients. Greene (1981) derives an analytical solution
to the correct error structure of this type of Heckit model.
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The approach adopted in this paper is to obtain the estimates for the endogenous switching
model by implementing estimation of equations (D.5), (D.6) and (D.7) is to estimate these
as a single equation using FIML. In practice this is done by using the programme derived by
Lokshin and Sajaia (2004). As noted by Puhani (2000) the use of the FIML estimator should
be preferred unless there are issues of collinearity. One major drawback to the FIML estimator
is the computational intensity required to run. The estimated log likelihood function looks as
follows:
lnL =
∑
i
(
Ui
[
ln {Φ(τui)}+ ln {φ(ηui/σu)/σu}
]
+ (D.8)
(1− Ui)
[
ln{1− Φ(τni)}+ ln{φ(ηni/σn)/σn}
])
Where as before φ(.) and Φ(.) are the PDF and CDF of the normal distribution, and
τsi =
(Z′iγi + ρsηsi/σs)√
1− ρ2s
s = u, n
As it should be clear an added advantage to this procedure is the indirect estimation of the
parameter ρ which is defined as before as the correlation between the selection model and the
selectivity corrected equation. In practice ρs and σs are indirectly estimated as transformations
lnσs and atanhρs, ensuring that the variables are positive and bounded in the space [−1, 1],
respectively.
The inclusion of the selection terms now pose a problem for the estimation of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition. In the case where the decomposition is computed from a two-step
procedure the σ parameters must be excluded from the βˆ vector of parameters and the x¯ vectors
of means as in equations (3.2) and (3.3). Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) propose various alternatives
for incorporating the selection effect into the decomposition. One of the most attractive is that
proposed by Duncan and Leigh (1980) and Reimers (1983) who suggest that the selectivity be
net out and a new term be added to equation (3.2). The decomposition now becomes:
w¯u − w¯n = (Xu −Xn)′βˆn + X′u(βˆu − βˆn) + (θˆuλ¯u − θˆnλ¯n) (D.9)
where θˆs = ρˆsσˆs. The last term is the selectivity effect, or the differences due to selectivity
bias. It should be noted that the decomposition no longer refers to the wage differential, as
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netting out the selectivity effect amounts to comparing the difference in wage offers between
union and nonunion sectors. Given the components of θs are not just identified, but estimated
as part of the log likelihood function then we may obtain the sampling variance of the last term
of the decomposition. The variance is as follows:
V(θˆuλ¯u − θˆnλ¯n) =
([
Vλ¯uVρ
2
u
]
+
[
V(λ¯u)ρ
2
u
]
+
[
V(ρ2u)λ¯
2
u
]−
[
Vλ¯nVρ
2
n
]
+
[
V(λ¯n)ρ
2
n
]
+
[
V(ρ2n)λ¯
2
n
])
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Chapter 4
Are there gains to joining a union?
4.1 Introduction
Unions in Mexico have been in decline since the 1980s. Union density has declined from a peak of
approximately 14% in 1984 of the male formal labour force to its current rate of approximately
7.5%. Whilst density fell in the 1990s, the early to mid-2000s witnessed a minor resurgence
in unionisation rates. Yet, most information on the effects of unions relate exclusively to that
period. Even then, very little is known about the role of unions in the face of macroeconomic
adversity, and their role in bargaining over non-pay packages. This chapter aims to investigate
the union role along these dimensions for the recent eleven-year period (2005–2016). The evid-
ence presented in Chapter 3 revealed that there is a sizeable raw mean wage differential between
union members and nonmembers (18–22 percent). This gap reduces to 6.7–13.8% once worker
characteristics are taken into account. However, this estimate is based on the counterfactual
wages if those not currently in a union were to unionise. Estimates from the Average Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATET) suggest that the union wage mark-up for current members is a
modest -2.4–4.4%. These point estimates are confirmed by a na¨ıve application of an individual
fixed-effects estimator confirming the effect of ‘switching’ to be 2%. However, conventional es-
timates of ATET and Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), conflate the effects of being
a union ‘joiners’ and ‘leaver’. This is likely biasing the estimates reported. The goal of this
chapter is to obtain a clean estimate of the ATET which is free of these issues.
Given the modest estimates of the ATET from Chapter 3, and the evidence presented by
Fairris (2006), who finds that during the 1990s and Mexican unions tilted worker compensa-
tion towards non-wage benefits, it is salient to ask “Is there any benefit / loss associated with
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transitioning in or out of a union?” This chapter will address the research question by carefully
disentangling the wage and non-wage benefits to joining (leaving) a union. The main contri-
bution of this chapter is that it provides the first estimates of the short-run effects of unions
on worker compensation to the literature for a developing country. This is investigated using
the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo (ENOE), a richly detailed labour force survey
conducted on a quarterly basis. This dataset comprises a rotating panel with individuals inter-
viewed for five consecutive quarters. I exploit the panel dimension of these data to look at the
union wage differential as well as probability models of non-wage benefits for union joiners and
leavers.
The results reveal that in the short-run, the average union joiner does not perceive any wage
differentials. However, when the data are disaggregated, it becomes clear temporary contract
workers who unionise—amongst some of the most vulnerable workers—obtain a wage increase
of 18.5% relative to other temporary non-unionised workers. No other wage effects are detected
for any other sub-group. Nevertheless, the probability of being in receipt of legally mandated
non-wage benefits rises as a consequence of unionising. This is also found to be consistent across
individuals either transitioning firms or contract types.
The results for union leavers suggest that in the short-run they perceive decreases in their
wages, in particular once differences in characteristics are taken into account. Temporary con-
tract workers who leave unions are the sub-group that find their wages decrease by 44%. Equally,
union leavers are found to have lower probabilities of holding legally mandated non-wage bene-
fits.
The evidence provided suggests that the voice effects originally suggested by Freeman and
Medoff (1984) remain relevant today in Mexico. Unions ensure that firms provide all of the
legally mandated benefits to which a worker is entitled. Leavers forfeit these benefits, perhaps
in exchange for maintaining wages commensurate with their erstwhile union bargained wage
levels.
The chapter is laid out as follows: I draw upon the developed country union literature and
provide a brief background to the legal requirements of the Ley Federal del Trabajo (FLL) in
Section 4.2. The data are described in more detail in Section 4.3. The methodology is detailed
in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results, some robustness checks are presented
in Section 4.6, and finally Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 Background
4.2.1 Federal Labour Law provisions in non-wage benefits
Chapter 2 outlined the entitlements guaranteed by the FLL. My aim in this chapter is to
investigate the effect of joining and leaving a union. This effect will be investigated focussing
on both the wages and the non-wage components of remuneration. In the Mexican context,
as outlined previously, full-time formal workers are entitled to an Aguinaldo (or Bonus), paid
holidays, and registration with social security, which in turn entitles workers to a pension. The
FLL also outlines the legal framework under which unions operate. It should be noted that
enshrined in the FLL is the freedom to both unionise and leave a union.1 Union membership is
defined as voluntary, and in the law it states that one may join or leave a union without being
the subject of coercion. Joining a union may take multiple forms. In principle, however, workers
must form a new union which may then be associated with a larger national unions congress.
When changing jobs one may be able to enter a union to obtain a union contract. Any worker
over 14 years of age may join a union. All unions need to be registered to the relevant Arbitration
and Conciliation Commission. The law does not proscribe the procedure for voluntarily leaving
a union, and only lays out the rules for someone to be involuntarily expelled from a union, for
which a two-thirds majority based on a non-secret vote is required. The details of leaving a union
are left to each union’s constitution. However, in general, leaving a union is an administratively
expensive affair. One may resign their union membership by writing a letter formally doing
so, and having it notarised. This will then need to be presented for ratification to the relevant
Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. Finally this is presented to the union leadership.
However, this may also have implications for a worker’s contract. If the collective contract is for
unionised individuals, workers may need to reapply for their jobs to obtain a role as a trabajador
de confianza, that is a nonunionised role within the same firm.
4.2.2 Literature Review
The original neoclassical labour economics view on unions characterises them as monopolists.
The absence of unions would see competition between individuals for jobs, which would lead to
firms offering market clearing pay packages that reward the worker for their marginal contribu-
tion to the production process. The composition of the pay packet should be attractive to the
1See (Art. 359 FLL)
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marginal worker in order to ensure competitiveness. Thus, if workers were interested in better
non-wage benefits (e.g. pensions, profit-sharing, medical cover, etc.), they would settle for a
job with a lower wage that provides better benefits. In this view unionised individuals distort
the pay composition of the remuneration package and increase it above the competitive level
through the threat of increasing firm costs(through strike action, for example).
Freeman and Medoff (1984) offer an alternative view of unions. In a series of seminal studies
they investigate what they describe as the ‘other face’ of unionism. This view, developed from
earlier work by Hirschman (1971) and Slichter et al. (1960), is coined by Freeman and Medoff as
‘collective voice’. For example, individuals who face economic problems may use two methods
to solve these problems. The first is exit-and-entry. In this instance, it would imply that the one
way in which an individual may make their discontent felt is through quitting their job. The
second alternative is what Hirschman called ‘voice’. It emphasises the use of communication
to lead to better outcomes. However, there may be instances in which worker voice may lead
to adverse outcomes. Unions in that sense serve as a medium for collective voice that may
be better able to speak to management to ameliorate work conditions. Unions in this case are
political institutions, which, if elected democratically, respond to the needs of their median voter
(member). This suggests that they will bargain with management over the composition of pay
packets to reflect their membership’s median preferences over those of the marginal worker.
Freeman (1981) was the first study to explicitly examine the effect of unions on non-wage be-
nefit composition. Using the Expenditures for Employee Compensation (EEC), an establishment
level survey for the USA, he finds that the a priori predictions that non-wage benefits are greater
for unionised firms is upheld by the data. Workplaces with a union density of 50% have 25–35%
higher expenditure on non-mandatory benefits. This raw gap, once adjusted for levels of total
compensation is reduced to 15–20%. Freeman and Medoff (1984) utilise various individual-level
datasets to further analyse this question2, and find that union members are 24 to 32 percentage
points more likely than nonunion workers to have a pension. Montgomery and Shaw (1997) find
unions to be associated with a larger incidence of pension benefits. Using longitudinal Canadian
data, Swindinsky and Kupferschmidt (1991) report that unionised workers are 20% more likely
to have a pension plan. Miller and Mulvey (1992) report for Australia, using a longitudinal
survey, that the value of fringe benefits are 13.9% higher for union compared to nonunion work-
ers. Kornfeld (1993) finds that joining a union in Australia increases the probability of having a
2Namely the Current Population Survey (CPS), the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men (NLSOM),
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Quality of Employment Survey (QES).
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pension. Budd (2004) updates the estimates of unions and fringe benefits for the USA and finds
that being in a union increases the probability of having employer-provided health insurance
and a pension by 16.4% and 18.8% respectively. Budd (2005) updates the Freeman (1981) EEC
estimates and finds that the voluntary benefits are 10.5% higher for union compared to nonunion
members. Budd and Mumford (2004) estimate the effects of unions on family friendly policies.
They find that unions increase the probability of parental leave, subsidised childcare, special
leave, and job-sharing options.
Budd (2004) suggests that unions may also increase the uptake of mandated social insurance
benefits through what he calls the ‘facilitation effect’. He suggests that unions not only act as
a medium for the collective voice of workers, but they may also play an important role in the
diffusion of knowledge about existing benefits to which workers may be entitled. Hirsch et al.
(1997) suggest that part of the differential in compensation between union/nonunion workers
may be due to the assistance unions provide. This is supported by evidence in Budd and Brey
(2003), who find for unionised hourly employees that there is a greater probability of having
heard of the American Family and Medical Leave Act. Budd and McCall (1997) find that
unemployment insurance is more likely to be taken up by union than nonunion members.
The literature reviewed thus far has focused on developed countries. For developing countries
Standing (1992) looks at the incidence of non-wage benefits using establishment level data for
Malaysia. He finds that benefits differ not only between union/nonunion workers but rather
that the entitlement to benefits is greater for those unionised by an industry-level union than
at plant-level. Baah (2005) finds that Ghanaean trade unions significantly increase access to
medical, and non-wage benefits by 41 to 48 percentage points. Fairris (2006) reports evidence
for Mexico using establishment level data for 1992 and 1999. He finds that for the period prior
to North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) unionised establishments offered benefits
140 percent higher than nonunion establishments, and after liberalisation this had decreased
to 26 percent. Fairris (2007) further exploits the establishment data to look at the value of
fringe benefits as a proportion of compensation and finds that unions lower this proportion
relative to the nonunion sector. The difference is found to be 0.2% in 1992. However, after trade
liberalisation this had widened to 7.2%. Fairris suggests that a lack of research in the area for
developing countries is to a large extent due to the unavailability of detailed surveys.
The extant evidence on non-wage benefits and wages reviewed thus far in the literature is
exclusively based on the concept of a differential between the union and nonunion sector using
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cross-sectional data. This chapter aims to look beyond the concept of the gap between the two
sectors and investigate the wage and non-wage benefit gain (loss) associated with transitioning
to (from) a union job using longitudinal data. This is a gap which both the developing and
developed country literature has not considered to date to my knowledge.
4.3 Data
The analysis in this chapter utilises the ENOE, a nationally representative labour force survey
carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica (INEGI), the
government statistics agency. The survey follows a complex sample design. It is a two-stage
self-weighting sample. The first stage stratifies over geographical areas, whilst in the second
stage households are randomly selected for inclusion in the survey. Each quarter one-fifth of
households in the sample are dropped and a new cohort is introduced. Each cohort is interviewed
for five consecutive quarters. Thus, every survey quarter contains five cohorts at different points
of their respective interview cycle. Unfortunately, the survey only includes the question on union
membership in the extended questionnaire, which is only administered once every calendar year.
For the purposes of this chapter, this effectively reduces the available sample to those individuals
for whom there are two extended questionnaire responses one year apart. In all instances this
leaves only two temporal observations per period.
The specific question that individuals were asked was: “¿En este empleo pertenece a algu´n
sindicato?”.3 Note that this question is asked separately for main jobs and any other jobs
that an individual holds. This chapter is only concerned with the response relating to an
individual’s primary job as this is the one for which the union decision is most likely to be
relevant. During the first five quarters of ENOE’s existence households were interviewed using
the expanded questionnaire, subsequent applications of the expanded questionnaire have been
restricted to once every four quarters. The present study exploits the between-year transitions.
To date there have been fourteen editions of the expanded questionnaire.4 The relevant question
for mandated non-wage benefits is as follows: “En este trabajo ¿ A usted le dan (aguinaldo |
vacaciones con goce de sueldo)?”5 and “En este trabajo ¿ A usted le dan fondo de retiro, aunque
no lo utilice?”.6 The nature of the questions asked limits the scope of the analysis. No further
3“In this job do you belong to a union?”
4These are 2005q1–2006q2, 2007q2, 2008q2, 2009q1, 2010q1, 2011q1, 2012q1, 2013q1, 2014q1, 2015q1 and
2016q1.
5“In this job do you receive (bonus | paid holidays)?”
6“Although you may not use it in this job do you receive a retirement fund (pension)?”
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information regarding the value of these benefits is asked in the survey questionnaire. Thus,
this chapter solely focuses on the incidence of these non-wage benefits rather than their value
or magnitude.
The nature of the pensions question must be regarded with care. Mexico since 1997 has
a defined contributions pension system. Workers who are registered with the Mexican Instuto
Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS) are automatically enrolled for a pension7, regardless of an
individual opting-in. Contributions towards this pension will automatically be deducted from
their base salary, employers have to match this by law, and the government also adds a small
proportion to this pot.8 Workers may opt to have their mandatory pensions managed by the
central government ‘concentrated’ account,9 or they may choose amongst one of the twenty-one
private providers to invest their pension. Given this automatic enrolment, this question must
therefore be interpreted as private—external to the IMSS scheme—pension provision.
As hinted above, the nature of the survey creates a challenge for the construction of a panel
dataset. For the first six quarters of the survey’s existence a large proportion of the whole
sample may be tracked.10 However, for later years we are only able to track one-fifth of the
sample between quarters. For the purposes of this chapter I have chosen to look at year on year
transitions.
The literature suggests that wage determination by unions within the public sector is markedly
different from that in the private sector (Ehrenberg and Schwarz, 1986). For this reason I restrict
the analysis to those wage earners in the private sector11, who are of legal working age (16–65).
This means that self-employed individuals, workers in the armed forces, and domestic service
workers are excluded from our sample. Females were not included in the analysis in order to
reflect the type of samples that have been used in the literature investigating the magnitude of
the wage gap.
The sample size, once these restrictions have been imposed, is reported in Table 4.1. The
dataset for the whole time period contains 70,698 observations, implying there are 35,346 indi-
7This is the case since the 1997 reform, so for any workers who were in the labour market prior to this date,
they would have had a pension which was managed in their employer’s designated bank, however, after the 1997
reform they would have had to migrate this to one of the privately managed pension funds available.
8Note that workers may also add additional unmatched contributions towards this fund.
9Which is in turn managed by one of the twenty-one private providers, with a rotating three month basis.
10The proportion that one is able to track depends on the frequency of transitions one wishes to consider.
11The analysis in this chapter is exclusively focused on the private sector, as there is a large literature that shows
that public sector unions, may behave differently. There is however a restriction which must be acknowledged.
There may be unobserved selection which is ignored wherein individuals sort themselves into the public sector
and private sector, as well as self-employment. I lack the instruments to identify this selection process. It should
be noted that both ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ in the analysis will be subject to this caveat.
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viduals, of which 4,512 transition in and out of unions over the period 2005–2016. It should also
be noted that all informal workers are excluded from this sample. This is due to the different
wage determination process in that segment of the labour force, and the fact that unionisation
in this sector is fairly fragmented.
Following Addison et al. (2013) I define two new groups ‘Union Joiners’ and ‘Union Leavers’.
Joiners are individuals who are not union members in time t = 0 but are so in t = 1. Therefore,
they are found to have transitioned into the union sector, and their natural comparison group are
those individuals who have never joined a union. That is, in both t = 0 and t = 1 they report no
union affiliation. Equally Leavers are those individuals who in t = 0 are union members and in
t = 1 report to no longer have a union affiliation. Their comparison group are those individuals
who in both t = 0, 1 report to be in a union. This method for identifying union status changers
does not distinguish between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ unionisation. Active unionisation is when
an individual seeks out a union, and this may often occur at the same time as one changes
job. Whilst ‘passive’ unionisation is when a union arrives at a work place and seeks to organise
it. This distinction requires foreknowledge of an individual’s intent. This information is not
included in ENOE. However, one way in which this can be identified is to look at other changes
that occur simultaneously with one’s union transition. We can think that those individuals who
actively unionise are those who also transition job at the same time as joining a union, whilst
those passively unionising are those who remain in their workplace during the transition. These
transitions will be identified by looking at changes in an individual’s self-reported tenure in a
firm. Those individuals who report having an employer tenure lower than one year and who
were employed in the previous period are assumed to have changed job.
Wages are defined as the log of the gross hourly wage, which is an individual’s gross wage
divided by the hours worked. This is deflated using the National Consumer Price Index (CPI)
for Mexico provided by INEGI. Thus wages are expressed in December 2010 prices. The coverage
of non-wage benefits in the ENOE survey is limited. The respondent is asked whether they are
in receipt of the following: bonuses, or paid holidays. The information regarding pensions is
reported as the availability of a pension regardless of whether or not an individual is a recipient.
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the whole sample of joining/leaving transitions.
It is notable that unlike the average wage gap, the average wage difference between joiners
and never union individuals is about 12.5% prior to joining a union, this gap is increased to
14.7% after joining a union. This gives a simple difference-in-difference estimate of joining a
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Table 4.1: Individual characteristics of Joiners and Leavers, 2005q1–2016q1
Never Union Union Joiners Always Union Union Leavers
(a) ln(Hourly Wages) in 2010 prices
Pre & Post transition 3.185 3.324 3.350 3.310
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Pre transition 3.196 3.321 3.347 3.339
(0.004) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Post transition 3.179 3.326 3.351 3.292
(0.003) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
(b) Bonus
Pre & Post transition 0.560 0.886 0.960 0.867
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Pre transition 0.557 0.830 0.955 0.911
(0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Post transition 0.561 0.919 0.963 0.841
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007)
(c) Paid Holidays
Pre & Post transition 0.245 0.570 0.746 0.542
(0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Pre transition 0.245 0.460 0.738 0.627
(0.003) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Post transition 0.245 0.635 0.750 0.489
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
(d) Pension
Pre & Post transition 0.529 0.872 0.952 0.855
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Pre transition 0.527 0.802 0.949 0.901
(0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Post transition 0.530 0.914 0.954 0.827
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
(e) Demographic
Age
Under 25 0.24 0.21 0.10 0.17
25–44 0.54 0.59 0.63 0.63
45+ 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.20
Married 0.55 0.61 0.74 0.65
(f) Job Characteristics
Tenure
Less than 1 year 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.06
1–3 years 0.41 0.40 0.23 0.33
4–6 years 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20
7–15 years 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.26
15–25 years 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.12
26+ years 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03
Temporary Contract 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.12
No Contract 0.47 0.11 0.03 0.12
Firm Size
Micro 0.40 0.08 0.01 0.10
Small 0.30 0.20 0.09 0.22
Medium 0.18 0.29 0.23 0.28
Large 0.11 0.42 0.67 0.40
Sector
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.02
Extractive Industry & Utilities 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02
Manufacturing 0.23 0.50 0.66 0.48
Constuction 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04
Trade 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.16
Accomodation & Food Services 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07
Transportation and Warehousing 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10
Professional, Financial & Corporate Services 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.05
Social Services 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Other Services 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.04
Public Administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Region
NE 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.22
NW 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.17
West 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.11
East 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.12
CN 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.18
CS 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
SE 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09
SW 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
∆firm
Stayers 0.30 0.35 0.38 0.34
Changers 0.46 0.40 0.35 0.43
N 70,692 4,320 4,704 4,384
Notes: All variables are measured at individual level. These data are derived from the extended questionnaires
of the ENOE survey. Standard errors for the means of the outcome variables are provided in parentheses. For
proportions, these standard errors are derived using the binomial formula.
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union of 2.2%.12 Equally, the gap between leavers and always union individuals is found to
be -0.01% in favour of always union members prior to leaving, and this falls to -5.8%, sug-
gesting a difference-in-differences estimate of -6% for the wage loss concept.13 With respect to
demographic characteristics the average joiner and leaver do not appear to be dissimilar.
Looking at the distribution of available non-wage benefits between joiners and never union
members, there is a notable difference in the incidence of provision of these benefits. The un-
adjusted difference-in-difference estimates, calculated from Table 4.1, suggest that union joiners
perceive an increase in the incidence of non-wage benefits in the range of 8.5–17.5 percentage
points.14 For union leavers, the unadjusted difference-in-differences the decline in incidence of
non-wage benefits is between 7.7–15 percentage points.15 The largest difference is found to
be for bonuses where the incidence of paid holidays. This suggests that there are issues with
compliance with FLL in the formal sector. Unfortunately, due to limitations with the data we
are unable to investigate how the magnitude of the perceived bonuses vary across joiners/never
union and leavers/always union individuals.
Many of the job characteristics reveal the same pattern. On average union ‘joiners’, ‘leavers’,
and ‘always members’, are remarkably similar. The rest of the labour force, however, appears
to be workers without a contract16, predominantly working in micro firms (i.e. those with fewer
than ten workers). There seems to much more dispersion across different sectors, unlike for
those union members, concentrated in large firms, often in the manufacturing sector.
4.4 Methodology
As outlined in the previous section, the objective of this chapter is to investigate the effects of
joining/leaving a union on wages, bonuses, holidays and pension provision. Let us assume that
the outcome of interest, denoted Y , for individual i in transition year t in quarter q is given as
follows:
Yitq = αi + γq + φPt + δUitq × Pt +Xitq′β + ηitq (4.1)
12The t-statistic for this is 1.63, suggesting that this is marginally statistically significant.
13The t-statistic for this is 2.22 suggesting it is highly statistically significant.
14The z statistics for these are 7.49, 11.36, and 9.14 for bonuses, paid holidays and pensions, respectively. All
of these are highly significant.
15Where the relevant z statistics for these are 6.65, 7.46 and 6.5 for bonuses, paid holidays and pensions,
respectively. All of these are highly significant.
16It should be noted that although a worker may not hold a written contract the Federal Labour Law explicitly
states that once an employer-employee relation has begun one is entitled to all of the non-wage benefits described
therein.
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In this particular application Yitq is either log wages (in December 2010 prices), or the
incidence of non-wage benefits (viz. Bonus, Paid Holidays, or Pension provision).
The difference-in-difference model presented in expression (4.1) is a two-period model where
αi is a time invariant unobserved individual effect, γq is the quarter-year fixed effect, Pt is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 where t = 1. Uitq is a dummy variable which denotes the
following two concepts: Firstly joiners, that is individuals who are not union members in time
t = 0 but in t = 1 are found to have transitioned into a union job, and their natural comparison
group are individuals who have never joined a union (that is, in both t = 0 and t = 1 they
report no union affiliation). Secondly, there are leavers, that is individuals who in t = 0 are
union members and in t = 1 they report as no longer having union affiliation. Their comparison
group are those individuals who in both t = 0, 1 report to be in a union. Thus, the model
will be separately estimated for each group. The vector Xitq is a vector of individual and job
specific characteristics. The parameter estimate of interest from equation (4.1) is the difference-
in-differences estimate, which is given by δ̂. This estimate can be given the interpretation of
the union wage/non-wage benefit gain/loss.The tables below exclusively report the estimates
of this parameter. This parameter is estimated by using a two-period fixed effects model. The
non-wage benefits difference-in-difference parameter is analogous to (4.1), and estimated by OLS
using a linear probability model.
The vector Xitq contain age and its quadratic, tenure and its quadratic, marital status, firm
size dummies, contract type, industry sectoral dummies, and state dummies, and state quarterly
trends.
4.5 Results
Table 4.2 presents the estimates for the gains associated with joining a union. The table presents
the estimate for the δ̂ parameter in expression (4.1). The estimates are for the pooled transitions
over the whole time period 2005q1–2016q1. Individuals are separated into union ‘joiners’ and
union ‘leavers’ with their respective comparison groups being those individuals who have never
been unionised, and those who over the course of the survey always report belonging to a union.
Thus, the estimate gives the ‘short-run’ effect of unionising when compared to the group of those
individuals who never joined a union. The row of baseline estimates reflect the whole available
sample, whilst each successive row represents the estimates for a particular sub-sample.
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Table 4.2: Difference-in-Differences estimates of joining a union 2005q1–2016q1
Wages Bonus Paid Holidays Pension
Baseline 0.030* 0.044*** 0.138*** 0.063***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)
N 75,012 75,012 75,012 75,012
Temporary Contract 0.170** 0.136** 0.057 0.138**
(0.080) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060)
N 32,979 32,979 32,979 32,979
Permanent Contract -0.037 -0.002 0.113*** 0.038***
(0.023) (0.010) (0.025) (0.013)
N 26,043 26,043 26,043 26,043
Exlude Micro Businesses 0.019 0.028** 0.121*** 0.051***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
N 39,914 39,914 39,914 39,914
Permanent Exclude Micro -0.040 -0.001 0.110*** 0.041***
(0.024) (0.010) (0.027) (0.013)
N 20,563 20,563 20,563 20,563
Firm Stayers 0.030 0.031* 0.137*** 0.049**
(0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.020)
N 22,518 22,518 22,518 22,518
Firm Changers 0.003 0.070*** 0.158*** 0.087***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020)
N 34,509 34,509 34,509 34,509
Notes: The model specification follows (4.1) in the text. Each column reports the difference-in-
differences (δ̂) estimate obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining
a union independent of the business cycle. The errors for these estimates are calculated using
the White (1980) sandwich estimator. The regressions reported include the demographic and job
specific characteristics outlined in panes (e) and (f) of Table 4.1. The regressions also include
State specific time trends. For definitions of the dependent variables see text in Section 4.3.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
Over the whole period the average wage gain for the average union ‘joiner’ is found to be
weakly statistically significant. I find that on average, those individuals who join a union see
their wages increase by 3% relative to never unionised individuals. In order to tease out the
effect I re-estimated equation (4.1) on different sub-samples. It can be seen that the wage effects
reported for the overall sample are mainly driven by those individuals who hold a temporary
contract. Temporary workers who unionise see their wages increase by approximately 17%
relative to their never unionised counterparts.
‘Never union’ individuals are predominantly clustered in micro firms, whilst union ‘joiners’
are on average more likely to be found amongst larger firms. This poses a potential issue in
comparing these two sub-samples as it could be argued that small firms have fundamentally
different labour relations, and are unlikely to even have a union presence. However, excluding
this particular sub-sample yields a broadly similar story as that for the aggregate, namely that
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there is no union wage gain.17 This evidence is thus consistent with the modest wage gaps of
the ATET reported in Chapter 3.
The evidence presented for non-wage benefits is the first of its kind. The impact of the union
gain on these fringe benefits has never been estimated. The poor macroeconomic performance
of the Mexican economy in the 1980s and 1990s coupled with a decline in union membership
altered the discourse of unions. The rhetoric of trade unions shifted towards the concept of
the ‘social wage’ (Middlebrook, 1995). This language suggests that unions seek to maximise
non-wage benefits for their rank-and-file. This is borne out by the estimates obtained. Union
joiners are consistently and significantly more likely to be in receipt of ‘mandatory’ benefits as
guaranteed by the FLL. Looking at the whole sample there is a modest increase in the probability
of being in receipt of bonuses of 4.4 percentage points. This suggests a 3.7 percent increase in
the incidence of bonuses if this is evaluated at the pre-transition average.18 Looking at the sub-
samples confirms a similar pattern. The effect is highest for those in temporary contracts, whilst
there appears to be no gains to unionisation for those workers who have permanent contracts.
This may be explained, in part, by the legal entitlement that is afforded to permanent workers
by the FLL. These guarantees are undefined for part-time workers and those with different
contract types. Thus, union gains perhaps change the distribution of non-wage benefits for
those workers. This would also explain the magnitude of increased incidence of these effects
with respects to bonuses. Workers on temporary contracts who join a union experience an
increase of 13.6 percentage points in the probability of being in receipt of an end-of-year bonus,
relative to sub-sample of never union workers. This effect, when evaluated at the relevant pre-
transition incidence implies an increase of 11.2%. As with the estimates for wages, excluding
micro enterprises decreases the corresponding estimated δ̂ parameter. Equally, the effect on
bonuses is positive regardless of whether an individual stays or changes their firm status.19
Bonuses in the Mexican context are a real and tangible addition to a worker’s salary. However,
crucially, this fringe-benefit is disbursed only once per annum. It also does not count as a
part of the ‘salary’ concept, thus, enjoying higher pay due to a bonus does not increase other
proportional benefits such as employer pension contributions.
17In a separate exercise, not reported here, micro enterprises were excluded from all of the estimated sub-
samples. The coefficients for firm changers and stayers do not differ materially from those reported in Table
4.2.
18This extensive margin can be computed by multiplying the mean proportion prior to transition by the estim-
ated coefficient δ̂ of joiners. The relevant proportion for this calculation is available in table 4.1, and is 83%. So,
0.83× 0.044 = 0.037.
19Again, excluding micro enterprises dampens the magnitude of the effects in some instances, and in others it
increases, but nevertheless the effects reported remain significant.
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A similar pattern is discernible from the other non-wage benefits. Joiners are found to be
13.8 and 6.3 percentage points more likely to be in receipt of paid holidays and have private
pension schemes available for workers, respectively.20 In these sets of non-wage benefits joiners
are consistently found to have a higher probability of being in receipt of these ‘mandatory’ non-
wage benefits, even if one has a permanent contract. These estimates are curious as under the
FLL all individuals who work for firms should be registered with the Mexican Institute of Social
Security.
However, the estimates suggest that the probability of being in receipt of these fringe benefits
(which should be 100% for all full-time salaried formal workers) is higher for those who join
unions. This suggests that unions are acting as a mechanism which ensures that employers
provide workers with all of their legal entitlements. Unfortunately, without the ability to further
delve into the magnitude of the non-wage benefits provided we are unable to determine to what
extent union bargaining is increasing the magnitude of these benefits relative to their never
union counterparts.
The estimated effects of leaving a union are presented in Table 4.3. The estimates suggest
that there is union wage loss associated with leaving a union. For the average union leaver this
is found to be 4.2% relative to those individuals who are always unionised. Individuals who have
temporary contracts are penalised with a punitive 30.5% decrease in hourly wages.21 The losses
of leaving a union are more pervasive with respect to non-wage benefits.
20These, when evaluated at their correspondent pre-transition incidences imply increases of 6.3 and 5 percent,
respectively.
21However, due to the reduced sample size, one could argue there is selection on unobservables. Indeed, one
of the ways in which unions affect wages is through overtime, if the difference-in-differences exercise is performed
on hours worked it’s clear that this decrease is driven solely by changes in wages. A separate exercise on hours
worked shows that there is actually a significant increase of approximately 6.6 hours associated with leaving a
union. This suggests that the magnitude would be greater were it not for the compensating increase in hours.
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Table 4.3: Difference-in-Differences estimates of leaving a union, 2005q1–2016q1
Wages Bonus Paid Holidays Pension
Baseline -0.043** -0.048*** -0.092*** -0.052***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014)
N 9,088 9,088 9,088 9,088
Temporary Contract -0.365*** -0.123 -0.009 0.035
(0.110) (0.118) (0.124) (0.125)
N 810 810 810 810
Permanent Contract -0.016 -0.005 -0.064** -0.027*
(0.026) (0.009) (0.029) (0.014)
N 6,541 6,541 6,541 6,541
Exlude Micro Businesses -0.041** -0.040*** -0.097*** -0.046***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.024) (0.014)
N 8,390 8,390 8,390 8,390
Permanent Exclude Micro -0.015 -0.002 -0.074** -0.027*
(0.027) (0.009) (0.030) (0.014)
N 6,224 6,224 6,224 6,224
Firm Stayers -0.054 0.014 -0.056 -0.021
(0.034) (0.018) (0.040) (0.022)
N 3,282 3,282 3,282 3,282
Firm Changers -0.037 -0.095*** -0.114*** -0.075***
(0.031) (0.021) (0.037) (0.023)
N 3,533 3,533 3,533 3,533
Notes: The model specification follows (4.1) in the text. Each column reports the difference-in-
differences (δ̂) estimate obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining a
union independent of the business cycle. The errors for these estimates are calculated using the White
(1980) sandwich estimator. The regressions reported include the demographic and job specific char-
acteristics outlined in panes (e) and (f) of Table 4.1. The regressions also include State specific time
trends. For definitions of the dependent variables see text in Section 4.3.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
The FLL entitles individuals with permanent contracts to an end-of-year bonus, paid holidays
and a pension. My findings suggest that these entitlements may not necessarily be adhered
to, as leaving a union is uniformly associated with decreases in the probability of receiving
any non-wage benefits.22 However, when looking at the sub-sample of permanent workers the
entitlements for bonuses are honoured. The exceptions are in the decrease in the probability
of having the option of a private pension by 2.7 percentage points, which although numerically
small, has potential implications in terms of the long term welfare of those leavers. Equally,
there is a reduction of 6.4 percentage points in receiving paid holidays.23 When workers in micro
businesses are excluded, it becomes clear that there are reductions in the incidence for all of
these mandatory benefits.
From a legal perspective if a worker leaves a permanent contract simultaneously as the event
22It is worth nothing that even bonuses and paid holidays should be present for union leavers who change firms,
this is because the law makes provision for individuals to receive the pro rata equivalent for both of these concepts.
23Evaluating each of these at the respective incidence of their sub-sample suggests a decline in incidence of
2.4% for pensions and 4% for paid holidays.
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of leaving a union, they would then lose their mandatory entitlement to non-wage benefits. The
law suggests that a firm does not have a statutory obligation to provide paid holidays unless an
individual has been working at the firm for at least a year. Equally, the bonuses are meant to
reflect the period that an individual has been employed with the firm. In cases where they have
been with the firm for a period of less than a year, employees are still entitled to pro rata bonus
payments. Thus, it could be argued that the estimates provided reflect to some extent changes
in contracting for individuals.
The estimates for the sub-sample of firm ‘stayers’ and firm ‘changers’ should, to some extent,
assuage these concerns. Firm ‘stayers’ are those for whom the entitlements to these non-wage
benefits should be unaffected by their leaving a union. My findings suggest that this sub-group
is, as hypothesised, unaffected by leaving a union, leading me to conclude that union leavers are
being affected due to facing unfavourable contracts in their new firms.
As a simple exercise to further elaborate this point, I re-estimated the regressions for those
individuals who left and changed firm, distinguishing by reason between those who quit and those
who lost their job.24 Quitters may report quitting for numerous reasons, but these individuals
are not subject to the same losses of non-wage benefits relative to those who quit and always
remained in a union. However, the same cannot be said of the sample of individuals who faced
involuntary job losses. For this sub-sample of individuals, there are substantial losses to non-
wage benefits due to leaving a union. They endure a decline in non-wage benefits between 26.3
and 42.2 percentage points.25
4.6 Robustness
There are three main concerns with regards to the specification underlying (4.1), which this
sub-section will attempt to address. Firstly, the δ̂ parameter captures the union member effect
upon wages or non-wage benefits under the assumption that, given the controls in vector Xitq, a
clean estimate of the effect of the average outcome of transitions to or from a union is obtained.
However, Table 4.1 shows that there are marked differences in characteristics, in particular
between those individuals who are never union and those joining. This can be mitigated to
some extent by adopting a matching approach. Secondly, one may have reservations that the
24This sub-sample is defined as those who changed firm, and reported having lost their job–either due to their
firm shutting down, or being made redundant. This sample is fewer than 300 individuals, and as such inference
should be taken with caution.
25When these are evaluated at their relative pre-transition means the loss is found to range between 28% to
60%.
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choice of control group may be driving the results presented thus far. In order to address this,
the following estimates are presented for swapped control groups. Finally, one may also be
concerned that the δˆ parameter reported may be tainted by the presence of misclassification in
the union status of an individual. This could potentially manifest itself through attenuation bias
in the coefficients. To allay fears around this latter issue estimates are reported below based
on a series of simulations in which measurement error is randomly introduced. The results are
reported in an appendix.
4.6.1 Conditional difference-in-differences
The parameter of interest has been the ATET. The conditional difference-in-differences proced-
ure is outlined in Appendix E. In practice the approach that is implemented relies on a two-step
procedure.
In the first step, a control function is estimated with a probit model on the relevant sample
in order to obtain the propensity score. The model takes the following form:
Pr(Ui0q = 1) = Φ(X
′
i0qβ) (4.2)
Where the dependent variable denotes union joiners or leavers and their relevant control
groups at time t = 0. A vector of covariates Xi0q at time t = 0 is then used to control for the
initial pre-transition scores, and Φ(.) is the CDF of the normal distribution. From this model
the propensity score for the ith individual is obtained.
These are estimated for the whole sample, and allows me to identify the region of common
support. This sample is kept for the next step. The matches are ranked in terms of their
respective propensity scores. The Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06 is used to
smooth out the differences between scores. As it is unlikely that there are exact matches this
procedure necessitates the generation of weights. Pairs of observations where the differences
in observable characteristics between treated and control groups26 are small will be given large
weights, whilst those who are a poor match will be weighted lower.
26viz. [Union joiners, never union] and [Union leavers, always union].
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Table 4.4: Conditional difference-in-differences estimates of joining a union 2005q1–2016q1
LHS Wages Bonus Paid Holidays Pension
Baseline 0.017 0.037*** 0.115*** 0.059***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011)
N 47,628 47,628 47,628 47,628
Temporary Contract 0.139* 0.092 0.033 0.127**
(0.078) (0.061) (0.062) (0.053)
N 19,161 19,161 19,161 19,161
Permanent Contract -0.048** -0.000 0.111*** 0.031***
(0.024) (0.010) (0.028) (0.012)
N 16,659 16,659 16,659 16,659
Exlude Micro Businesses 0.007 0.028** 0.109*** 0.052***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014)
N 25,496 25,496 25,496 25,496
Permanent Exclude Micro -0.051* 0.002 0.103*** 0.032**
(0.027) (0.010) (0.029) (0.013)
N 12,988 12,988 12,988 12,988
Firm Stayers 0.012 0.027 0.118*** 0.042**
(0.030) (0.019) (0.032) (0.019)
N 16,707 16,707 16,707 16,707
Firm Changers -0.012 0.063*** 0.142*** 0.087***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.031) (0.020)
N 19,291 19,291 19,291 19,291
Notes: The model specification follows the two-step procedure outlined in the text. The Kernel
utilised in the first step was an Epanechnikov with a bandwidth of 0.06. Each column reports the
conditional difference-in-differences (δ̂) estimate obtained from the weighted fixed effects estim-
ator on the pooled time sample that lies in the region of common support. This gives the effects
of joining a union conditional on observable characteristics between treatment and control groups
(viz. never union). The errors for these estimates are obtained from a bootstrapping procedure
with 100 repetitions. The regressions reported include the demographic and job specific charac-
teristics outlined in panes (e) and (f) of Table 4.1, with the exception of the firm change variable.
The regressions also include State specific time trends. For definitions of the dependent variables
see text in Section 4.3. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
The second step employs a weighted fixed effects estimator using the weights obtained from
the matching estimator. From this, the ATET parameter is given by δˆ through running the
same model as in (4.1). Whilst a large portion of sub-sample selection has been aimed at mitig-
ating differences between union joiners and never union individuals, the approach considered in
this section formally addresses these differences. The identification provided by this procedure
is contingent on the observable characteristics between the two groups being a sufficient proxy
for unobservables. Thus, matching on these characteristics may help mitigate the role of unob-
servables. If this assumption is not met, then the procedure will provide estimates for similar
observed groups, but unobserved heterogeneity will still prevail.
The results of the conditional difference-in-differences are reported in tables 4.4 and 4.5.
These estimates are similar to the results presented thus far in tables 4.2 and 4.3. However,
the association previously found for firm staying joiners with respect to wages is no longer
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significant, nor is the baseline wage findings for joiners. This suggests that to some extent the
union joiners had better characteristics than their ‘never union’ counterparts. However, the
result for temporary contract workers is upheld by use of this procedure. This finding is key as
it suggests that unions are effective in protecting some of the most vulnerable workers in the
economy, those with temporary contracts.
The estimated effects of leaving a union are found to be in line with those obtained from
the matched sample of ‘leavers’ and ‘always union’ individuals. This exercise is notable for this
group, as although there appears to be no real differences in average characteristics between
these two groups, the estimates from the procedure reveal that there are no wage effects from
leaving a union. It should be also noted that although the estimates provided in tables 4.4 and
4.5 rely on a bandwidth of 0.06, alternate bandwidths within the range [0.04–0.12] have been
used, and these do not materially alter the estimates reported here.
Table 4.5: Conditional difference-in-differences estimates of leaving a union, 2005q1–2016q1
LHS Wages Bonus Paid Holidays Pension
Baseline -0.052** -0.037** -0.088*** -0.041**
(0.021) (0.015) (0.024) (0.018)
N 6,050 6,050 6,050 6,050
Temporary Contract -0.271 -0.030 0.050 -0.001
(0.210) (0.252) (0.269) (0.218)
N 490 490 490 490
Permanent Contract -0.016 -0.006 -0.060* -0.031**
(0.027) (0.008) (0.034) (0.015)
N 4,031 4,031 4,031 4,031
Exlude Micro Businesses -0.051** -0.034** -0.096*** -0.051***
(0.025) (0.015) (0.028) (0.018)
N 5,614 5,614 5,614 5,614
Permanent Exclude Micro -0.018 -0.003 -0.075** -0.037**
(0.028) (0.010) (0.036) (0.016)
N 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,824
Firm Stayers -0.023 0.013 -0.054 -0.011
(0.035) (0.020) (0.053) (0.030)
N 2,346 2,346 2,346 2,346
Firm Changers -0.085** -0.068** -0.090** -0.060*
(0.036) (0.030) (0.045) (0.030)
N 2,216 2,216 2,216 2,216
Notes: The model specification follows the two-step procedure outlined in the text. The Kernel
utilised in the first step was an Epanechnikov with a bandwidth of 0.06. Each column reports the
conditional difference-in-differences (δ̂) estimate obtained from the weighted fixed effects estimator
on the pooled time sample that lies in the region of common support. This gives the effects of join-
ing a union conditional on observable characteristics between treatment and control groups (viz.
always union). The errors for these estimates are obtained from a bootstrapping procedure with
100 repetitions. The regressions reported include the demographic and job specific characteristics
outlined in panes (e) and (f) of Table 4.1, with the exception of the firm change variable. The re-
gressions also include State specific time trends. For definitions of the dependent variables see text
in Section 4.3. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
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4.6.2 Inverted control groups
Table 4.6: Difference-in-differences estimates of joining a union 2005q1–2016q1, alternative control
group
Wages Bonus Paid Holidays Pension
Baseline 0.015 0.048*** 0.132*** 0.074***
(0.021) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014)
N 9,024 9,024 9,024 9,024
Temporary Contract -0.090 0.035 -0.058 0.161
(0.114) (0.128) (0.135) (0.113)
N 950 950 950 950
Permanent Contract -0.026 0.011 0.134*** 0.031**
(0.028) (0.010) (0.029) (0.015)
N 6,214 6,214 6,214 6,214
Exlude Micro Businesses -0.002 0.034*** 0.123*** 0.060***
(0.022) (0.012) (0.024) (0.014)
N 8,346 8,346 8,346 8,346
Permanent Exclude Micro -0.030 0.010 0.121*** 0.030**
(0.029) (0.010) (0.030) (0.015)
N 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
Firm Stayers -0.029 0.064*** 0.158*** 0.075***
(0.038) (0.020) (0.039) (0.023)
N 3,305 3,305 3,305 3,305
Firm Changers 0.013 0.057*** 0.144*** 0.062**
(0.033) (0.021) (0.039) (0.024)
N 3,373 3,373 3,373 3,373
Notes: The control group for joiners in these regressions are always union member individu-
als. The model specification follows the text. Each column reports the difference-in-differences
(δ̂) estimate obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining a union in-
dependent of the business cycle. The errors for these estimates are calculated using the White
(1980) sandwich estimator. The regressions reported include the demographic and job specific
characteristics outlined in panes (e) and (f) of Table 4.1. The regressions also include State spe-
cific time trends. For definitions of the dependent variables see text in Section 4.3.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
A concern that might be expressed about the estimates presented thus far relates to the
choice of control group. The act of transitioning union status is not a laboratory experiment.
There may be some ambiguity with respect to the appropriate comparison group. In order
to verify that the selection of comparison group is not the driving factor with respect to the
findings discussed, the same models have been re-estimated for a group where the control groups
are swapped. Thus, joiners in this section will be compared with always union individuals, and
mutatis mutandis for union leavers. Unsurprisingly there is no union wage gain for newcomers
with respect to established union members. Remarkably, new union joiners do have an increased
probability of holding all of the legally mandated non-wage benefits relative to their ‘always
union’ counterparts. This suggests that perhaps the compensation effects of unionisation may
be limited to the gains made at the time of the unionisation event. This finding holds regardless
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of the sub-sample analysed. Permanent employees who unionise are found to have decreased
wages, perhaps lending credence to the notion that workers may trade-off their salary for non-
wage benefits.
The losses associated with leaving a union are robust to the selection of control group for
leavers as well, and become greater when the comparison group is comprised those individuals
who have never unionised. This deterioration for union leavers is apparent for all the sub-
samples, and as such is independent of contract type and firm transitions.
Nevertheless, the results from this exercise further demonstrate that the effects of transition-
ing to/from a union are robust to the choice of the control group.
Table 4.7: Difference-in-differences estimates of leaving a union, 2005q1–2016q1, alternative control
group
Wages Bonus Paid Holidays Pension
Baseline -0.027* -0.051*** -0.115*** -0.054***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
N 75,076 75,076 75,076 75,076
Temporary Contract -0.046 -0.149** -0.151*** -0.099
(0.055) (0.064) (0.056) (0.060)
N 32,839 32,839 32,839 32,839
Permanent Contract -0.018 -0.014 -0.098*** -0.012
(0.021) (0.009) (0.026) (0.013)
N 26,370 26,370 26,370 26,370
Exlude Micro Businesses -0.023 -0.044*** -0.121*** -0.051***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012)
N 39,958 39,958 39,958 39,958
Permanent Exclude Micro -0.018 -0.009 -0.102*** -0.012
(0.022) (0.009) (0.027) (0.013)
N 20,835 20,835 20,835 20,835
Firm Stayers -0.012 -0.020 -0.081** -0.056***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.032) (0.019)
N 22,495 22,495 22,495 22,495
Firm Changers -0.052** -0.077*** -0.153*** -0.060***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018)
N 34,669 34,669 34,669 34,669
Notes: The control group for leavers in these regressions are never union member individuals. The
model specification follows the text. Each column reports the difference-in-differences (δ̂) estimate
obtained from the pooled time sample. This gives the effects of joining a union independent of the
business cycle. The errors for these estimates are calculated using the White (1980) sandwich es-
timator. The regressions reported include the demographic and job specific characteristics outlined
in panes (e) and (f) of Table 4.1. The regressions also include State specific time trends. For defini-
tions of the dependent variables see text in Section 4.3. ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
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4.6.3 Classification error
One final concern that can be addressed is that of classification error. This issue has been
raised in the literature, and in particular in the context of measuring the longitudinal effect
of unions. Card (1996) provides estimates for the USA using CPS data in conjunction with a
correlated random effects model with misclassification errors. Utilising this approach, however,
is contingent on knowing something about the rate of misclassification across the distribution of
the outcome variable. For Mexico, no such survey exists that would allow one to have a priori
knowledge regarding the rate of misclassification.
One can illustrate the effect of a random classification error through the use of a simulation.
Assume the known state of joiners is determined at time t = 0, then a random selection is
made to some percent of the estimation sample. This sub-sample has their union status altered
to its opposite value. So, for example, if one decides to induce n% measurement error in the
union variable, a n% random sub-sample is selected and their union status is recoded. So if
one was a joiner they will be miscoded as a never union, and vice versa. This sample is then
used to estimate the δ parameter and the simulation exercise is repeated a number of times. If
attenuation bias is a concern, we should observe the parameter being diluted to zero.
The results for such an exercise are reported in Appendix F. The results illustrate that the
reported results are invariant to random measurement errors. A priori, there is no good reason
to assume why the error would be non-random, but if this were the case and a suitable data
generating process could be approximated, then this approach would allow one to bound the
size of the ‘true’ effect.
4.7 Conclusions
The empirical analysis undertaken in this chapter provides evidence on the pay package gain
(loss) associated with joining (leaving) a union in Mexico during a period of deunionisation.
I use a rich labour force survey of the Mexican labour market with a sample size of 35,346
male salaried private employees in the formal sector aged between 16–64. The real wage (in 2010
Pesos) is calculated for the hourly wages net of any non-wage benefits that individuals receive
from their main job. A fixed effects model was applied to see what are the transitional gains in
terms of wages or the probability of receipt of non-wage benefits.
The estimates presented provide a consistent story. With respect to wages, joiners are found
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to be no better off than their ‘never unionised’ counterparts. However, workers who unionise
and hold temporary contracts enjoy higher wages. For leavers, I find that there is a decline in
wages. However, workers who exit unions and hold a temporary contract are subject to a wage
decrease of 44%, but when matched on characteristics this effect reduces to 14.4%.27
However, the real gains (and losses) associated with union status are the non-wage compon-
ents of pay packages. Union joiners experience sizeable increases in the probability of being in
receipt of mandatory benefits, such as bonuses, and paid holidays. The magnitudes for these
gains vary but range between 4.4 and 13.4 percentage points, which when evaluated at pre-
transition incidence rates suggest sizeable gains of 3.7–11.2% relative to those individuals who
never unionise. When disentangling these returns, these findings appear to be unrelated to
passive or active unionisation, denoted by those who stayed or left their firm during the union
joining period. However, it appears that the workers who stand to benefit most are those for
whom benefits are not guaranteed under the FLL. Union leavers are found to have a lower prob-
ability of holding non-wage benefits. This trend is detected in a consistently lower probability of
holding legally mandated benefits, regardless of whether one has been at the same firm or not.
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that despite the decline in union membership
over the last decade, unions have adapted their bargaining strategies. Union rhetoric of increas-
ing a worker’s ‘social wage’ has some merit, and may help an individual maintain their living
standards. Further, the evidence presented here suggests that unions are still an important
institution in the Mexican labour market. In the absence of strong regulation they ensure that
workers who decide to unionise see their compensation package reflect their legal entitlement.
Individuals who choose to leave unions effectively trade these benefits, perhaps in exchange for
retaining their wages at a previously union determined level.
27This difference remains despite the approximate six hour increase in hours worked for the average union
leaver. Thus, although wages are affected less, union leavers are now working more hours to achieve this rate.
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Appendix E
Conditional Difference-in-Differences
The differences-in-differences estimate δ̂ is the ATET. This may be re-cast within the Rubin
(1974) framework of potential outcomes as follows
ATET ≡ E(y1iq − y0iq|Ui = 1)
= E{E(y1iq − y0iq|Ui = 1, Xi)|Ui = 1}(by iterated expectations)
= E{E(y1iq|Ui = 1, Xi)− E(y0iq|Ui = 1, Xi)|Ui = 1}
= E{E(y1iq|Ui = 1, Xi)− E(y0iq|Ui = 0, Xi)|Ui = 1}
This may be simplified as:
= E(δX |Ui = 1)
(E.1)
The propensity score version of the ATET may be expressed as follows:
ATETpsm ≡ E(y1iq − y0iq|Ui = 1)
= E{E(y1iq − y0iq|Ui = 1, p(Xi))|Ui = 1}(by iterated expectations)
= E{E(y1iq|Ui = 1, p(Xi))− E(y0iq|Ui = 1, p(Xi))|Ui = 1}
= E{E(y1iq|Ui = 1, p(Xi))− E(y0iq|Ui = 0, p(Xi))|Ui = 1}
(E.2)
Thus, the expression in (E.2) is directly analogous to (E.1). The difference lies in the use of
a control function p(Xi) which allows one to compute the propensity score. Thus, one estimates
a Probit containing the Xi vector of characteristics. From this procedure one takes the sample
of individuals that lie in the common support region, 0 < pˆ(Xi) < 1, discarding all individuals
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for whom pˆ(Xi) = 1. However, it is unlikely that one may find exact matches. Thus, one must
use the distance between matched treated and control units as a weighting factor.
Smith and Todd (2005) show that the typical matching estimator can be expressed as:
δˆpsmATET =
1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩Sp
= [y1iq − Eˆ(y0i|Ui = 1, p(Xi))] (E.3)
=
1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩Sp
= [y1iq −
∑
j∈I0
W (i, j)y0j , I1] (E.4)
where I1 is the set of status changers, and their control group is denoted by I0. The region
of common support is Sp, and n1 the number of individuals in the set I1 ∩ Sp. Finally, W (i, j)
is the weights derived from the distance of matched observation i and j given by the estimated
pˆ(Xi) and pˆ(Xj), respectively.
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Appendix F
Classification error simulation
There is a concern in the union literature regarding the non-random selection into union status.
Indeed, the use of longitudinal data, as in this chapter, has been criticised given issues of
measurement error in the union status indicator could create a potential attenuation bias in
the δ̂ estimates obtained. Card (1996) provides estimates for the USA using CPS data in
conjunction with a correlated random effects model with misclassification errors. Utilising this
approach, however, is contingent on knowing something about the rate of misclassification across
the distribution of the outcome variable. Unfortunately, similar information for this survey is
not available. However, one would expect that the introduction of measurement error in the
union status of an individual would bias the estimates of the δ parameter downwards towards
zero.
One approach that can be employed is to induce the measurement error in the union status
and re-estimate the parameter. The proposed approach is as follows. First, the known state
of joiners is determined at time t = 0, then a random selection is made to some percent of
the whole estimation sample. This sub-sample has their union status altered to its opposite
value. So, for example,if one decides to induce 5% measurement error in the union variable, a
5% random sub-sample is selected and their union status is recoded, so if one was a joiner they
will be miscoded as a never union, and vice versa. This sample is then used to estimate the δ
parameter and the simulation exercise is repeated a number of times. If attenuation bias is a
concern, we should observe the parameter being diluted to zero. The plots shown in figures F.1a
and F.1b, report the outcomes of such an exercise for all of the main outcomes for the baseline
regressions reported in tables 4.2 and 4.3.1
1The simulations were run for all of the sub-samples, however, for brevity these are not reported.
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The resulting exercise reveals that there is little to no difference in the estimates found. The
graphs show in a solid black line the resulting parameter estimates given by each simulation
with their associated confidence interval shown in grey. These can be compared to the estimate
obtained from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, which is reproduced for clarity as a maroon dot with its
associated confidence interval as a candle stick. As it can be seen a random 5% misclassification
in the union status does not significantly alter the parameter estimates obtained.
115
Figure F.1: Plots of Simulations inducing 5% measurement error in treatment variable
(a) Joiners
(b) Leavers
Note: These plots are the results of a simulation inducing a 5% measurement
error on the status of union joiners/transition at time t = 0. The Measurement
error is the symmetric swapping of an individual’s status. Thus, if one was
a joiner and are selected as part of the 5% of recodes, they would be falsely
attributed as never union, mutatis mutandis for leavers. This exercise was
repeated 500 times per outcome and sub-sample and then the same difference-
in-differences parameter as given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 was computed 100 times.
The black line is the plot of this estimate. The area shaded in grey is the
confidence intervals from these. The estimate given by the red dot and red
confidence intervals are those obtained from the unaltered data, and are reported
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
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Chapter 5
(You gotta) Strike if the Right (is
the party!)
Strike Petitions, the business cycle and the electoral
cycle in Mexico
5.1 Introduction
There is a large literature which has focused extensively on the importance of institutions for
economic outcomes (La Porta et al., 1998; Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2002; Alesina and
Giuliano, 2015; Aghion et al., 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2003, 2006).
North (1990) defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game’, and there have been numerous studies
that examine the formal state institutions and their effects on economic outcomes. There is also
another branch of the institutionalist literature that suggests that institutional changes may
have long-lasting effects (see Dell, 2010; Nunn, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2011). One formal civil
society and labour market institution which has been extensively researched is the trade union.
This chapter investigates this institution and asks how unions behaved over a period in which
other institutions were reformed. Roland (2004) notes that there are fast- and slow-acting
institutions and suggests that politico-electoral institutions are fast-changing, whereas other
institutions may take longer to change. This chapter will investigate how quickly private sector
unions change their political behaviour in the face of a changing landscape. It is documented
that unions have effects on wages, non-wage benefits, inequality, productivity, health and safety
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(e.g. Freeman, 2010; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986). These gains are
bargained through the threat of strikes—the group withdrawal of labour—and this chapter
provides a novel exploration of external influences on strike threats.
The theoretical literature on strikes is motivated by what Kennan (1986) calls the ‘Hicks
Paradox’. This is the idea that if there was a theory which predicted when strikes will occur
then all parties would agree beforehand on an outcome and thus avoid strike action. If this
were the case then strikes would not occur, and the theory would cease to hold. In this view
strikes are an inefficient outcome. Although strikes are the outcome of failed negotiations, their
active role as a bargaining mechanism has been investigated. Much of the theoretical literature
rests on the assumption that there are two agents in the bargaining negotiations: the union
and the management, though Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) introduced the role of the rank-
and-file.1 However, the role of unions can and does extend beyond the plant or sectoral levels.
Unions also play a role in lobbying for legislation and local politics. Thus, the threat of strikes,
although nominally about intra-firm conditions may be influenced by external factors, such as
political outcomes. This role of politics in the context of private sector unions has been hitherto
unresearched in the economics literature, and is one of the main contributions of this chapter.
This study attempts to investigate whether there is a relationship between the electoral
cycle and strike threats. In order to inform upon this subject, I require a large sample of
elections in a setting where the following conditions are met: (i) elections are free, democratic
and competitive; (ii) they are matched to full information on the collective bargaining between
employers and unions; (iii) the elected official has no control over union legislation; (iv) there
is sufficient cross-sectional and temporal variation to be able to observe both multiple electoral
cycles and business cycles.
The study focuses on Mexico, where due to institutional arrangements, the act of threatening
to strike is recorded as a strike petition. I have access to the administrative records of the local
state-level Arbitration and Conciliation Commission on petitions for the private sector in each
of the 31 Mexican states. These are tripartite commissions comprised of employer associations,
unions, and the local state government. Unions who wish to strike must first set out a petition to
strike outlining the reasons for their strike. These petitions are then evaluated by the Arbitration
and Conciliation Commission. All strike threats with no legal basis are removed at this stage,
and a period of mediation between the union and the employer begins. If this process fails, then
1Throughout this text the terms “rank-and-file” and union members will be used interchangeably, but they
refer to those members of the union who do not hold any office within the union.
119
a union may strike. All formal petitions are lodged and it is these data that are used in the
empirical analysis.
The analysis is structured in three stages. Firstly, an investigation of how petitions react
to the business cycle finds that they behave much as strikes do in other countries, providing
confirmation that strike threats are used as a bargaining tool.2 When controls for electoral
periods are introduced, there is evidence showing increases in petitions during electoral years.
This gives the first indication that strike threats may be politically motivated.
In the second part of the analysis, I form a chain of evidence which isolates the impact of
the electoral cycle on strikes threats by focusing on municipal elections. This is because these
elections should be low stakes to a union: Municipal Presidents do not have any control in
the arena of labour relations, nor regulation, and as such we should expect unions to have no
preferences for Mayors, nor should we expect union strike threats to be related to these. I exploit
close elections3 and employ a sharp Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach to compare those
locations where there has been a narrow result, and the victor is drawn from one of Mexico’s
three main political parties.4 At the margin this allows me to unpack a causal effect from
elections to strike threats. The findings suggest that the narrow election of right- (PAN) or
left-wing (PRD) Mayors leads to increases in the rate of petitions two years after an election.
As the periodicity of municipal elections is triennial, this suggests that unions are increasing the
intensity of industrial relations (as measured by the rate of strike threats) to coincide with the
following election campaign. I find no evidence for any effects of close PRI electoral victories
on strike threats. The interpretation I give these causal findings from the RD clearly suggest
that strike threats, an institutional tool to aid collective bargaining, are used by some unions in
advance of elections as a campaigning tool.
In order to test this theory the final stage of the analysis models electoral turnout using
a triple differences-in-differences approach. I compare those municipalities that had a narrow
margin of elections, where a right- or left-wing where victorious, relative to those that did not.
I find that the increased petition rates in these municipalities lead to large changes in electoral
turnout in the following election, implying these elections act as a ‘dog whistle’ of sorts for
organised labour to go and turn out to vote. I suggest that this vote may go to the traditional
2This is true for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
3This is defined here as those with a margin of victory of 10 percentage points. For example, a win for a
Partido Accio´n Nacional (PAN) coalition by 47 percent of the vote, where the second place winner obtained at
least 37 percent of the vote.
4viz. PAN, Partido Revolucio´nario Democra´tico (PRD), and Partido Revolucio´nario Institucional (PRI)
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political masters of the ‘officialist’ unions (PRI).
The set of results when taken as a whole suggest that strike threats in Mexico are a powerful
tool for collective bargaining and react to the business cycle. I argue that during the period of
democratisation, although the ‘rules of the game’ changed, the actors remained committed to
their pre-reform behaviour. Thus, whilst the nature of the institutional game is changing, some
institutions are more slow changing than others.
This chapter contributes to several distinct literatures. First, it adds to the literature on
the importance of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010; La Porta
et al., 1998; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). In looking at the changes in institutions it is similar
to the Acemoglu et al. (2011) study on the historical legal institutional changes and subsequent
economic growth. Equally, it is similar to the literature that looks at the coevolution of culture
and labour regulation as in Aghion et al. (2011). However, in contrast with this literature the
work presented here allows me to investigate whether political institutional changes are affecting
the behaviour of the ‘players’ of the game, or vice versa.
Second, it contributes to the empirical literature on strikes and union bargaining behaviour
(Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Kennan, 1986; Gunderson et al., 1986; Gunderson and Melino,
1990; Card, 1990a,b; Reilly, 1996; Baah, 2005). In particular, I motivate my analysis using
the framework developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) where the bargaining problem is
disaggregated into three core players: the employer, the rank-and-file and the union leadership.
However, this chapter differs from the established literature by explicitly investigating strike
threats rather than strikes (which are the outcome of failed bargaining).
Finally, this chapter contributes to the smaller literature on the interaction between unions
and politics. Burton (1984) presents analysis of unions as a political institution which need not
be exempt from economic analysis. He suggests that unions and the concept of ‘union voice’ can
be viewed through the lens of public choice theory. In particular, the ease of exiting a union and
the legislative institutions relevant to unions will determine the magnitude of union executive
discretion. I argue that the legislative arrangements have benefited large unions for which the
‘paradox of participation’ implies a large degree of executive discretion, as documented by the
findings in this study.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 will give a brief background on the economic
literature relating to unions and strikes. Section 5.3 outlines the institutional background on
the state-trade union relationship, as well as a background to the legal framework that unions
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operate within, and the political framework for Municipal Presidents. Section 5.4 explains the
data sources, Section 5.5 reports the business cycle behaviour of strike petitions and that even
after controlling for this there is evidence of electoral cycle effects. Section 5.6 then looks at
the causal effects of Municipal President elections on strike threats. I show that there is a
discontinuity in petitions where there are narrow wins for the right- and left-wing parties and
demonstrate that this finding is robust to alternative functional form specifications, as well as the
size of the bandwidth. Section 5.7, shows the implications of the result of increased threats by
modelling electoral turnout between those municipalities which experienced narrow elections,
and those that did not. Finally, Section 5.8 concludes and discusses the implications of this
research.
5.2 On unions and strike behaviour
Trade unions achieve wage gains for their rank-and-file mainly through collective bargaining.
Much of the theoretical literature is dedicated to explaining the existence of strikes as they are
cast as inefficient outcomes. These are subject to what Kennan (1986) calls the ‘Hicks Paradox’:
the idea that if there was a theory which predicted when strikes will break out then all parties
may agree beforehand on an outcome avoiding strike action. Assuming that both the union and
management are rational agents, it becomes difficult to see how they fail to reach an agreement
ex ante (see Marceau and Musgrave, 1949; Nash, 1950; Cross, 1965; Hicks, 1963). One paper
which succeeds in ignoring the paradox altogether is that of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) who
develop an alternative view of collective bargaining, where there are three agents: the union,
the rank-and-file members, and the management. This leads to divergent motivations when
the collective bargaining process begins. The main difference with earlier theory is the explicit
disaggregation of the union side of the bargaining process. The union leadership is interested
in ensuring that the union as an entity thrives and survives, as well as the personal survival of
the leadership within the union. Both of these ambitions are usually met through satisfying the
rank-and-file’s expectations. However, they may diverge from the wishes of the union members
if the union leaders are aware of the possibilities of success of the negotiation process. For
example, if the rank-and-file expect wage increases that are larger than management will agree,
the union leadership is likely to try and convince the membership to accept a smaller wage
increase. This could result in two potential outcomes: success where a deal is reached, or failure
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in the bargaining process and then a strike. In all of the theoretical models, bargaining is
predicated on the threat of strike, and yet to date in the literature there has been no effort to
explicitly model these types of threats.
The empirical literature has focused on modelling the incidence and duration of strikes.
This is motivated by the suggestion that the incidence of strikes is inversely proportional to
their cost. Reder and Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980) argue that the very act of bargaining
is expensive, and as such contracts will not contain clauses that cover all possible contingencies.
However, a bargaining protocol could be established that could prevent costly strikes from
occurring. Thus, if bargaining protocols exist then strikes will only occur when they are less
costly. The early empirical literature focused on the outcome of strikes, and the side that won.
(see Bevan, 1880; Moore, 1911; Peterson, 1938; Edwards, 1981; Knowles, 1952). It can be argued
that these early findings are broadly supportive of the Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) theory
in that long strikes persist until workers make reductions to their wage demands. A number of
studies however report an empirical regularity, the incidence of strikes is found to be pro-cyclical
(see Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Farber, 1981; Gunderson et al., 1986; Reilly, 1996; Vroman,
1989). But this is not necessarily found for all countries as Ingram et al. (1993) report that
during the 1980s strikes were counter-cyclical in Britain.
As a complement to the literature that focuses on strike incidence, there is another strand
which explicitly models strike durations (see Hovarth, 1968; Lancaster, 1972; Gunderson and
Melino, 1990; Harrison and Stewart, 1989, 1993; Campolietti et al., 2005; Baah and Reilly,
2009; Devereux and Hart, 2011). This branch of the literature examines the role of public
policy, the business cycle or other application specific covariates on the length of strikes. The
business cycle is sometimes proxied by the inclusion of the unemployment rate but more often
by the inclusion of detrended industrial production. The literature finds that strike durations
are counter-cyclical.
From this brief review of the academic literature on strikes, it is fairly clear that most
bargaining models are plagued by the ‘Hicks paradox’. The few models that have successfully
avoided this scenario have been those that explicitly model the event of a strike, as opposed to
the bargaining process. This chapter innovates on the existing literature by focusing exclusively
on the bargaining signal as measured by the strike threat, rather than the outcome of failed
negotiations — the strike.
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5.3 Institutional Background
This section explains the institutional set-up of Mexico. I outline the relevant labour legisla-
tion, providing some information on electoral authorities, and finally some details on Municipal
Presidents.
5.3.1 Labour legislation, unions and strikes
As outlined in Chapter 2, the FLL places regulation of unions under the jurisdiction of the
Secretar´ıa de Trabajo y Previsio´n Social (STPS). However, this only applies to certain unions,
and in general is not a straightforward matter. Public sector unions are subject to federal
oversight, but equally some key industries are also subject to this jurisdiction, and as such the
relevant Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions are federal in nature. However there are also
‘local’ jurisdiction Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions for whom oversight falls at state
level. These commissions exist in every municipality within the country, and it is the role of
these Local Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions that will be the subject of investigation
here.
As part of the larger legal framework unions must also register with local Arbitration and
Conciliation Commissions. These are tripartite institutions whose President is designated by the
state Governor. It is also comprised of representatives of both union and employer organisations.
The procedure to strike is therefore as follows. A union who intends to strike must first make
their grievances known in writing to their employers. A copy of their grievance letter must
then be sent to the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. This initiates what is termed
by the FLL as the the ‘pre-strike period’. The grievance letter is termed a ‘petition to strike’,
but may be considered a strike threat. The receipt of the petition by Commission triggers
a conciliation meeting between the union and the employer, who will attempt to solve the
issue. If the workers, or their representatives, fail to attend to this meeting, then the strike
will be determined invalid by the Commission and as such illegal. It should be noted that the
Commission is legally allowed to call this meeting at any time of day during any day of the week.5
If the mediation efforts fail, and there is a legal foundation for the strike, then formal strike action
may commence. The mechanism by which the renewal of a collective bargaining contract is
signalled is through a petition to strike (Barba Garc´ıa, 2004). Thus far, the procedure for strikes
5This is mandated under Article 928 of the FLL, and naturally, this clause may be exploited, as technically a
meeting could be called outside of business hours during the weekend.
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has been presented as a mechanical process. In reality this procedure, whilst straightforward,
is subject to significant levels of discretion by the state governor (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook,
2012b). Under the framework of the law the only valid reasons for threatening a strike are
related to intra-firm complaints. Legally, there is no scope for strikes to be threatened over
wider political issues.
A unique feature of the Mexican landscape is the distinct lack of ‘wildcat’, or illegal strikes.
The regulation surrounding the licensing of unions is so stringent, and obtaining registration as
a union is so onerous, that there is a distinct disincentive to illegally strike over conditions within
the firm. Further legal disincentives for ‘wildcat strikes’ are in the form of large fines and even
the threat of jail time for those illegally striking (Middlebrook, 1995, p.70) In addition to this,
the penalties for proceeding with an illegal strike are set out by Article 463 of the FLL. This
states that illegal strike action, as determined by the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission,
may be used as a legitimate reason for termination of contracts for all union members who take
part without the usual redundancy pay and notice period. Furthermore, the FLL guarantees
employers the ability to hire replacement workers without any delay if union members are
unwilling to return to work.6 If workers occupy the business premises illegally, this would not
be considered a strike, nor strike action, and is liable to prosecution under penal code.
It is also worthwhile to note that although in many respects Mexico saw a series of institu-
tional changes throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the legislation which oversaw the labour market
had not really changed since the 1930s. There were some minor procedural reforms to the text of
the FLL in the 1970s and 1980s, but neither of these affected the articles regarding the oversight
of unions. Since 2012 there has been a major reform of the FLL, which came into effect in
January 2013, which is outside the scope of the present analysis.
5.3.2 COFIPE, IFE and State Electoral authorities
In this section I outline the Mexican political system and the nature of the reforms which have
taken place since the 1990s. As outlined earlier in Chapter 2 the judicial and electoral reforms
witnessed in Mexico in the 1990s were undertaken as a result of the 1988 election, which is
generally characterized as being rigged (Camp, 2012). The result of this was the creation of a new
branch of government independent of political intervention in the form of the Instituto Federal
Electoral (IFE)7, as legally mandated by the Co´digo Federal de Institucio´nes y Procedimientos
6However, if there is a legal strike, then employers may not contract replacement workers.
7Federal Electoral Institute
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Electorales (COFIPE).8 This was initially envisioned as another dependency of government,
which fell under the oversight of Congress and the Executive branch.9 Of importance for this
chapter is the reform of 1996, which required all electoral authorities to become independent of
the state and have their own legal personality separate from the state. This in effect converted
the previously existing state electoral authorities into a variety of electoral institutes, which
oversaw elections for Governor and Municipal President.
The final piece of reform which is key for the credibility of this analysis is the independence
of the judiciary. As outlined previously,the Judicial branch of government saw a series of reforms
in the 1990s, alongside the introduction of the COFIPE. These reforms created the Tribunal
Electoral del Poder Jucidial de la Federacio´n (TEPJF),10 which ensures that election disputes
are resolved independent of Government intervention. As noted by Eisenstadt and Yelle (2012),
the tribunal went to great lengths to demonstrate its political independence as early as the 1996
elections. The introduction of a strong judiciary institution ensures that the elections under
analysis in this chapter are the result of free and fair elections, and thus are unlikely to be the
result of manipulation.
5.3.3 Municipal Presidents
Mexico is comprised of 31 states, that are comprised of 2,438 separate municipalities. These
have elections on a three year cycle. Municipalities elect representatives to the Town Hall,
which is headed by the Municipal President through first-past-the-post elections.11 Due to
constitutional restrictions there is no re-election, and as such there are no issues of individual
incumbency. Until recently,12 the only way to be a candidate for an election was to be a member
of a political party.
Since 1983 municipalities have been able to raise property taxes and other levies. The
municipal budget is comprised of a fixed portion, which each municipality receives from the
federal government, and a portion that they receive from the state government. This leaves
some room for discretion for the state governor to allocate the budget as they see fit, with
some evidence that governors distribute this to same-party individuals (Kahn, 2015). The
8Federal Code of Procedures and Electoral Institutions
9Indeed, the first president of the IFE was the then Interior Minister, Fernando Gutie´rrez Barrios.
10Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judiciary Power.
11With the exception of Oaxaca, Chiapas and Sonora where there is a system called usos y costumbres used
by indigenous communities to elect local leaders. This system was introduced as a means to increase political
engagement, as the some of the last elections to be held in those municipalities had a voter turnout of less than
5%. This system operates in 570 municipalities out of the 2,438.
12Outside the period of the present study.
126
same constitutional amendment of 1983 gave Municipal Presidents control over utilities (water,
sanitation, lighting), preventative policing (safety, traffic) and local maintenance. Notably for
the analysis here, labour regulation falls outside their purview. Equally, it was not until the
1999 reform that municipalities were given a political character.13 It was this reform which
raised the political competition within municipalities, and it will be this increased variation in
electoral results that is exploited in the empirical analysis of this chapter.
13i.e. they were empowered to have divergent policy from their local state (Seele, 2012).
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Table 5.1: Summary of Strike Petitions
Mean Standard error
Total # Petitions
All 145,098
Officialist Union 118,864
Independent Union 26,234
Total # by cause:
Contract Signing 69,869
Contract Revision 39,122
Contract Fail 19,487
Wages 16,362
Other 1,138
Mean petitions:
Contract Signing 0.193 (0.003)
Contract Revision 0.108 (0.002)
Contract Fail 0.054 (0.001)
Wages 0.045 (0.001)
Other (0.003) (0.000)
Electoral year 0.033 (0.000)
Mean Number of Petitions per 10,000 population
All 0.025 (0.000)
Independent Union (0.006) (0.000)
Officialist Unions 0.019 (0.000)
by Manufacturing subsector:
Food, Drink, Tobacco 0.162 (0.002)
Textiles, Clothing, Leather 0.166 (0.001)
Wood and Wood Products 0.116 (0.001)
Paper, Paper Products, Printing, Editing 0.073 (0.001)
Chemical Industries 0.137 (0.001)
Minerals 0.159 (0.001)
Basic Metals 0.101 (0.001)
Machinery and Equipment 0.162 (0.002)
Other Manufacturing 0.309 (0.002)
by Macroegion:
NE 0.240 (0.002)
NW 0.134 (0.001)
West 0.170 (0.002)
East 0.281 (0.001)
CN 0.110 (0.001)
CS 0.180 (0.002)
SE 0.067 (0.000)
SW 0.273 (0.000)
Business Cycle measures
Manufacturer Inflation 10.714 (0.071)
Unemployment Rate 4.139 (0.007)
The unemployment level data is determined at state level and is derived from
the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU) and ENOE surveys run by
INEGI for the appropriate time periods.
The manufacturer level of inflation was obtained from INEGI as the national
level manufacturing subsector specific rate of inflation.
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5.4 Data description
As outlined earlier a key research question entails investigating the relationship between the
electoral cycle and strike threats. The attribute of Mexican labour law which I exploit relates
to the requirement for all strike threats to be lodged at an Arbitration and Conciliation Com-
mission. I utilise the disaggregated administrative records of strike petitions lodged with the 32
Local Arbitration and Conciliation Boards,14 thus excluding the public sector, and those firms
in industries which fall under federal jurisdiction. The data have a temporal coverage from
1991–2012, and are collected on a monthly basis. The records contain information both on the
petition rate per 10,000 of the population received by the board. These are disaggregated both
at an industry and at a municipal level. The data include information on the motives of the
petition (i.e. reason for the strike petition) under the general categories of ‘Contract Revision’,
‘Contract Failure’, ‘Contract Renewal’,‘ Wages’, and ‘All other causes’. Table 5.1 reports some
summary statistics on strike threats. It is fairly clear that the number of strike threats has
declined over the time period under investigation, as there are fewer petitions in the post 2000
period. The majority of petitions are procedural in nature and related to routine contract ne-
gotiation. There is a smaller subset related to one-off wage demands. The majority of petitions
come from officialist unions, commensurate with their size and their larger membership (de la
Garza Toledo, 2012). There is substantial variation in mean petition rates between manufac-
turing subsectors, but the table shows that there has been a decline in the average number of
petitions since 2000.
Other data utilised by this chapter were obtained from INEGI, the Mexican national statistics
institute. These data included access to vital statistics to derive the workplace accident death
rate per 10,000 of the municipal population, and the manufacturing sub-sector specific rate of
inflation. These are obtained at a two-digit level that matches the subsectors shown in table
5.1. It should be noted that the inflation data are only available from 1995, and that the high
rates of inflation hinted at by the pre-2000 mean are driven by the 1995 peso crisis. The average
rate of inflation faced by manufacturers, this has declined in every year since the data have
become available. The ENEU and its replacement the ENOE were utilised to compute the
unemployment rates at a quarterly level for all of the years in the sample.
14Despite having 31 states, there is also another Commission which oversees Mexico City. It should be noted
that whilst the arbitration boards are state-level institutions, the disaggregated data are defined at municipal
level.
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Figure 5.1: Unemployment rate, manufacturer inflation and the petition rate, national averages
1991–2012
(a) Z-score of Unemployment rate
(b) Z-score of Manufacturer Inflation
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Figure 5.1 provides a visual indication of the national average rate of petitions as compared
to both the unemployment rate and the rate of inflation faced by manufacturers. It is notable
that although unemployment in Mexico has been relatively stable at 3–5% per annum, the 2008
recessionary period had a similar increase of unemployment as the 1994 peso crisis. However,
one notable difference between the two is the behaviour of the average rate of petitions which
has fallen. Despite, the seemingly cyclical peaks and troughs in this mean, there is considerable
variation between states. In a sharp contrast the average prices faced by all manufacturers have
been relatively stable in the period after the introduction of NAFTA.
Figure 5.2: Margin of victory in Municipal Elections
Note: Author’s own calculations from electoral data. Each vertical line represents a Presidential
Election.
The second part of the analysis will look at electoral outcomes for municipal presidencies.
I obtained these from each of the 31 independent electoral authorities in Mexico, and some of
the gaps were completed by IFE. These data represent electoral data covering the same period
as the strikes data. Figure 5.2 provides some visual stylized facts about Mexican municipal
elections. For each pane in the figure each of the monochrome lines represent the mean margin
of victory at a state level, and the red line is the national trend obtained from a simple linear
regression. The following electoral stylized facts can be observed. First, the electoral reforms
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of the 1990s were successful, as they created competitive elections at municipal level. At the
beginning of the period the state mean margin of victory was approximately 54%, whereas the
mean margin of victory between winners and losers in 2012 was about 12%. This narrowing
of electoral victories shows an increased belief in the democratic process, and the increasing
importance of Municipal Presidents as political actors. The second pane shows that whilst the
PRI are the most electorally successful party in Mexico, their electoral successes have diminished
over time. In fact, by the 2000 election more than half of Mexican municipalities had been ruled
by another party (Seele, 2012), showing that increasing municipal democracy was an influential
factor in demonstrating that credible institutional changes had occurred. The third and fourth
panes show that as the PRI electoral wins diminished, PAN and to a lesser extent the PRD’s
electoral successes have increased.
Table 5.2 presents the summary of electoral outcomes and strike petitions when aggregated
around electoral years. The table reports the outcomes across all elections, and the three sub-
samples of narrow elections, where the margin of victory/loss lies in the ±10 percentage point
window. As asserted before, it is clear that PRI are the most electorally successful party, as
they won 64.0% of all municipal elections across the time-span 1991–2012. With PAN winning
21.7% and PRD 14.2%. These do not sum to 100%, as there is some overlap due to coalitions.
One of the electoral strategies aggressively pursued by parties in the post 2000 period has been
coalitions—often spanning ideological divides—to deny the opposition the likelihood of victory.
I consider for my analysis all such wins to be equally attributable to all coalition partners.
Indeed, coalitions have been a key innovation that has led to the dramatic narrowing of electoral
victories seen in the earlier figures. The time-varying covariates do appear to differ across the
three sub-samples of narrow electoral victories. And finally, it is worth noting that, on average,
there seem to be more strike threats two years after an election. The fewest number of strikes
are associated with PRI narrow victory municipalities, whereas municipalities narrowly won
by PAN are most likely to be associated with more strikes. Equally, it can be noted that the
large ‘officialist’ unions represent the predominant source of strike threats. This may be some
evidence for the Burton (1984) view, suggesting that larger unions may suffer from the ‘paradox
of participation’. As membership size increases, workers are less likely to participate in union
decision-making processes, and as such we may see more union leadership discretion. This may
lead to an increased number of strike threats during key political periods, such as the lead-up
to elections.
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Table 5.2: Summary of Elections and Petitions
All Elections Narrow PAN Narrow PRD Narrow PRI
Electoral Outcomes by party (%)
PAN wins 21.734 47.656 27.104 18.260
Margin of Victory / Loss PAN -26.384 -0.920 -14.835 -23.831
PRD wins 14.204 13.276 19.303 46.077
Margin of Victory / Loss PRD -35.207 -29.488 -22.189 -1.231
PRI wins 64.041 44.622 51.643 44.365
Margin of Victory / Loss PRI 10.300 -2.048 0.331 -2.177
Other Electoral outcomes (%)
PAN incumbency 14.691 19.507 14.753 8.951
PRD incumbency 8.183 5.391 8.776 13.766
PRI incumbency 44.824 45.543 44.258 43.188
PAN coalition 12.459 23.273 14.897 25.178
PRD coalition 21.755 33.135 24.612 32.168
PRI coalition 24.390 35.925 28.711 30.635
PAN governor 14.246 22.866 16.558 9.023
PRD governor 10.060 10.864 12.712 24.501
PRI governor 74.894 65.348 69.718 63.873
Electoral turnout 60.774 62.554 62.261 61.485
Other time-varying covariates
Workplace death ratet+1 (Per 10,000) 15.461 8.993 8.806 5.860
Workplace death ratet+2 (Per 10,000) 38.265 18.362 19.088 11.251
Unemployment ratet+1 (%) 3.564 3.774 3.587 3.557
Unemployment ratet+1 (%) 3.468 3.601 3.426 3.427
Average Petitions
One year after election 8.625 12.102 8.238 4.513
Two years after election 27.907 44.876 29.976 15.513
Independent Uniont+1 1.147 1.493 1.050 0.553
Independent Uniont+2 3.693 4.856 3.376 1.995
Officialist Uniont+1 7.477 10.609 7.188 3.960
Officialist Uniont+2 24.214 40.020 26.600 13.518
Average Petition Rate per 10,000
One year after election 0.531 0.643 0.514 0.402
Two years after election 1.757 2.299 1.755 1.540
Independent Uniont+1 0.084 0.094 0.079 0.065
Independent Uniont+2 0.289 0.367 0.290 0.191
Officialist Uniont+1 0.447 0.549 0.435 0.336
Officialist Uniont+2 1.469 1.933 1.465 1.348
The electoral data were collected from each of the 31 state electoral bodies, with supplementary data obtained from
IFE.
Workplace death rate comes from vital statistics published by INEGI. The data are derived from administrative
records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or construction site, and are defined per
10,000 of the municipal population.
The unemployment level data is determined at state level and is derived from the ENEU and ENOE surveys run by
INEGI for the appropriate time periods.
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5.5 Strike threats, the Business Cycle and the Electoral Cycle
As a starting point for this section, I investigate the behaviour of strike petitions—the signal re-
flecting union-employer bargaining—over the course of the sample. I model the rate of Petitions
per 10,000 of the municipal population. The relationship to be estimated is as follows:
Petition Rateimst = αm + β1Unemploymentst + β2Inflationit +X
′
imstγ + eimst (5.1)
The equation above will allow me to determine how strike petitions behave over the economic
cycle. In order to do so, I exploit the administrative records of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Commissions at a local level. These provide an exhaustive record of all petitions to strike
reported in Mexico at a municipal level on a daily basis. I aggregate these data to monthly total
Petitions per 10,000 of the municipal population, these are available for each ith industry in
the mth municipality in the sth state for month t. This measure is then regressed on the state-
level quarterly unemploymentst rate, computed from the ENEU and the ENOE for the periods
1991q1–2004q4 and 2005q1–2012q4, respectively. This measure of the unemployment rate should
capture the effects associated with the business cycle. I introduce an additional control in the
form of the inflationit rate for producers in manufacturing. This measure should encapsulate
the increased uncertainty associated with high inflation periods. It could be surmised that
when inflation is greater to a manufacturer, there may be higher levels of profits made by the
firm, and as such unions will seek to bargain for some of the resultant rents. This measure is
defined monthly at a national level, but varies at the two-digit manufacturing subsector level.
These data cover the time period 01/1995–12/2012. For this reason, this control is introduced
gradually into the analysis, as its inclusion reduces the sample size. I additionally include a
series of controls such as manufacturing i subsector dummies which capture the industry specific
state of labour relations, yeart fixed effects which should capture year-specific events which may
affect union-employer bargaining, montht fixed effects, which should account for seasonality of
petitions, and αm municipal fixed effect.
If petitions run counter to the economic cycle then we would find β1 > 0. This suggests
that in periods of high unemployment, unions are more likely to threaten to strike. This may
sound counterintuitive as work stoppage may seem less credible in adverse economic conditions.
Nevertheless, a counter-cyclical frequency of strike threats would indicate that petitions play an
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important role as a statutory instrument for bargaining worker conditions and wages. I argue
that this hypothesis is consistent with the Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) view of the world.
Whilst the union leadership would find it hard to sell the consequences of a potential strike to
their rank-and-file, the institutional framework implies that a forced period of negotiation would
take place between employers and unions.
The inclusion of the rate of manufacturing inflation allows me to further investigate if during
periods of higher prices there is increased bargaining by unions in an attempt to maintain their
relative wage level, where this hypothesis would suggest β2 > 0. The inclusion of this measure
allows me to disentangle whether industry-specific uncertainty affects the demands for contract
negotiations.
Columns 1–9 of Table 5.3 present the findings for equation (5.1). This is estimated using
a municipal fixed effects estimator. The partial correlation in column 1 suggests that petitions
go counter to the economic cycle, this a contrast to the findings of the literature with respect
to American and Canadian strikes (Vroman, 1989; Gunderson and Melino, 1990; Card, 1990a)
which suggest that strikes themselves are pro-cyclical. The estimates in columns 2, and 7–
9 suggest that there are sizeable sector, seasonal and macroregional effects. When these are
partialled out, there is a positive correlation between unemployment and strike threats. The
coefficient in column 2 suggests that an increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage
point increases the petition rate by 0.014 per 10,000 of the municipal population.15 This finding
can be contrasted with Vroman (1989), who suggests that increases in unemployment decrease
the probability of strikes. Naturally, these are not strictly comparable, but nevertheless reveal
that strike threats do not necessarily capture the same thing as strikes themselves.
15For a municipality like Jiutepec in the state of Morelos–with a population of 122,000 and a sizeable manufac-
turing community—this would imply an increase of nearly two petitions.
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Formally testing whether increases in uncertainty, as faced by the firm, lead to increased
demands for contract negotiations, no evidence is found for this proposition. Manufacturing
subsector specific inflation decreases strike threats. Column 4 suggests that a five percentage
point increase16 in the manufacturing rate of inflation decreases strike threats by 0.005 per 10,000
of the municipal population.17 The magnitude of this effect suggests that during periods of low
uncertainty unions will increase their belligerence, perhaps in an attempt to capture greater
rents that may be available in the economy. It should be noted that when the rate of inflation
is partialled out, the effects of unemployment increase, showing that it is important to control
for both these two opposing effects.
The columns 5, 6, 8 and 9 of table 5.3 augment the analysis to include binary indicators
for electoral year.18 The evidence here suggests that there is a sizeable effect of electoral years
which is comparable in magnitude to the unemployment rate effect previously noted. Column 9
suggests that the mere fact of being a local election year in a municipality increases the number
of strike petitions by 0.012 per 10,000 of the population, relative to non-electoral years.19 This
finding is robust to specification and suggests that, although strike threats are related to the
economic cycle, they are also related to the electoral cycle. This may be part confirmation for
union leadership executive discretion as theorised by Burton (1984). The model developed by
Martin (1984) further expands on the notion of the agency problem in collective bargaining as
hinted in Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). Martin shows that if unions are concentrated into
large entities the union leadership is relatively unaccountable to their rank-and-file. Thus we
may expect that the union leadership will be more willing to abuse their institutional tools for
political ends, and those would be unrelated to the state of labour relations at firm level.
In order to tease out the above findings, I have replicated the specifications in column 9 from
table 5.3 on a set of disaggregated set of causes of strike petitions presented in table 5.4. It
should be noted that the specifications are identical to those previously reported. However, in
order to conserve space, only the coefficients for unemployment, inflation and electoral year are
presented.
The effects of the business and electoral cycle on the rate of petitions vary by cause. Increases
in the unemployment rate increase the number of contract signing petitions and decrease wage
16The equivalent of a one standard deviation increase for all subsectors in the post 2000 period
17For Jiutepec, this would imply a decrease of 0.61 petitions.
18Defined as Electoral Year= 1 for being one calendar year from that municipality-specific electoral date, and
zero otherwise.
19For a municipality such as Jiutepec, this would suggest an increase of 1.5 petitions.
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Table 5.4: Effects of the Economic cycle by strike petition types
per 10,000 Petitions Contract Contract Contract Wage
Signing Revision Failure
Unemployment 0.014** 0.014*** 0.002 0.002 -0.003**
rate (%) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Manufacturer -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000**
Inflation (%) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Election Year 0.012* -0.001 0.010*** 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Manufacturing FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroregion time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.581 0.432 0.314 0.274 0.449
N 37,475 37,475 37,475 37,475 37,475
Note: The regressions specification is identical to column 9 of table 5.3. The standard errors
are clustered at municipal level and are reported in parentheses
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the pooled sample of Manufacturing firms, the
unemployment level data is determined at state level and is derived from the ENEU and ENOE
for the appropriate time periods.
The rate of inflation is determined as the one-digit manufacturing subsector specific price infla-
tion.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
increase petitions, where a one percentage point increase in the state level unemployment rate
decreases the petition rate per 10,000 of population by 0.014 and -0.003 respectively.Contract
signing petitions are those that seek to negotiate a new collective bargaining contract, and
encompass the whole of the remuneration package. Wage petitions are those which seek to
have an extraordinary increase in wages that falls outside of normal bargaining. The opposite
nature of these types of petitions reflect that the counter-cyclical nature of petitions is driven by
the desire of union members to negotiate remuneration packages, which will see them weather
adverse economic conditions better. Equally, the demand for off-contract negotiation cycle wage
increases exhibit a significant decline. This result is broadly comparable to what has been
reported by the literature on strikes.
The findings regarding petitions and the electoral cycle seem to originate from contract
revision petitions. The rate at which unions seek to renegotiate existing contracts seem to be
unrelated to the economic cycle. Nevertheless, there seems to be well determined electoral year
effects in the demand for contract revision. This confirms the previous findings that there is an
electoral-cycle relevant component to strike threats.20
It is worth emphasising that, while it is perfectly legitimate for unions to threaten strikes
through the institutional mechanism of petitions in response to changes in the economic cycle,
20As a separate exercise the analysis above was re-run for non-manufacturing firms. These findings remain in
comport with the effects for the manufacturing firms and thus are not reported here.
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there is no reason for unions to systematically increase threats during electoral years. The next
section will explore how election results exert a direct effect on strike threats.
5.6 Close elections lead to more strike threats
In order to further explore the causal nature of the first empirical finding that there is an
association between strike threats and the electoral cycle, I will employ a sharp RD design (see
Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; van der Klaauw, 2008; Lee and
Lemieux, 2010) using information on close municipal elections. The RD approach used here as
applied to elections is due to Lee (2008). Given the count nature of the petitions data, these
are transformed into the rate of petitions per 10,000 of the population. I employ a parametric
estimator to obtain the RD estimates, which assumes the following functional form:
Petition Ratemst = αm + ρt + βPartyWinmt + f(MoVPartymst) + Zmst′θ + ηmst (5.2)
The causal identification here is achieved by employing a parametric estimator within a RD
design. The causal variable of interest in equation (5.2) is given by the treatment parameter
β from the parametric regression, which is a binary indicator variable that takes the value of
1 where one of the three political parties won the municipal presidency (either alone or in a
coalition) and zero otherwise. So, for example, in municipality m in state s in time t, if there is
a significant effect of the estimated β parameter, assuming that there is a discontinuity whose
variation is appropriately captured by the functional form, then the β parameter is interpretable
as a causal effect from elections to petitions.
The regression outlined in equation (5.2) is also augmented with additional covariates, which
are outlined in table 5.2. These covariates include state-level unemployment rates, municipal
year specific effects, and some such as workplace accident related deaths, controls that capture
the political party of the governor of each municipality, incumbency dummies, and coalition
dummies.21 The electoral calendar in Mexico operates such that even though there may be
municipal elections in a given year across multiple states, there is no guarantee that these will
occur on the same day. Thus, in the final specification electoral cycle fixed effects are introduced
21Some of these were excluded from the earlier analysis, as they are not available in as high a frequency as
required. The aggregation to years allow these to come into play.
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and are defined to be the year in which there was at least one election (regardless of month).
Although the data utilised in this section are similar to those used in the previous section,
these data differ in one key respect. Previously these had been disaggregated at a monthly level.
However, due to the nature of electoral contests the most appropriate level for analysis is annual.
The data are therefore aggregated as the sum total strike threats in the immediate 12 months
after an election, as well as the total petition rate per 10,000 of population in the 12–24 month
interval after an election.
The panel nature of the data, and the twenty year time span that this covers, suggest that
there are likely important unobserved effects that are occurring at the municipal level. In order
to net these out I employ municipal specific fixed effects. Due to the count nature of the petitions
data, it would be inappropriate to estimate their relationship by OLS. The estimates presented
in tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 are obtained through a fixed effects estimator on the rate of petitions,
which neatly sidesteps the count nature of petitions.22 This allows the estimates to represent
the true causal effect in the relationship of interest.
Figure 5.3: Continuity along forcing variable
22Nevertheless, these tables have also been estimated using petitions data as a count with a Negative Binomial
fixed effects estimator. These findings are consistent to what is presented here.
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McCrary (2008) raises a concern for RD designs relating to the validity of the estimates being
contingent on the inability of the running variable to be manipulated by agents. In the context of
electoral results, manipulation can manifest in the form of electoral irregularities, this may be a
concern in particular for marginal elections. Given that the identification strategy relies strongly
on these results, falling foul of this assumption would invalidate the RD approach. I employed
the test suggested by McCrary, which estimates a finely binned histogram of the forcing variable,
and then used a Local Linear Regression (LLR) to estimate whether there is a discontinuity at
the victory threshold. The use of LLR raises the issue of optimal bandwidth selection for this
test. McCrary uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) algorithm for selecting the appropriate
bandwidth. The test is then effectively the log difference in height between the point estimate
from the LLR using a bandwidth of the nearest n-points on both the left and the right of the
discontinuity.23 The results from this test can be seen in figure 5.3, which suggest that there
is no discontinuity along the forcing variable. One thing that must be noted for the PRD and
PAN diagrams is the ‘double hump’ of the forcing variable along the 50% mark as well as those
elections where there is a narrow election with a margin of victory near the zero boundary. This
mass of density along the 50% mark reflects the changing nature of Mexican politics. Prior
to the 2000 election the PRD and PAN would not have been seen as credible contenders for
municipalities, and this is representative of the PRI hegemony across all levels of government.
If those elections prior to 2000 are excluded the second peak of density along those large losses
disappears. Nevertheless, this may give rise to concerns that this may have some effect on the
estimates obtained from the global parametric RD approach. In order to mitigate this, I re-
estimate equation (5.2) across a variety of narrow electoral margin windows. These estimates
should thus demonstrate that the effects derive from narrow elections and are not due to the
large losses experienced prior to 2000.
As an additional robustness check on the continuity of the forcing variable I employ the test
proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2016). This approach has the added benefit that it does not rely
on the pre-binning of data into a histogram, and provides a test value that follows the robust-
bias correction proposed in Calonico et al. (2014c). The test statistics for each of the PAN,
PRD and PRI are as follows .718 (.473), -1.192 (.233) and -2.22 (.026), where the respective
p-values are reported in parentheses. These test statistics suggest that there is no manipulation
of the running variable for the PAN and PRD. In contrast to the McCrary test, the null of no
23In practice to employ this test I used McCrary’s Stata module -DCdensity-.
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discontinuity along the forcing variable cannot be rejected for the PRI party. This suggests that
at the electoral margin, there may be manipulation of PRI results. This is consistent with the
long established history of PRI electoral manipulation, which is well documented (Gillingham,
2012; Eisenstadt and Yelle, 2012; Lujambio, 2001). However, performing the test again on the
post-2000 election sample, yield a test statistic of -1.628 (.1034) suggesting that the watershed
elections of that year, where the PRI lost the presidency also witnessed the end of such electoral
manipulation. Indeed, if one considers that narrow electoral margins are a new phenomenon in
Mexican politics, with margins significantly narrowing since 2000, and the test is performed for
the PRI only for the sub-sample of 10% closest elections, the finding is once again reversed with
the test statistic of -0.712 (0.476).
Figure 5.4: Impact of PAN win on Strike Petitions rate
Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 allow visual inspection of the discontinuity and the petitions data.
The plots were generated using the methods developed by Calonico et al. (2014c). These methods
are robust methods that select the optimal bin size either side of the discontinuity. Each figure
is comprised of four sub-figures, each of these plot the petition rate per 10,000 of population over
the rating variable. The first and third panes plot the whole span of the rating variable [-1,1]
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Figure 5.5: Impact of PRD win on Strike Petitions rate
Figure 5.6: Impact of PRI win on Strike Petitions rate
143
representing losing and winning by 100 percent of the vote for the total petition rate per 10,000
of the population in a municipality one and two years after the election, respectively. For ease of
viewing panes 2 and 4 of each figure plot the data, using the Calonico et al. (2014a) methods, over
the window [-.1,.1] over elections where 10% or less of the vote decided the outcome. The lines
for all of the plots are the result of a local polynomial smoothed at either side of the discontinuity
using the optimum bandwidth as determined by the Calonico et al. (2014c) algorithm.
It is noteworthy that all of the plots show a clear discontinuity on the petitions data across
the margin of victory for all three parties. The plots suggest that locations that had a right-wing
PAN mayoral victory perceive a higher petition rate per 10,000 of population both one year and
two years following the election. The findings are similar, if less marked for the left-wing PRD
party. The findings for the PRI party suggest that around the discontinuity a PRI election leads
to fewer petitions.
The results from the global parametric RD exercise are reported in tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7
for the PAN, PRD and PRI parties, respectively. In each instance the functional form employed
uses a quadratic polynomial around the discontinuity. This functional form was preferred due
to the Gelman and Imbens (2014) suggestion to avoid high-order polynomials, as these cannot
be satisfactorily chosen and the confidence intervals in these should be treated with care.
Table 5.5 suggests that the rate of strike threats is unaffected by one year after a right-wing
narrow PAN election. This is found to be the case regardless of the specification. However, the
estimates in columns 4–6, suggest that two years after the mayoral elections for the right-wing
PAN party, there is an increase of approximately 0.992 petitions per 10,000 of the population.
The mean population for a municipality where the PAN won is 128,838.24 The estimates sug-
gest that a right-wing electoral victory in the average sized municipality leads to an additional
12.4 strike threats, relative to those municipalities where any other party won.25 When other
covariates are introduced the coefficient reduces in size and there is a predicted increase of
approximately 9.94 strike threats relative to those who voted other parties into power.26
24A similar sized town that elected a PAN mayor would be the municipality of San Pedro Cholula in the state
of Puebla in 2012. The population in 2012 was 124,937 and it is an area with some manufacturing, and industry.
They elected a PAN mayor in 2010.
25This can be obtained by taking the coefficient in column 4 of Table 5.5 and multiplying it by the population
of Cholula in tens of thousands (12.4947).
26Note, that it should be clear that this effect scales with the size of the municipality and thus the magnitude
of the effect will vary between [0.05,146.44] extra petitions. Where the smallest municipality that elected a right-
wing mayor had a population of 633 in 2012 and the largest, Iztapalapa borough in Mexico city with a population
of 1,839,700 in 2006.
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Table 5.5: Impact of PAN election on strike petition rate
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PAN win 0.087 0.013 0.016 0.992*** 0.787*** 0.796***
(0.106) (0.103) (0.104) (0.295) (0.276) (0.274)
MoV -0.227 -0.106 -0.106 0.351 0.068 0.059
(0.441) (0.443) (0.447) (1.274) (1.293) (1.297)
PAN win × MoV -0.855 -0.169 -0.193 -9.010*** -6.565*** -6.549***
(0.860) (0.898) (0.907) (2.163) (2.148) (2.173)
MoV2 -0.021 -0.001 0.002 0.794 0.806 0.790
(0.403) (0.420) (0.424) (1.198) (1.193) (1.195)
PAN win × MoV2 1.287 0.071 0.124 7.536*** 4.204* 4.194*
(0.877) (0.837) (0.830) (2.400) (2.186) (2.161)
PRD governor 0.423*** 0.427*** -0.042 -0.040
(0.110) (0.110) (0.219) (0.220)
PRI governor 0.492*** 0.495*** 0.296 0.314
(0.103) (0.104) (0.215) (0.219)
Incumbent -0.068 -0.094** 0.064 -0.006
(0.044) (0.047) (0.125) (0.134)
Workplace death rate 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.049* 0.049*
(per 10,000) (0.054) (0.054) (0.029) (0.028)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.012 0.011 0.240*** 0.241***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.057) (0.057)
In coalition 0.342*** 0.350*** 1.013*** 1.049***
(0.065) (0.068) (0.168) (0.173)
Constant 0.472*** 0.011 -0.079 1.688*** 0.362 0.059
(0.083) (0.145) (0.153) (0.237) (0.467) (0.408)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
N 8,052 8,052 8,052 8,052 8,052 8,052
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered at
municipal level and are reported in parentheses.
The estimates are obtained from a conditional fixed effects negative binomial estimator. In order to interpret
the coefficients, one must exponentiate the coefficient. The extensive margin can be obtained by multiplying
the coefficient with the exponentiated sample mean for that sub-sample.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t + 1 and t + 2 in
a given municipality that had an election in t, the unemployment level data is determined at state level and is
derived from the ENEU and ENOE for the appropriate time periods. The work place deaths data are derived
from administrative records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or construction site,
and are defined per 10,000 of the municipal population.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.6: Impact of PRD election on strike petition rate
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRD win 0.248*** 0.269*** 0.256*** 1.351*** 1.262*** 1.218***
(0.082) (0.074) (0.074) (0.338) (0.325) (0.321)
MoV 0.180 0.325 0.364 -0.136 -0.003 0.110
(0.307) (0.317) (0.317) (1.246) (1.281) (1.263)
PRD win × MoV -3.222*** -3.742*** -3.764*** -12.367*** -11.098*** -11.093***
(0.673) (0.710) (0.701) (2.942) (2.752) (2.716)
MoV2 0.468 0.455 0.491 0.261 0.448 0.532
(0.317) (0.325) (0.322) (1.250) (1.278) (1.268)
PRD win × MoV2 2.694 3.498** 3.453** 15.800*** 13.790*** 13.238***
(1.721) (1.508) (1.620) (5.207) (4.859) (4.987)
PRI governor 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.115 0.131
(0.037) (0.037) (0.139) (0.137)
PAN governor -0.294*** -0.291*** -0.264 -0.259
(0.079) (0.078) (0.191) (0.189)
Incumbent 0.119 0.103 -0.030 -0.110
(0.124) (0.126) (0.229) (0.239)
Workplace death rate 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.049 0.049
(per 10,000) (0.052) (0.052) (0.033) (0.031)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.033 0.033 0.261*** 0.262***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.058) (0.059)
In coalition -0.071 -0.066 0.169 0.196
(0.056) (0.054) (0.135) (0.129)
Constant 0.499*** 0.368*** 0.309** 1.594*** 0.542** 0.256
(0.065) (0.119) (0.131) (0.251) (0.232) (0.327)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 8,055 8,055 8,055 8,055 8,055 8,055
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered at municipal
level and are reported in parentheses.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t+ 1 and t+ 2 in a given
municipality that had an election in t, the unemployment level data is determined at state level and is derived from
the ENEU and ENOE for the appropriate time periods. The work place deaths data are derived from administrative
records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or construction site, and are defined per 10,000
of the municipal population.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.7: Impact of PRI election on strike petition rate
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRI win -0.049 -0.019 -0.028 -0.493*** -0.445*** -0.470***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.169) (0.169) (0.172)
MoV 0.484 0.316 0.342 1.088 0.981 1.016
(0.524) (0.520) (0.525) (1.314) (1.290) (1.286)
PRI win × MoV 0.031 -0.280 -0.314 0.489 -0.026 -0.121
(0.621) (0.613) (0.616) (1.568) (1.665) (1.636)
MoV2 0.296 0.245 0.309 -0.507 -0.702 -0.689
(0.532) (0.529) (0.529) (1.657) (1.696) (1.696)
PRI win × MoV2 -0.617 -0.219 -0.275 -0.705 0.193 0.213
(0.661) (0.656) (0.662) (1.750) (1.696) (1.704)
PRD governor -0.070** -0.069** -0.346*** -0.366***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.129) (0.130)
PAN governor -0.382*** -0.381*** -0.289* -0.297*
(0.088) (0.089) (0.175) (0.177)
Incumbent 0.030 -0.004 0.114 -0.013
(0.048) (0.062) (0.120) (0.127)
Workplace death rate 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.035 0.035
(per 10,000) (0.054) (0.054) (0.029) (0.028)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.282*** 0.284***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.078) (0.077)
In coalition -0.206*** -0.207*** -0.092 -0.082
(0.059) (0.059) (0.283) (0.275)
Constant 0.533*** 0.409*** 0.347*** 1.998*** 0.983*** 0.752***
(0.052) (0.123) (0.112) (0.126) (0.229) (0.213)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 7,865 7,865 7,865 7,865 7,865 7,865
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered at muni-
cipal level and are reported in parentheses.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t + 1 and t + 2 in
a given municipality that had an election in t, the unemployment level data is determined at state level and is
derived from the ENEU and ENOE for the appropriate time periods. The work place deaths data are derived
from administrative records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or construction site,
and are defined per 10,000 of the municipal population.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Looking at the results for the left-wing PRD party it becomes clear that increases in the rate
of strike threats are due to elections but perhaps unrelated to political ideology. The estimates in
table 5.6 imply that those municipalities that elect a left-wing PRD mayor exhibit systematically
higher rates of petitions both one year and two years after a PRD victory. Columns 3 and 6–
my preferred specifications– suggest that the rate of strike threats increase both one and two
years after a left-wing win by the PRD party. The rate increases by 0.256 and 1.218 petitions
per 10,000 of the municipal population one and two years after the election. To put this into
context, the average size for a municipality won by the PRD is of 78,638.27 For the average
municipality won by the PRD, the effects implicit in column 3 suggest that one year after an
election there will be approximately 2 more strike petitions, relative to non-PRD Municipalities.
Whilst, in the lead-up to the following election, the model predicts an additional 9.5 petitions.28
As with the previous findings the magnitude of the effect is diminished by the introduction of
other controls, with the smallest effect associated with introducing electoral cycle fixed effects.
The results from Table 5.7 for the PRI party are in stark contrast to the PAN and PRD
parties. I find that despite the discontinuity visible in Figure 5.6, once a global modelling
strategy is employed, there is a negative effect from PRI municipal wins on the number of strike
threats two years after a PRI election. The estimates for column 6 suggest that the rate of strike
threats reduces by 0.47 per 10,000 of the municipal population two years after an election. The
average population in PRI winning Municipalities is 75,171.29 For the average sized municipality
the estimates suggest that they would see a decline of 3.54 petitions. However, there are two
things that must be borne in mind with regards to this finding.
(i) PRI are the most electorally successful party in Mexican politics.Both legitimately, and
indeed through well known incidents of fraud (Camp, 2003). It should come as no surprise
that as outlined in Chapter 2 on the history of unions, PRI are the party which has the closest
historical links with ‘officialist’ unions. Those unions which are formally a part of the party30,
and were complicit in maintaining this party in power during their 71 year rule of the country
(Lastra Lastra, 2002a). Once these facts are taken into account, the veracity of the reported
effects must be interpreted with care.
27This is roughly equivalent to the population of the municipality of Salina Cruz (pop. 77,825) in the state of
Oaxaca, which elected a left-wing mayor in 1998.
28Note that the population of municipalities won by PRD range from 633 to 1,830,000, so the effect range
will lie somewhere in the range of [0.016,47.053] on year after the election and [0.077,223.869] two years after an
election.
29This is similar to Jesu´s Maria in Aguascalientes in 2001, with a 75,499, this municipality elected a PRI
Municipal President in 2001.
30Indeed, some union leaders were postulated by PRI as senators and congressmen (Middlebrook, 1995).
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(ii) Identification may be compromised by instances of electoral fraud, and the failure of these
data to pass the Cattaneo et al. (2016) manipulation test as previously noted for the pre-2000
period.
The findings presented in this section demonstrate that there are important effects on strike
threats originating from certain electoral results. These effects are found to span political lines,
affecting municipalities where both right-wing and left-wing mayors were elected. The identi-
fication of these effects has thus far relied on a global parametric strategy, exploiting all of the
data. The RD approach, however, is only valid on the assumption that it is those observations
that are close to the discontinuity that are as good as random. As such, it could be argued that
the magnitude of the effects presented thus far are identified with excess variation which should
not be taken into account. Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 relax this assumption through restricting
the sample to only those elections that can be termed as narrow. I define narrow elections
arbitrarily as those whose margin of victory lies within the window [-.1,.1], that is where 10%
or less of the vote settled the outcome. The findings for PAN and PRD presented previously
are robust to estimation within a more restrictive window. Another issue worthy of comment,
is that estimation with the subset of narrow elections strengthens the results, where column 6
of each respective table suggests that narrow electoral victories lead to an increase in the rate
of strike threats by 1.507 (1.456) two years after a narrow win for the right (left) in a municipal
election.31 The robustness exercise reported above changed the estimates for the PRI party, and
these are no longer found to be statistically significant.
31If these are evaluated for the average sized Municipality which elected a right- and (left-) wing mayor these
effects imply an increase of 18.82 (11.33) additional petitions relative to all other municipalities.
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Table 5.8: Impact of narrow PAN election on strike petition rate
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PAN win 0.221 0.035 0.056 1.740*** 0.978* 1.057*
(0.186) (0.191) (0.194) (0.605) (0.587) (0.589)
MoV 4.557 5.573 5.317 -10.105 -7.751 -9.409
(5.964) (5.963) (6.065) (18.059) (17.953) (17.718)
PAN win × MoV -26.016*** -21.540** -20.654** -48.386* -15.990 -11.795
(9.141) (9.346) (8.906) (27.135) (26.425) (25.836)
MoV2 41.890 52.704 52.881 -171.177 -139.344 -150.217
(57.179) (56.954) (57.286) (151.756) (149.029) (147.589)
PAN win × MoV2 138.802 86.860 78.826 623.043** 280.055 258.175
(104.520) (111.234) (107.070) (264.250) (261.517) (261.080)
PRD governor 0.333 0.325 -0.635 -0.695
(0.219) (0.218) (0.491) (0.505)
PRI governor 0.412* 0.402* -0.452 -0.470
(0.218) (0.213) (0.501) (0.499)
Incumbent -0.171 -0.239 -0.009 -0.184
(0.134) (0.178) (0.241) (0.259)
Workplace death rate 0.265* 0.269* 0.044 0.015
(per 10,000) (0.142) (0.145) (0.120) (0.119)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.042 0.043 0.302*** 0.305***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.088) (0.088)
In coalition 0.287*** 0.315*** 1.148*** 1.217***
(0.111) (0.110) (0.255) (0.260)
Constant 0.767*** 0.314 0.053 2.055*** 1.071 0.433
(0.138) (0.255) (0.265) (0.468) (0.707) (0.632)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07
N 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered at municipal
level and are reported in parentheses.
Narrow wins are defined as those where the margin of victory is within the window [-.1,.1], for alternate specific-
ations which vary this assumption please see table 5.12.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t + 1 and t + 2 in
a given municipality that had an election in t, the unemployment level data is determined at state level and is
derived from the ENEU and ENOE for the appropriate time periods. The work place deaths data are derived
from administrative records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or construction site,
and are defined per 10,000 of the municipal population.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.9: Impact of narrow PRD election on strike petition rate
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRD win 0.278* 0.251* 0.264* 1.532** 1.263** 1.456**
(0.142) (0.141) (0.146) (0.677) (0.624) (0.668)
MoV 1.890 2.542 2.388 11.556 13.681 9.727
(4.517) (4.662) (4.698) (14.230) (14.225) (13.756)
PRD win × MoV -12.210* -11.702* -12.179* -110.489*** -100.845*** -100.894***
(6.816) (6.963) (7.262) (38.680) (37.046) (37.318)
MoV2 22.464 27.762 25.834 93.096 112.898 78.118
(41.110) (42.388) (42.645) (126.905) (127.687) (123.935)
PRD win × MoV2 54.993 41.667 48.054 828.693** 706.591** 765.870**
(61.572) (61.443) (64.487) (354.702) (329.549) (338.706)
PRI governor 0.079 0.068 0.316 0.354*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.200) (0.195)
PAN governor -0.053 -0.073 -0.347 -0.280
(0.089) (0.095) (0.299) (0.310)
Incumbent 0.089 0.086 -0.089 -0.256
(0.079) (0.086) (0.166) (0.180)
Workplace death rate 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.004
(per 10,000) (0.061) (0.059) (0.122) (0.120)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.008 0.009 0.132** 0.110*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.057) (0.059)
In coalition 0.112 0.125* 0.718** 0.726**
(0.074) (0.073) (0.309) (0.323)
Constant 0.369*** 0.251 0.240 1.613*** 0.801* 0.044
(0.106) (0.181) (0.187) (0.327) (0.413) (0.617)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10
N 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered at municipal
level and are reported in parentheses.
Narrow wins are defined as those where the margin of victory is within the window [-.1,.1], for alternate specifications
which vary this assumption please see table 5.12.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t+ 1 and t+ 2 in a given
municipality that had an election in t, the unemployment level data is determined at state level and is derived from
the ENEU and ENOE for the appropriate time periods. The work place deaths data are derived from administrative
records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or construction site, and are defined per 10,000
of the municipal population.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.10: Impact of narrow PRI election on strike petition rate
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRI win -0.076 -0.063 -0.069 -0.779 -0.709 -0.737
(0.141) (0.139) (0.141) (0.731) (0.716) (0.712)
MoV 2.551 2.989 2.960 6.592 4.450 3.519
(5.184) (5.219) (5.162) (14.230) (14.007) (14.087)
PRI win × MoV -2.174 -2.834 -2.767 19.759 21.318 20.746
(6.545) (6.693) (6.544) (34.787) (35.052) (34.040)
MoV2 8.931 11.522 11.123 66.616 42.329 27.494
(53.064) (52.918) (51.870) (137.834) (136.387) (136.937)
PRI win × MoV2 -4.437 -5.521 -5.912 -294.975 -252.481 -221.794
(69.530) (69.102) (70.484) (304.077) (283.626) (264.974)
PRD governor -0.044 -0.043 -0.508* -0.538*
(0.054) (0.054) (0.287) (0.291)
PAN governor -0.114 -0.110 0.105 0.143
(0.138) (0.138) (0.281) (0.290)
Incumbent 0.173* 0.138 0.677* 0.414
(0.095) (0.096) (0.390) (0.273)
Workplace death rate 0.125 0.140 -0.054 -0.038
(per 10,000) (0.102) (0.103) (0.105) (0.087)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.077** 0.078** 0.036 0.022
(0.038) (0.038) (0.273) (0.282)
In coalition -0.168 -0.163 0.594 0.592
(0.110) (0.107) (0.687) (0.658)
Constant 0.582*** 0.266* 0.179 1.924*** 1.218* 0.683*
(0.093) (0.136) (0.140) (0.270) (0.661) (0.401)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered at
municipal level and are reported in parentheses.
Narrow wins are defined as those where the margin of victory is within the window [-.1,.1], for alternate
specifications which vary this assumption please see table 5.12.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t+ 1 and t+ 2
in a given municipality that had an election in t, the unemployment level data is determined at state level
and is derived from the ENEU and ENOE for the appropriate time periods. The work place deaths data
are derived from administrative records for those unexplained deaths that occurred in a manufacturing or
construction site, and are defined per 10,000 of the municipal population.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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The explanation I have offered with regards to why the PRI party are unaffected relies on the
historic association between the PRI and the ‘officialist’ unions. However, in order to formally
test this hypothesis I would need to disentangle the RD effects estimated by a union submitting
the petition to strike. Given the administrative nature of the data, I have access to such
information. The RD parameter of interest β is given in table 5.11 for all three political parties. I
define ‘officialist’ unions to be those large trade unions congresses which have dominated Mexican
unionisation.32 The findings from this exercise strengthens my argument. It can be seen that
for the PAN and PRD that the increase in petitions associated with the election of a Municipal
President solely comes from the ‘officialist’ unions. As asserted earlier one way to understand
these results is to appreciate that ‘officialist’ unions are members of large confederations, where
the ‘paradox of participation’ is in full force (see Burton, 1984; Downs, 1957). Given their
large membership, we may expect that union engagement is low. Furthermore, given the large
national standing of these unions, there is likely to be union leadership discretion. I interpret
this finding in this instance to imply that the leadership of these large unions are perhaps more
interested in furthering their national goals, as opposed to the demands of their rank-and-file.
One may also situate this finding in the model sketched out by Rosa (1984) where the union
may derive political rents through acting as a campaigning tool for the PRI party.
32These are: Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico (CTM); Confederacio´n Regional Obrera Mexicana
(CROM); Conferacio´n Obrera Regional (COR); Congreso General de Trabajadores (CGT); and Conferacio´n
Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (CRT). All of these trade unions congresses belong to the PRI aligned Congreso
del Trabajo (CT).
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Table 5.11: Impact of Municipal President elections on strike petition rate, by petitioner type
Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +2 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PAN win
Officialist Union 0.107 -0.057 -0.047 1.612*** 0.854 0.943*
(0.165) (0.174) (0.176) (0.580) (0.563) (0.562)
N 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025
Independent Union 0.114 0.092 0.104 0.128 0.124 0.113
(0.077) (0.064) (0.073) (0.091) (0.098) (0.104)
N 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,025
PRD win
Officialist Union 0.291** 0.255** 0.268** 1.546** 1.321** 1.504**
(0.127) (0.126) (0.131) (0.637) (0.582) (0.636)
N 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465
Independent Union -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 -0.014 -0.058 -0.048
(0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.155) (0.149) (0.143)
N 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465 1,465
PRI win
Officialist Union -0.044 -0.033 -0.038 -0.494 -0.437 -0.468
(0.128) (0.126) (0.129) (0.438) (0.433) (0.432)
N 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984
Independent Union -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.285 -0.271 -0.268
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.389) (0.380) (0.377)
N 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984 2,984
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Electoral Cycle FE No No Yes No No Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2). The standard errors are clustered
at municipal level and are reported in parentheses.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000 of population in t+1 and t+
2 in a given municipality that had an election in t, The covariates included replicate the specifications
previously shown previously. These include: unemployment rate, unexplained workplace deaths,
coalition dummies, incumbency dummies, governorship dummies, a quadratic polynomial around the
discontinuity.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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5.6.1 Robustness Checks
In this subsection I report a number of robustness checks for the main findings of this chapter.
These checks attenuate some of the concerns of the identification strategy employed. The main
concern considered by this section is that the causal parameter (β) from (5.2) may be sensitive to
changes in the estimation window or the functional form of the local linear regression. I report
tables 5.12, 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 as evidence to the contrary. These tables provide narrower
bandwidths for each of the three main political parties, where each cell reports the crucial βˆ
parameter. This is estimated and reported for both petitions in t + 1 and t + 2. It is clear
that the results are robust to either the inclusion or exclusion of covariates, and in general the
results are not dependent on the length of the estimation window. Indeed the narrowing of
the bandwidth shows that the effects for these extremely narrow windows are larger than those
reported by 10 percentage point window. With regards to the functional form of the RD local
linear regression, Tables 5.14 and 5.15 suggest that when interpreting the optimal polynomial,
the results of the main text remain unaltered. There is a causal effect from narrow elections on
Strike threat rates in municipalities where PAN and PRD won by a margin of 10 percentage
points or less. If anything, interpreting the optimal polynomial estimates as determined by the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)33 suggest larger estimates than those reported in the main
body of the text.
A final robustness check to the RD estimates is the estimation of non-parametric estimates
of the regression discontinuity. These were estimated using both the plug-in bandwidth estim-
ator suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), and the standard errors reported reflect
the robust-bias correction suggested by Calonico et al. (2014c). I also employed the optimal
bandwidth estimator suggested by Calonico et al., and in practice all of these were estimated
using the Calonico et al. (2014b) Stata module. The results from this exercise are reported
in Appendix H. The results remain invariant to this approach. In summary, the findings sug-
gest that there is a strongly robust causal effect from narrow right- and left-wing victories to
‘officialist’ strike threats two years after a narrow election.
33Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest using Akaike’s cross-validation criterion, however, this is shown by Stone
(1977) to be asymptotically minimised by minimising the AIC.
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Table 5.12: Impact of alternate bandwidths in local linear regression on narrow election results with
no controls
MoV PAN PRD PRI
Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions
Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2% 0.656 5.368*** 1.347*** 0.727 -0.008 -0.034
(0.419) (1.740) (0.382) (1.265) (0.454) (1.039)
N 562 562 432 432 650 650
3% 0.666** 4.558*** 1.029*** 1.511 -0.779* -1.990*
(0.334) (1.239) (0.327) (1.037) (0.459) (1.096)
N 747 747 560 560 959 959
4% 0.586** 3.962*** 0.506 0.531 -0.473 -1.302
(0.293) (1.069) (0.335) (0.940) (0.326) (0.825)
N 894 894 669 669 1,225 1,225
5% 0.356 3.336*** 0.603** 1.513 -0.227 0.330
(0.267) (0.901) (0.245) (0.938) (0.260) (0.961)
N 1,079 1,079 809 809 1,538 1,538
6% 0.255 2.657*** 0.443** 2.002** -0.127 -0.918
(0.219) (0.744) (0.204) (0.951) (0.200) (0.625)
N 1,254 1,254 933 933 1,814 1,814
7% 0.301 1.885*** 0.364* 1.909** -0.094 -0.866
(0.194) (0.727) (0.190) (0.882) (0.179) (0.905)
N 1,471 1,471 1,075 1,075 2,150 2,150
8% 0.212 2.032*** 0.295* 1.866** -0.085 -0.982
(0.195) (0.685) (0.172) (0.826) (0.169) (0.879)
N 1,667 1,667 1,193 1,193 2,425 2,425
9% 0.225 1.939*** 0.281* 1.767** -0.048 -0.862
(0.189) (0.635) (0.156) (0.748) (0.152) (0.804)
N 1,850 1,850 1,329 1,329 2,719 2,719
10% 0.221 1.740*** 0.278* 1.532** -0.076 -0.779
(0.186) (0.605) (0.142) (0.677) (0.141) (0.731)
N 2,025 2,025 1,465 1,465 2,984 2,984
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2), with no covariates
and replicate the functional form of columns 1 and 4 of tables 5.8,5.9 and 5.10. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the municipal level.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the parameter β in (5.2) for the appro-
priate time periods as given in the column heading.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.13: Impact of alternate bandwidths in local linear regression on narrow election results with
controls
MoV PAN PRD PRI
Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions
Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2% 0.886 4.603** 1.589*** 1.465 -0.134 0.930
(0.574) (2.027) (0.406) (0.936) (0.446) (1.193)
N 562 562 432 432 650 650
3% 0.950* 4.030*** 1.028*** 1.667** -0.798* -1.495
(0.540) (1.387) (0.327) (0.812) (0.450) (1.041)
N 747 747 560 560 959 959
4% 0.747* 3.304*** 0.409 0.610 -0.489 -1.007
(0.419) (1.143) (0.355) (0.801) (0.317) (0.781)
N 894 894 669 669 1,225 1,225
5% 0.162 2.552*** 0.581** 1.239* -0.225 -0.120
(0.349) (0.928) (0.255) (0.723) (0.260) (0.772)
N 1,079 1,079 809 809 1,538 1,538
6% -0.072 1.529* 0.456** 1.838** -0.053 -0.979
(0.286) (0.844) (0.212) (0.777) (0.204) (0.836)
N 1,254 1,254 933 933 1,814 1,814
7% 0.050 0.967 0.372* 1.908** -0.051 -0.881
(0.231) (0.764) (0.204) (0.812) (0.176) (0.995)
N 1,471 1,471 1,075 1,075 2,150 2,150
8% -0.012 1.190* 0.288 1.782** -0.059 -0.941
(0.214) (0.691) (0.183) (0.772) (0.166) (0.907)
N 1,667 1,667 1,193 1,193 2,425 2,425
9% 0.057 1.178* 0.267* 1.640** -0.030 -0.798
(0.200) (0.617) (0.162) (0.713) (0.150) (0.755)
N 1,850 1,850 1,329 1,329 2,719 2,719
10% 0.056 1.057* 0.264* 1.456** -0.069 -0.737
(0.194) (0.589) (0.146) (0.668) (0.141) (0.712)
N 2,025 2,025 1,465 1,465 2,984 2,984
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2), with covariates
and replicate the functional form of columns 3 and 6 of tables 5.8,5.9 and 5.10. The
standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the municipal level.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the parameter β in (5.2) for the appro-
priate time periods as given in the column heading.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.14: Impact of alternate polynomial functional forms on narrow election results with no
controls
PAN PRD PRI
Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions
Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polynomial spline of order:
Zero -0.081 0.618*** 0.086* 0.207 0.050 -0.121
(0.107) (0.200) (0.049) (0.128) (0.066) (0.121)
N 2,025 2,025 1,465 1,465 2,984 2,984
AIC 6,749.470 9,489.294 1,828.861 5,658.524 9,266.278 17,471.887
One 0.111 1.037** 0.242** 0.800** -0.069 -0.330
(0.142) (0.449) (0.097) (0.358) (0.098) (0.350)
AIC 6,745.210 9,465.081 1,815.892 5,631.381 9,268.344 17,475.278
Two 0.221 1.740*** 0.278* 1.532** -0.076 -0.779
(0.186) (0.605) (0.142) (0.677) (0.141) (0.731)
AIC 6,742.272 9,456.979 1,813.233 5,568.928 9,272.309 17,477.915
Three 0.259 2.627*** 0.383** 1.878** -0.133 -0.602
(0.198) (0.760) (0.179) (0.820) (0.188) (0.597)
AIC 6,741.506 9,441.413 1,793.293 5,541.002 9,274.155 17,480.774
Four 0.510** 3.374*** 0.379* 1.675* -0.421* 0.135
(0.239) (0.858) (0.207) (0.877) (0.251) (0.872)
AIC 6,740.669 9,425.681 1,776.923 5,538.304 9,273.513 17,481.532
Five 0.480** 3.219*** 0.370* 1.684** -0.391 0.037
(0.233) (0.848) (0.202) (0.858) (0.239) (0.744)
AIC 6,740.618 9,428.848 1,778.385 5,539.287 9,273.062 17,481.675
Optimal order of 5 4 4 1 0 0
the polynomial
N 2,025 2,025 1,465 1,465 2,984 2,984
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2), with no covariates and replicate
the functional form of columns 1 and 4 of tables 5.8,5.9 and 5.10. The bandwidth for the local linear
regression lies within the window [-.1,.1]. The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
the municipal level. Optimal polynomial is that which minimises the AIC.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the parameter β in (5.2) for the appropriate time
periods as given in the column heading.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5.15: Impact of alternate polynomial functional forms on narrow election results with controls
PAN PRD PRI
Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions Petitions
Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2 Rate +1 Rate +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polynomial spline of order:
Zero -0.140 0.464*** 0.090 0.149 0.062 -0.097
(0.113) (0.178) (0.056) (0.130) (0.069) (0.119)
N 2,025 2,025 1,465 1,465 2,984 2,984
AIC 6,728.720 9,398.945 1,826.981 5,607.759 9,255.009 17,468.119
One -0.011 0.701* 0.227** 0.685** -0.061 -0.398
(0.147) (0.421) (0.099) (0.341) (0.098) (0.389)
AIC 6,730.084 9,391.739 1,818.676 5,590.100 9,256.787 17,471.064
Two 0.056 1.057* 0.264* 1.456** -0.069 -0.737
(0.194) (0.589) (0.146) (0.668) (0.141) (0.712)
AIC 6,730.487 9,394.067 1,816.772 5,540.195 9,260.733 17,474.126
Three 0.077 1.753** 0.382** 1.812** -0.096 -0.593
(0.214) (0.756) (0.189) (0.808) (0.187) (0.637)
AIC 6,731.975 9,389.644 1,799.602 5,519.977 9,262.945 17,476.715
Four 0.329 2.440*** 0.395* 1.639* -0.392 0.041
(0.274) (0.851) (0.218) (0.858) (0.248) (0.739)
AIC 6,735.508 9,384.596 1,780.858 5,520.891 9,261.950 17,477.941
Five 0.298 2.273*** 0.382* 1.651** -0.362 -0.045
(0.267) (0.844) (0.212) (0.839) (0.237) (0.651)
AIC 6,733.441 9,386.974 1,782.399 5,519.698 9,261.500 17,480.107
Optimal order of 0 4 4 5 0 0
the polynomial
N 2,025 2,025 1,465 1,465 2,984 2,984
Notes: Regressions all follow general specification outlined in (5.2), with covariates and replicate the
functional form of columns 3 and 6 of tables 5.8,5.9 and 5.10. The bandwidth for the local linear
regression lies within the window [-.1,.1]. The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at
the municipal level. Optimal polynomial is that which minimises the AIC.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the parameter β in (5.2) for the appropriate time
periods as given in the column heading.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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5.7 Strike threats stimulate electoral turnout
So far I have shown that strike threats are not only associated with elections, but the election
of certain political parties directly increases the petition rate in the lead-up to the following
election. At the end of the previous section, I hypothesized that the reason there is an increased
number of strike petitions is that they are being misused as an electoral campaigning tool. In
order to test this hypothesis I collected data from all of the state electoral institutes on electoral
turnout at municipal level. This is distinct from the electoral district, as there is no direct
one-to-one mapping between the two geographies. I argue that electoral turnout is stimulated
by strike threats over and above the amount that would be affected by the mere existence of
narrow elections in those municipalities ‘treated’ by having narrow elections.
Therefore, the most appropriate model to test my hypothesis is a triple differences-in-
differences model34 of the following form:
Turnoutmst =αm + ρt + ψst + δNarrowOutcomemst−3 + φPetition Ratemst−1
+ γ (Narrowmst−3 × Petition Ratemst−1) + Xmst′θ + ms (5.3)
where α is the fixed effect for the mth municipality, ρ is the fixed effect for the tth year, ψ
is the specific time trend for the sth state. δ is the standard differences-in-differences estimate
of the impact of having a narrow election in the mth municipality in the previous election on
the following election. The variable NarrowOutcome is defined as follows: it takes the value of
1 for those municipalities that in the previous mayoral elections had a margin of victory of 10
percentage or less, and where a given party has won or been runner up, and zero otherwise. Two
NarrowOutcome variables will be used in this analysis. Narrow PAN and Narrow PRD. These
measure whether previous electoral results yield some influence in the following election turnout.
φ is the effect of the Petition rate on turnout. X is a matrix of controls, that are both varying
at municipality and state level. These include municipal population, Presidential fixed effects,
an indicator if a given state s is concurrently running gubernatorial elections or presidential
elections, the rate of unemployment at state level.  is the municipal error term. Finally, γ is
the parameter of interest, as it disentangles the turnout variation due to strike threats in the
34Time has been re-indexed to the next election, so the previous narrow election is now t − 3 and the causal
effect in the previous section is found for t− 1.
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period prior to electoral year t.
The interpretation that can be given to the γ parameter is the variation due to the increased
intensity in the state of industrial relations, as measured by strike threats for those municip-
alities that experienced a narrow electoral contest. I estimate the model separately for those
municipalities that experienced a narrow right-wing or left-wing wins, and a final set of model
estimates that include both differences-in-differences estimates in a single model.
Table 5.16 reports the results for this exercise. There are no direct effects from narrow
outcome elections where the right-wing party was competitive. Whereas as shown by column 4
municipalities with a narrow left-wing outcome in the previous electoral cycle saw an increase
in electoral turnout at the following election by approximately 1.2 percentage points. These
effects are reduced by the inclusion of the unemployment rate in the year before the election.
When dummies for presidential election years and gubernatorial election years, are introduced
the effects from a narrow electoral win disappear. However, once state time trends, presidency
fixed effects and electoral-year fixed effects are introduced the magnitude is roughly halved. This
suggests that there are important temporal effects that need to be accounted for in modelling
electoral turnout. These temporal effects should in themselves not be surprising. Over the
time period in the sample there were several electoral and judicial reforms which would increase
confidence in the electoral process and thus increase turnout.
Strike threats are found to have a direct effect upon electoral turnout but once additional
controls are introduced this effect disappears as in columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9. However, Column
1 implies that whilst there is no direct impact in narrowly contested right-wing municipalities,
there is a joint effect channelled through the intensity of the strike threat rate one year prior to
the following election. The γ coefficient suggests that for those municipalities who in the previous
election had a right-wing mayor or runner up, exhibit an increase of 0.480 percentage points
in electoral turnout per each additional strike threat per 10,000 of the municipal population.
When additional temporal controls are introduced the magnitude of this effect is roughly halved.
For those municipalities that where the left were electorally competitive, strike threats do not
stimulate electoral turnout. When accounting for presidential fixed effects, electoral cycle fixed
effects and state time trends I find that increases in the petition rate reduce electoral turnout
by 0.809 per each additional strike threat per 10,000 of the population.
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I will interpret the model in column 9, as this accounts for important temporal variation,
as well as disentangling the effects of the narrow electoral victories and petitions. The model
itself also minimises the AIC, thus suggesting that this model has the best fit amongst those
presented. Each marginal petition decreases (increases) electoral turnout in those municipalities
where the PRD (PAN) won by 0.807 (0.295) of a percentage point per additional petition per
10,000 of the population. In order to get perspective on what these estimates imply I will now
provide an illustration of the implied effect for municipalities where both PAN and PRD won
narrow electoral victories.
Earlier in this chapter the causal effect of narrow PRD and PAN victories was derived from
(5.2) by the estimates of the β parameter. The estimand for γ is valid for all municipalities
where a narrow electoral contest took place, however, the β estimate is only causal where the
named parties (viz. PAN, PRD) won. Thus, a back-of-the-envelope calculation may be made
evaluating the implied causal effect on the turnout of the following election by multiplying it by
the γ estimate from equation (5.3).35 Thus, we know that municipalities where a PAN mayor
was elected by a narrow margin of ±10 percentage points perceived a causal increase of 1.057
petitions per 10,000 of the population as suggested in column 6 of table 5.8. If we multiply both
of these estimates this suggests that there is an increase of 0.311 percentage points in electoral
turnout per 10,000 of the municipal population as a result of the increased number of petitions.
The estimated standard error associated with this point estimate is 0.208. This suggests that
the estimate is marginally statistically significant at a 10% level.
Now, to derive the effect of a narrow left-wing victory. The coefficient in column 9 of table
5.16 suggests in municipalities that had a narrow left-wing victory for each additional petition
per 10,000 of the population there is a decrease in electoral turnout of 0.807 percentage points.
From column 6 of table 5.9 we know that narrow PRD victories at the 10 percentage point
margin increase the petition rate by 1.456 per 10,000 of the municipal population. Thus, if
we take the product of both of these estimates which suggests that each additional petition
decreases turnout by 1.75 percentage points. The standard error for this point estimate is 0.638,
which suggests this finding is significant at 5%. The magnitude of this effect is roughly half of
the expected increase due to gubernatorial elections.
35To test the significance of this prediction the analytical variance can be derived using the delta method, this
is found to be:
V(βˆ · γˆ) = V(βˆ) ·V(γˆ) + V (βˆ) · γˆ2 + V (γˆ) · βˆ2
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Table 5.17 disaggregates the difference-in-differences exercise by union type. It is notable
that for municipalities where there was a narrow right-wing victory, the turnout effect is being
channelled by the increases in strike threats by independent unions. Evaluating the compound
effect for narrow left-wing victory is obtained by evaluating the causal change in petitions due to
officialist unions two years after the narrow election. From column 6 of table 5.11 we know that
left-wing elections are associated with an increase of 1.5 petitions per 10,000 of the municipal
population. The product of that estimate with the relevant differences-in-differences parameter
in column 6 of table 5.17 suggests that this increase in petitions is associated with a decline in
electoral turnout of 1.65 percentage points. The standard error for this point estimate is 0.624,
suggesting that this is significant at 1%. This decline in turnout is comparable with the decline
in turnout due to a one percentage point increase in state-level unemployment. No such effects
are detected for PAN narrow elections.
This section had the explicit goal of demonstrating that the increases in the petition rate
following narrow right- and left-wing victories matter. I have shown that whilst numerically these
effects may appear small when these are evaluated at the average causal increases suggested in
Section 5.6, these effects are non-trivial relative to other electoral year effects. Implicit in the
calculations performed in this section, is the following causal chain: An narrow-win of PRD
(PAN) election happens in time t, in time t + 2 there are 1.456 (1.056) more strike threats in
those contested municipalities; the additional strike threats stimulate increases in turnout for the
election in t+ 3 by -1.75 (.311) percentage points. Whilst in of themselves these magnitudes are
not sufficient to swing the margin of the following election,, these findings suggest that unions
via strike threats, may play an role in mobilising the electorate. If one considers that electoral
advertising is strongly regulated by IFE, then this could potentially constitute illegal electoral
campaigning.
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5.8 Summary and Discussion
This chapter set out to answer the following questions: Do Union strike threats follow the busi-
ness cycle? Do Union strike threat follow political cycle? I addressed this question by exploiting
the administrative records of the local jurisdiction Arbitration and Conciliation commissions
that govern union activity in Mexico. Utilising this extensive database, I look at strike threats
in the private sector, during a period of increased democratisation and political institution
improvement. My findings are three-fold:
The key findings are as follows. Petitions increase as the state-level unemployment rate
increases; this may be consistent with Reder and Neumann (1980) view of strikes as inversely
proportional to their cost (strike threats are cheap after all). The cost of threatening to strike,
or striking increases at an economic trough, as such suggesting that strike threats are counter-
cyclical. Inflationary episodes decrease the number of strike threats, suggesting that collective
bargaining is usually performed during periods of certainty. When the models are extended to
include a dummy for municipal electoral year effects yields a positive finding. Municipalities,
and mayors, in particular, do not have any control over the field of labour relations in the private
sector, as such we should expect ex ante that there should be no electoral year effects, and yet
the mere fact of being a municipal election year increases the rate of strikes by 0.012 per 10,000
of the municipal population. This effect dominates the cyclical effects previously discussed.
The analysis then focuses on whether there are direct causal effects from close municipal
elections to strike threats. I exploit the quasi-random nature of close municipal elections to
conduct a RD exercise. This yields the finding that when the right or left- win this leads
to an increase of 0.796 (1.218) petitions per 10,000 of the municipal population. If these are
evaluated at the mean municipal populations where the right- and left-wing win then these
effects suggest an increase of 10.2 (9.6) more petitions than all other Municipalities. I find
no change to strike threat behaviour for the centrist PRI party. This finding is found to be
robust to the inclusion of state level controls, and alternate bandwidth specifications. This
finding is particularly troublesome since a mayor has no control over any regulation regarding
unions. Unions themselves should have no preferences, nor misuse petitions against Municipal
Presidents.
The lack of a significant finding for the PRI party, suggests that there may be a direct
partisan motive by unions and of executive discretion in the union leadership. I posit that
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contrary to the analysis of Bensusa´n and Middlebrook (2012a), ‘officialist’ unions continued
their partisan support for the PRI. Whilst this did not necessarily translate into increased
numbers of strikes, the evidence I provide suggests that the rate of strike threats increased. I
argue that these strike petitions—a tool for bargaining—are misused for electoral purposes by
the union leadership. In the final part of the analysis I demonstrate that the increased rate of
threats two years after an election has an effect upon electoral turnout in the key municipalities
where the PRI has a chance to recapture power. I employ a differences-in-differences approach. I
compare those municipalities that had a close election, relative to those that did not. When this
is interacted with petitions, I find that one extra marginal petition per 10,000 of the municipal
population increases turnout in municipalities where there was a narrow win for the right (left)
by 0.295 (-0.807) of a percentage point. This is an important finding, when a back-of-the-
envelope calculation is performed for the average municipality where the right- (left-)wing win,
it implies an increase (decrease) in electoral turnout of 0.311 (-1.75), which is sizeable when
compared to the added turnout due to having a year of gubernatorial elections, where these
increase turnout by 2.49%.
Finally, I answer the question: Are trade unions a fast- or a slow-changing institution? The
findings presented in this chapter suggest that over the time period under investigation– when
strong independent political institutions were being built—unions reflected the slow-changing
nature of societal norms. They did not change their behaviour in the face of a changing political
landscape. This is to some extent consistent with the findings in the literature that suboptimal
institutions persist an the slow changing nature of cultural norms (see Nunn, 2009; Dell, 2010;
Guiso et al., 2013; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). However, unlike culture, unions can be reformed,
just as with the institutional improvement surrounding the electoral authorities. In particular
rules surrounding internal union democracy may be an area where legislative changes may reduce
the agency problem which leads to a divergence between union leadership aims and the wishes
of the rank-and-file.
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Appendix G
Continuity of Covariates
This appendix reports the results of a series of robustness tests for spuriousness in the RD
design. A concern may be that the effect observed is spuriously discontinuous. It has been
suggested in the RDD literature that one may visually inspect the balance of the covariates
across the discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). If one finds that there is no discontinuous
effect on the covariatese, then, the RD design is valid and the covariates may be included in the
local linear regressions. Below I reproduce such diagrams for each political party (viz. PAN,
PRD, PRI). In all three cases, there is no visible discontinuity in the covariates along the forcing
variable. This suggests that the RD findings reported in the text are not spurious, and the rate
of unexplained workplace deaths at municipal levels, and the state level unemployment rates are
valid covariates.
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Figure G.1: Continuity PAN Covariates
Figure G.2: Continuity PRD Covariates
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Figure G.3: Continuity PRI Covariates
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Appendix H
Non-parametric regression
discontinuity
Table H.1: Impact of narrow PAN elections on strike petition rate, non parametric estimates
Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +2
IK BW CCT BW IK BW CCT BW
All Union 0.156 0.143 1.192** 1.250**
(0.151) (0.146) (0.535) (0.496)
h 0.197 0.124 0.157 0.122
N 3,414 2,427 2,895 2,392
Independent Union 0.039 0.047 -0.168 -0.185
(0.047) (0.047) (0.263) (0.255)
h 0.226 0.129 0.292 0.305
N 3,759 2,496 4,397 4,526
Officialist Union 0.099 0.105 1.312*** 1.421***
(0.128) (0.129) (0.421) (0.434)
h 0.189 0.133 0.129 0.104
N 3,300 2,558 2,491 2,095
Notes: Regressions are all estimated using non-parametric methods out-
lined in Calonico et al. (2014b).
Narrow wins here are optimally computed using the Imbens and Kalyanara-
man (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014c) bandwidth estimators, these are
columns IK and CCT, respectively where the reported parameter h is the
bandwidth utilised.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000
of population in t+ 1 and t+ 2 in a given municipality that had an election
in t. The standard errors reported below in parentheses are the result of the
Calonico et al. (2014c) robust-bias corrected procedure.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table H.2: Impact of narrow PRD elections on strike petition rate, non parametric estimates
Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +2
IK BW CCT BW IK BW CCT BW
All Union 0.143 0.117 1.445*** 1.966***
(0.148) (0.182) (0.391) (0.476)
h 0.270 0.107 0.143 0.059
N 3,063 1,541 1,913 920
Independent Union -0.023 -0.037 -0.093 -0.095
(0.071) (0.080) (0.110) (0.100)
h 0.226 0.163 0.113 0.125
N 2,717 2,126 1,603 1,720
Officialist Union 0.140 0.204* 1.683*** 2.076***
(0.111) (0.114) (0.376) (0.435)
h 0.199 0.084 0.146 0.054
N 2,462 1,238 1,956 873
Notes: Regressions are all estimated using non-parametric methods out-
lined in Calonico et al. (2014b).
Narrow wins here are optimally computed using the Imbens and Kalyanara-
man (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014c) bandwidth estimators, these are
columns IK and CCT, respectively where the reported parameter h is the
bandwidth utilised.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000
of population in t+ 1 and t+ 2 in a given municipality that had an election
in t. The standard errors reported below in parentheses are the result of the
Calonico et al. (2014c) robust-bias corrected procedure.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table H.3: Impact of narrow PRI elections on strike petition rate, non parametric estimates
Petition Petition
Rate +1 Rate +2
IK BW CCT BW IK BW CCT BW
All Union -0.029 -0.061 -0.390 -0.153
(0.170) (0.129) (0.435) (0.411)
h 0.161 0.145 0.212 0.173
N 4,359 4,018 5,158 4,554
Independent Union 0.020 0.018 -0.075 0.131
(0.043) (0.047) (0.106) (0.178)
h 0.151 0.193 0.224 0.161
N 4,159 4,886 5,311 4,354
Officialist Union -0.033 -0.049 -0.319 -0.291
(0.309) (0.104) (0.484) (0.298)
h 0.298 0.149 0.198 0.160
N 6,048 4,113 4,962 4,332
Notes: Regressions are all estimated using non-parametric methods out-
lined in Calonico et al. (2014b).
Narrow wins here are optimally computed using the Imbens and Kalyanara-
man (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014c) bandwidth estimators, these are
columns IK and CCT, respectively where the reported parameter h is the
bandwidth utilised.
Each column reports the estimate obtained for the Petition rate per 10,000
of population in t+ 1 and t+ 2 in a given municipality that had an election
in t. The standard errors reported below in parentheses are the result of
the Calonico et al. (2014c) robust-bias corrected procedure.
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respect-
ively.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis has investigated the behaviour of Mexican unions. Mexico has been the subject of
the largest academic literature on union effects for developed countries, and I set out to update
this knowledge and expand it by documenting union effects to wages and non-wage benefits over
the last decade. I also document the perverse institutional behaviour of unions during two recent
decades, when Mexico witnessed a democratic transition and the creation of strong political and
judicial institutions. The last decade, and backdrop for this thesis, witnessed further changes to
the Mexican electoral and political system with the passing of a long-promised labour market
reform. It was also a time of economic uncertainty, characterised by the ‘great recession’ of
2008, and a further recession in 2012.
6.1 Summary and reflection of findings
Labour relations in Mexico must be understood in the context of the authoritarian regime
run by Partido Revolucio´nario Institucional (PRI), which ruled the country for 71 years. As
was reviewed in Chapter 2, this political hegemony was made possible due to the co-opting
of organised labour movements. Worker groupings were effectively organised into another sub-
branch of the PRI party. Their role was to ensure that union workers turned out to vote
for the party. This level of control was achieved by providing large trades unions congresses
such as Congreso del Trabajo (CT) and Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico (CTM)
leverage over its rank-and-file through coercive laws which ensured that union membership
was not only desirable to workers, but essential to maintaining their job. The use of exclusion
clauses and the lack of internal democracy within unions created an effective tool for maintaining
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union members within the system. If that was the ‘stick’, the ‘carrot’ was in the form of
enhanced non-wage benefits and regular wage increases. However, this control system came to
an abrupt halt as the 1980s debt crisis put stresses on the public purse, and changed the nature of
Mexican politics. PRI was faced with a series of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural
adjustment programmes. These programmes entailed a mass sell-off of public enterprises, and a
reorientation of the Mexican economy towards an export-oriented system. Unions navigated this
uncertain climate by changing the nature of their discourse from one which sought to maximise
wage increases, and instead fought for higher ‘social’ wages, that is, higher non-wage benefits.
Nevertheless, this change in politics saw unions lose the privileged position they had previously
held within PRI.
The election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari in the controversial 1988 presidential elections,
created the impetus for the political reforms during the 1990s. The introduction of Instituto
Federal Electoral (IFE) and an independent judicial oversight over elections created the pre-
conditions for democratisation that would lead to the watershed 2000 presidential elections,
which would see an end to PRI’s unbroken run of holding the top political office of the country.
At the time, some feared that unions still loyal to the PRI would ensure the country would
be ungovernable (Bensusa´n and Middlebrook, 2012a). These views ignored the fragmentation
which had occurred within organised labour throughout the 1990s. The upheaval caused by the
crises in 1980s and the structural changes in the Mexican economy meant that ‘officialist’ unions
began falling out of favour, and the death of Fidel Vela´zquez1 signalled a change in labour rela-
tions. During this period independent unionism became a credible alternative, however unlike
‘officialist’ unions they did not adopt the same deferential approach to the state and employers.
Some, influenced by company unions allied with business and Partido Accio´n Nacional (PAN),
whilst others wished to hold government to account and sought to remain internally democratic,
and allied with Partido Revolucio´nario Democra´tico (PRD), and of course ‘officialist’ unions
remained broadly aligned to the PRI.
It is here where the analysis in this thesis begins. In the spirit of Freeman and Medoff (1984),
in Chapter 3 I asked: “What have Mexican unions done to wages in the past decade?” This
question was explored by employing a two-fold approach. In the first part of the analysis I focus
on estimating the union wage mark-up, whilst in the second I seek to assess the effect of unions
across the wage distribution. The analysis in this chapter exploited the Encuesta Nacional de
1Recall that he was Secretary General of the CTM since 1943.
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Ocupacio´n y Empleo (ENOE) labour force survey, a panel dataset which began in 2005 and is
conducted quarterly, to inform on union behaviour in the past 11 years. The contribution of
this chapter to the wider academic literature was in the form of a careful consideration of union
treatment effects, and the updating of knowledge to encompass the last decade.
The raw union-nonunion wage gap was found to range between 18–22% for the period 2005q1–
2016q1. This was the more thoroughly interrogated through the estimation of wage equations
using OLS. These estimates were then utilised to provide the basis for implementing the well
known Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) in order to estimate the
adjusted wage gap. When asking the question: “What would be the average gap if a nonunion
worker were to unionise?” the findings suggest a wage mark-up that lies between 6.7–13%. Thus,
suggesting that whilst the majority of the raw wage differential is explained by the relatively
better characteristics of unionised individuals, there is a modest and non-trivial union effect on
wages.
The veracity of these estimates is then investigated through the application of various meth-
ods. Firstly, one issue raised by the academic literature concerns the non-random nature of
union attachment. This concern relates to the fact that individuals who unionise are not a
random draw from the population in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics, and
it is perhaps those with better characteristics that select into unions. As widely acknowledged
(Robinson, 1989; Rios-Avila and Hirsch, 2014), overcoming this issue is tricky. I employed a
(Lee, 1978) endogenous switching model to account for this selection. The stringent nature of
government regulation of strikes was exploited to obtain identifying instruments. The strike
procedure and the usage of strike petitions yields a high-quality dataset which includes all strike
threats that fall under state jurisdiction. The heterogeneity between independent and ‘officialist’
unions were then utilised to estimate two separate petition rates with a one year lag. These data
are used as an instruments for an individual’s selection into union status. The results suggest
that for Mexico, using the instrument set there is no selection into unions. Instead the findings
suggest that there are unobservable characteristics which determine nonunion attachment which
are negatively related to wages. The selectivity corrected wage differential is then computed
using a similar approach to that of Duncan and Leigh (1980). The findings when computing
the Average Treatment Effect on the Non-treated (ATEN) suggest that they are remarkably
invariant to selection, where the effect is found to be statistically significant. An estimate of the
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) is obtained by exploiting the panel nature of
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ENOE, and thus estimating a model with individual fixed-effects. In this application the union
wage gap for those that switch union status is found to be 2% over the last decade.
I then provided a synthesis of all of the estimated treatment effects as suggested in all of
these different estimates and compare them to previous estimates of the union mark-up reported
in the literature. I conclude that the discrepancies in size are due to the conceptual differences in
the estimated treatment effects. When these are considered jointly a coherent narrative emerges.
My findings indicate that a union wage mark-up exists, and the Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
oscillates between 7–10%. This estimate averages the findings of the ATET and ATEN. The
estimates from a na¨ıve application of individual fixed-effects estimators conflate the effect of
union ‘joiners’ and ‘leavers’ without properly accounting for the fact that these are opposite
effects, and this explains the attenuation in the estimates. A more careful consideration of the
ATET provided the subsequent focus of Chapter 4.
One regularity found in the economics literature refers to the ‘sword-of-justice’ effect (Callan
and Reilly, 1993; Metcalf et al., 2001) that unions exert across the wage distribution. This refers
to the observed compression in the dispersion of wages of union members. The existence of this
effect is hinted at by estimates of the variance from wage equations from both OLS and the Lee
(1978) model. A simple analysis of these reveals that union wages have systematically lower
variance than those in the nonunion sector. I then estimated a variance decomposition for these
two models. These findings suggest that unions decrease the dispersion of wages. This is then
further explored through the use of conditional quantile regression techniques (Koenker and
Bassett, 1978). This also permits for a more flexible approach at determining the magnitude
of the union wage mark-up across the conditional wage distribution. The findings suggest that
in the Mexican context, this sword is blunt. There is evidence that unions reduce dispersion in
the wage distribution, but this seems to only be possible during non-recessionary periods. This
equity is enforced through higher returns at the bottom end of the conditional wage distribution,
with returns decreasing as one progresses up out the distribution. It is, however, at the upper
ends of the wage distribution where the ‘sword-of-justice’ glints, unions appear to reduce the
wages of those at the 90th percentile of the conditional wage distribution, relative to their non-
unionised counterparts.
Taken as a whole, the findings from this chapter are suggestive of unions being a weakly
equalising force in the labour market, that cannot perfectly shelter their workers from wider
macroeconomic forces. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity in union types uncovered by the contex-
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tualisation, and the slight increase in unionisation rates during the early 2000s, suggest that the
estimates of the ATE may not be a good characterisation the union mark-up, and thus explain
happenings in the Mexican labour market.
Chapter 4 asks “Are there are gains and losses associated with joining and leaving a union?”
This chapter adopts a differences-in-differences approach to determine what benefits new union
‘joiners’ and ‘leavers’ perceive during the previous eleven years. The findings suggest that join-
ing and leaving a union is associated with no wage gains and small wage losses respectively,
unlike what the literature reports for most industrialised economies. The lack of wage increases
for new joiners and leavers are suggestive of the narrative which emerged in the estimates of the
ATET from Chapter 3, namely that unions are fairly weak. The discrepancy in wage differences
between both of these papers can be explained by the conceptual difference between instru-
ment ‘compliers’ with actual union ‘joiners’. In the first, the individuals identified as ‘joiners’
may in fact be individuals whose wages have already been subject to union wage bargaining
practices for a number of years, whilst in this chapter, ‘joiners’ are those who were observed
transitioning into a union. The relatively ‘new’ nature of these union joiners implies that it is
unlikely that unionisation would be able to immediately lead to an increase the wages of their
workers. Equally, those who leave unions will not necessarily lose their union bargained wages
immediately. However, there are exceptions to these statements, namely those individuals who
exit (enter) a union and hold temporary contracts. These subgroups were found to incur rel-
atively large losses (increases) in wages relative to their always (never) unionised counterparts.
These findings suggest that unions, whilst perhaps ineffective for the average worker, still seek
to improve the lot of marginalised workers.
Nevertheless, the findings from Chapter 4 suggest that the real gains and losses associated
with unionisation are not to be found in ones wages, but rather in terms of non-wage benefits.
This chapter contributed to the wider literature by providing the first estimates of the real gains
(losses) associated with joining (leaving) a union, otherwise known as the ATET, with respect
to non-wage benefits. The findings revealed that joining (leaving) a union increased (decreased)
the probability of being in receipt of legally guaranteed benefits such as bonuses, paid holidays
and pensions. The findings suggested a flagrant disregard of the law, which is concerning. This
disregard for the law reflects the poor enforcement of the Ley Federal del Trabajo (FLL) and is
suggestive of weak regulatory institutions. The estimated magnitudes for gains varied but were
found to range between 4.4 and 13.4 percentage points, which when evaluated at pre-transition
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incidence rates suggested sizeable gains of 3.7-11.2% relative to those individuals who never
unionised. A caveat with these estimates, is that although these are the ATET there may be
other concurrent changes, such as job moves, that may be associated with these findings. As such
I sought to disentangle the estimated effects between those individuals who were firm stayers
and those who were firm movers. The estimates allow me to determine whether the union effects
are related to passive or active unionisation. The result from this exercise suggested that those
who stand to benefit the most from unionisation, are those for whom non-wage benefits are not
guaranteed under the FLL. Finally, the robustness of the findings was confirmed through the
application of a set of conditional differences-in-differences regressions, those accounted for the
differing characteristics between those joiners and leavers who are concentrated in larger and
smaller firms, respectively.
The findings that emerged from this chapter confirm the change in bargaining strategy as
suggested in Chapter 2. The change in union dialectic from wages to ‘social wages’, is reflected
in the higher non-wage benefits enjoyed by union joiners. These gains may also have a direct
effect upon a worker’s pocket, as they may be perceived in monetary terms. Whilst the evidence
I presented is unable to go further and attach a magnitude to the size of the gains, the greater
incidence of bonuses, and paid holidays have a direct translation to higher pay. Whilst these
may be lump-sum payments, they represent ways in which workers are able to improve their
conditions. Thus, despite the continued decline in union density, unions have still an important
role to play in voicing worker’s preferences with respect to wider compensation and ensuring that
employers are compliant with the law. A final caveat to this interpretation must be addressed,
the estimates from this chapter represent the average gains and losses of individuals to joining
and leaving a union. However, the nature of the union question asked in ENOE does not allow
me to disaggregate these effects by type of union. So, these estimates are unable to inform
on the effects of union heterogeneity, without further assumptions. However, it does not seem
unreasonable to assume that workers will only unionise into those unions that they perceive
to be effective, and so if ‘officialist’ unions are perceived to be inefficient, then the ATET from
joining may be perceived as the independent union gain. Conversely, the ATET of leaving, could
be interpreted as the loss associated with leaving an ‘officialist’ union. Unfortunately, as hinted,
this proposition is untestable due to the nature of the data.
Finally, Chapter 5 was a novel investigation, which provided the first empirical estimates of
the political behaviour of unions in Mexico. In this chapter I sought to elucidate whether the
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relationship between unions and political parties continued to exist during the period 1991–2012.
This period is notable as it spans the extensive political and judicial reforms of the 1990s. I
exploited the administrative data on all strike threats that fell under local jurisdiction level,
during the period of political institutional improvement. The analysis in this chapter was in
three distinct stages. First, I documented the behaviour of strike threats along the business
and economic cycle. Secondly, having found a tentative association between strike threats and
the political cycle, I sought to investigate if this relationship was causal through an application
of Regression Discontinuity (RD). In the final portion of the analysis, I present and test a
mechanism by which the increased rates of strike threats are affecting future elections.
The chapter documented the behaviour of strike threats over the economic cycle, with the key
findings that petitions are pro-cyclical, which confirms their role as a tool for contract bargaining.
I then introduced controls for electoral years and found that despite the FLL stipulation that
strike threats only deal with intra-firm complaints, there was an association between threats
and electoral years.
This association was the basis for the main analysis presented, in which I asked: “Are strike
threats partially caused by the political cycle?” Using results for Municipal President elections
I sought to answer this question. This electoral level was chosen, as Municipal Presidencies
have an independent political character, that is, they may set divergent policy to that in their
respective state. But notably, Mayors have no control over labour politics. The causal nature
of the relationship was explored through an application of RD. Under this approach, one may
claim that narrow elections, defined here as those for whom the margin of victory lay within 10
percentage points, at the margin are as-good-as random. This allows me to identify a causal
relationship, using this quasi-experimental approach, I found a causal effect from close elections
of right- and left-wing mayors on strike threats two years after an election. Narrow electoral
victories of the right-wing (PAN) (left-wing, PRD) party increased the number of strike threats
by 1.057 (1.456) per 10,000 of the municipal population two years after an election. These
findings were further interrogated by unpicking the effects by type of union. The estimates were
unequivocal, the effects were found to originate from the behaviour of ‘officialist’ unions. These
findings were found robust to alternate specifications.
Lastly, I proposed a channel by which the increased incidence of strike threats had a further
effect on politics. I posited that strike threats acted as a type of unofficial campaigning for
upcoming elections. To test this hypothesis a differences-in-differences model was employed to
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estimate electoral turnout for those municipalities that had narrow electoral wins for the right
and left. When the product of those estimates and the causal findings from the RD is computed
the estimate suggests that the causal effect leads to sizeable increases (decreases) in turnout
when the right- (left-)wing win in the following election. These are of the order of 0.311 (1.75)
percentage points for the right- and left-wing, respectively. These are comparable in magnitude
to the increased turnout rates associated with gubernatorial election years and may be sizeable
enough to swing marginal elections.
The portrait that emerged of Mexican unions from this investigation was a complex and
nuanced one. It may be contrasted to the metaphorical Curate’s egg. On the one hand, unions
act as a weak regulator for the FLL, as was described in Chapter 4. They ensure that the
most vulnerable workers receive their legal entitlements. On the other hand, as illustrated in
Chapter 5 unions may display perverse behaviour such as exploiting strike threats for political
means which go beyond the interests of their rank-and-file. So, how can we reconcile the two?
Throughout the whole of this investigation I have sought to disentangle the duality of Mexican
unions. There are the mostly ‘good’ independent unions, and there are the somewhat ‘bad’
‘officialist’ unions. I suggested that workers who unionise will be more likely to join the ‘good’
unions, and the evidence of strike threats suggests that the politicised behaviour is entirely
deriving from ‘officialist’ unions.
6.2 Implications of research
From this research agenda a number of broader implications arise. These may be aggregated
into methodological points and policy recommendations.
I will begin with the methodological points. First, in Chapter 3, I demonstrated that it is
important to consider carefully what each estimate of treatment effects really tell us. As it was
clear, I obtained numerous estimates, which on first sight are rival. However, once these were
carefully considered, and the counterfactual question inherent in each was formulated, it became
clear that each of these was providing evidence under a number of different scenarios. Thus, it
is up to researchers to evaluate which effect is relevant. I opt for the weighted sum of the ATET
and ATEN implicit in the ATE.
The literature has been dominated by concern over the issue of selection. Proving that there
is none is an onerous task for any research. In this work, I have attempted to identify instruments
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which allow me to do just that. I exploit clauses in FLL which require unions to issue strike
petitions to Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions. This yields a fine grained dataset of all
strike threats that fall under local jurisdiction over the period 1991–2014. I posit, in the light of
the findings of Chapter 5, that the rate of strike threats for independent and ‘officialist’ unions
may act as signalling mechanisms which prospective union members may decipher differently.
Thus, if independent unions are viewed as being effective, then a higher rate of strike threats
will suggest an active trades unions movement, that workers may seek to join. Conversely, given
the history between ‘officialist’ unions and the state, increases in that strike threat rate may
discourage workers from joining as this may reflect the wishes of the union leadership. The
estimates presented from the Lee (1978) model estimated are indicative, that with these set of
instruments selection of unobservable characteristics into the union sector is not a feature of
the last decades. Perhaps, paradoxically, I found that selection was more often into the private
nonunion sector.
Now considering the broad policy conclusions. An undercurrent that has gone throughout
this whole research agenda, has been the understanding that context is key. The contextualisa-
tion chapter went to great lengths to describe how labour legislation was exploited by PRI as a
means to control unions, this is the legacy of history. The institutions inherited from previous
political regimes, may still exert effects in the future, even after the regime has fallen. As can
be surmised, the lack of labour market reform after democratisation was due to deference of
unions, as it was feared at the time that the country would become ungovernable (Bensusa´n and
Middlebrook, 2012a). When the fabled reform finally materialised in 2012, it was the chapters
which most needed reform that were left untouched. It is likely that the benefits of unions to
their membership would increase, if internal democracy was embedded in unions. As suggested
by the findings from Chapter 4, where people choose to join a union, there are gains. Thus,
changes to the internal regulation of unions, such as secret ballots, would go to great lengths in
increasing the potential for unions to express worker ‘voice’ more effectively than they already
have. In particular, this would be beneficial to those who are already in unions, rather than
those yet to unionise.
There appear to be large counterfactual ‘gains’ for individuals, as measured by the ATEN,
if they choose to unionise, but looking at those who did transition into the union sector, I did
not observe higher wages. It was revealed that unions mainly have an effect upon non-wage
benefits as the real ‘gains’ to unionisation. Workers who unionised are more likely to hold these
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than those who never unionise. However, this is is a troubling finding as the non-wage benefits
investigated in this thesis are all mandatory. This suggests that there is very little compliance
with the FLL in the labour market. A larger point, is that whilst it is good that unions ensure
their members receive their legally mandated benefits, it is important for Secretar´ıa de Trabajo
y Previsio´n Social (STPS) to inspect and ensure that the law is applied to all, and that effective
compliance prevails. These findings are also broadly suggestive that institutional improvement
in Mexico has been uneven, with the focus being on those institutions that Roland (2004) has
identified as fast acting.
This research sought to measure the effect of unions in Mexico for working age males in
the private sector. I intentionally avoided the thorny issue of public sector unions. There is a
literature for developed countries which shows that these follow fundamentally different labour
relation regimes and wage determination processes. For Mexico, as mentioned in the context
chapter, this is reflected by the application of a different chapter of the FLL. And so, whilst I
have little to say with respect to these, it must be noted that disentangling the public sector
union effect is fraught with difficulties, as there is also a public sector wage premium which must
be contended with.
It would be disingenuous to pretend that unions do not serve a dual purpose. Chapter
5 showed that unions are an institution in the labour market, but at the same time they are
actors in the political arena. The evidence presented here has shown that strike petitions, a legal
instrument whose purpose is to seek negotiation, are being systematically abused as a result of
narrow left- and right-wing victories. I showed that this behaviour was coming from ‘officialist’
unions. It seems that if these are being used as a protest, or a motivating factor for elections, this
is inefficient as it absorbs resources in the Arbitration and Conciliation Commissions, who have
to consider other petitions, which themselves may be legitimate. An approach to mitigate these
is perhaps to add a cost to the union in issuing a strike threat. This would discourage ‘cheap’
words, and thus would discourage these sort of illegal practices. One could imagine that part
of any bargaining outcome would include this cost. Whilst this proposal raises equity concerns
about ‘poorer’ unions being able to raise complaints, a pricing structure could be worked out to
minimise this concern.
Finally, one last implication regards institutions. In the foregone research, it is clear that
whilst some outcomes in Mexico have been improved through greater engagement with demo-
cracy and institutional improvement, some institutions such as the FLL are not only weakly
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enforced, but actively flaunted. Given the large literature suggesting that institutions are the
fundamental cause for long-run growth, then it seems salient to note that the institutions which
have been successful in creating change all share similarities. Although they are public institu-
tions, these are politically autonomous. IFE and the judiciary have been purposefully moved
out of reach of meddling by the Executive branch and they have overseen important changes in
Mexican society. Thus, if regulation of those institutions which are perceived as ‘slow-acting’,
such as oversight over labour matters, were made independent of the Executive then perhaps
the failure in enforcement would be resolved.
6.3 Future Research Agenda
The work presented in this thesis has prompted various ideas which may be fruitful in future
research. A few of these will now be outlined.
The analysis in Chapter 3 with respect to the ‘sword-of-justice’ could be improved through
the application of a more modern decomposition such as the Recentered Influence Function
(RIF) approach of Firpo et al. (2009). Equally, a careful measure of the conditional ATET could
be obtained for selected quantiles of interest by employing the quantile fixed-effects estimator
proposed by Koenker (2004); Abrevaya and Dahl (2008).
The analysis of Chapter 4 sought to explain how much of the changes in non-wage benefit
holding was due to changes in jobs. A similar exercise on the effects of job transitions across
the labour market and wage cyclicality as in Devereux and Hart (2006) would be fruitful.
Finally, the analysis presented in Chapter 5 provides evidence of the misuse of legal instru-
ments. I proposed a mechanism by which unions seek to influence the electoral outcome of
the following election. One of the things I wish to work on in future is to try and explore the
transmission mechanism a little bit further and see if there are other ancillary effects coming
from the increased rate of petitions towards the wider economy and society.
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Glossary
Administradoras de Fondos de Retiro Retirement Fund Administrators. Introduced after
the 1997 pension reform. These are privately managed defined contribution pension
vehicles. There are currently 21 to chose from, and are run by large financial organisations.
21, 191
Bloque de Unidad Obrera Worker Unity Block. 191
Co´digo Federal de Institucio´nes y Procedimientos Electorales Federal Code or Elect-
oral Procedures and Institutions. Introduced in 1990. See Chapter 2. 26, 125, 190, 191
Casa del Obrero Mundial House of the World Worker 191
Comite´ Nacional de Defensa Proletaria National Committee of Proletarian Defense. A
forerunner to the CTM Was comprised of a meeting of the most important labour or-
ganisations including the Confederacio´n General de Obreros y Campesinos de Me´xico
(CGOCM), Confederacio´n Sindical Unitaria de Me´xico (CSUM), and the Sindicato de
Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Repu´blica Me´xicana (STFRM), amongst others. 11,
191
Confederacio´n General de Obreros y Campesinos de Me´xico General Confederation of
Peasants and Workers of Mexico. 187, 191
Confederacio´n Regional Obrera Mexicana Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers.
The first trades union congress to join both agricultural workers and industrial workers.
Was crucial during the Partido Laborista Mexicano (PLM) presidencies of Obrego´n and
Calles. Its Secretary General, Morones was minister of labour, and was key in the intro-
duction of novel policies which would be the basis for PRI control of unions. Fell out of
favour after the assassination of Obrego´n. 8, 152, 189, 192
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Confederacio´n Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos 192
Confederacio´n Sindical Unitaria de Me´xico Sindicalist Unitarian Confederation of Mex-
ico. The trades unions wing of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) 187, 192
Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico Confederation of Mexican Workers, a trades
union congress, founded in 1936. Officially part of PRI as the labour sector. 5, 10, 152,
175, 192
Conferacio´n Obrera Regional Regional Confederation of Workers. 152, 191
Conferacio´n Revolucionaria de Trabajadores Revolutionary Confederation of Workers. 152,
192
Congreso General de Trabajadores General Congress of Workers. 152, 191
Congreso del Trabajo Work Congress. Was a trades unions congress which joined CTM with
other major competing congresses in the 1960s. It served as a super structure of control
over other unions by the PRI. 12, 152, 175, 192
Encuesta Nacional a Trabajadores de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa Y Capacitacio´n en el sector manufacturero
Survey of Workers, Wages, Technology and Training in the Manufacturing Sector. An
establishment-level survey run on an irregular basis by Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica,
Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica (INEGI). 192
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano Mexican Labour Force Survey, carried out between
1987–2004 by INEGI. 127, 188, 192
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 16, 34, 192
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo National Survey of Employment and Occu-
pation. A Mexican Household survey, run by INEGI, replaced Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo Urbano (ENEU). Has run since 2005q1. ix, 3, 16, 31, 88, 177, 192
Frente Autentico de Trabajo Authentic Work Front. A new union founded in the 1980s,
rose to prominence in the 1990s as an independent union, committed to internal democracy.
2, 193
Instituto Federal Electoral Federal Electoral Institute. Was the fourth branch of govern-
ment that oversaw all elections between 1994–2015. From 1996 onwards was completely
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independent of Governement intervention. Has been replaced by the National Electoral
Institute. 26, 124, 176, 193
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica The Mexican Statistics Agency.
40, 92, 188, 193
Instituto Nacional del Fondo de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores Institute of the Na-
tional Fund for Worker Housing. Latin America’s largest mortgage issuer. It was originally
introduced in the 1950s to meet a constitutional obligation of employers to provide clean
and salubrious housing to their employees. 21, 193
Instituto de Seguridad Social y Servicios de Trabajadores del Estado Social Security
and Institute of State Workers. The public sector analogue of Instuto Mexicano de Seguro
Social (IMSS). 21, 193
Instuto Mexicano de Seguro Social Mexican Instituto of Social Security. A dependency of
government introduced in 1943. Its oversight is to oversee public health, pensions and
social security provision. 20, 93, 189, 193
Ley Federal del Trabajo Federal Labour Law. First introduced in 1931 under the Ortiz
Rubio Presidency. It formalised many of the Confederacio´n Regional Obrera Mexicana
(CROM) practices with respect to union regulation. Saw minor amendments in the 1970s
and 1980s and was the subject of a reform in 2012. For more detail see Chapter 2. 1, 9,
10, 31, 88, 179, 193
Partido Accio´n Nacional National Action Party. It follows a Christian Conservative agenda,
and between 1939–2000 served as the opposition to PRI. 6, 119, 176, 194
Partido Comunista Mexicano Mexican Communist Party. 188, 194
Partido Laborista Mexicano Mexican Labour Party. This party was the political wing to
the CROM, successfully postulated Obrego´n and Calles to the presidency. After CROM
fell out of power and Partido Nacional Revolucio´nario (PNR) was founded this party fell
into irrelevance. 8, 187, 194
Partido Liberal Constitucio´nal Liberal Constitutional Party. An early Mexican party that
arose from the Revolution, became marginalised after 1920 coup by Huerta. 194
190
Partido Nacional Revolucio´nario National Revolutionary Party. Founded by Calles, for
more detail see Chapter 2. 9, 189, 194
Partido Nueva Alianza New Alliance Party, founded by Alba Esther Gordillo, the leader
of Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacio´n (SNTE). This party acts as the
political wing of the SNTE union. 194
Partido Revolucio´nario Democra´tico Party of the Democratic Revolution. Founded in
1989 after the controversial 1988 presidential elections. It is Mexico’s left-wing party. 15,
119, 176, 194
Partido Revolucio´nario Institucional Revolutionary Institutional Party, the successor to
PNR and Partido de la Revolucio´n Mexicana (PRM). Collectively these three parties
ruled Mexico for 71 years. 2, 5, 32, 119, 175, 194
Partido de la Revolucio´n Mexicana Party of the Mexican Revolution. Was the rebranded
PNR under Ca´rdenas. Officially subsumed CTM as one its the four constituent ‘sectors’.
11, 190, 194
Secretar´ıa de Trabajo y Previsio´n Social Secretariat for Labour and Social Provision. Gov-
ernment ministry with oversight over labour. 10, 123, 184, 195
Sindicato Me´xicano de Electricistas Mexican Union of Electricians 194
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacio´n 190, 194
Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Repu´blica Me´xicana Union of Railroad
Workers of the Mexican Republic. 187, 195
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Jucidial de la Federacio´n Electoral Tribunal of the Judi-
cial Power of the Federation. The Judiciary tribunal overseeing elections and the imple-
mentation of Co´digo Federal de Institucio´nes y Procedimientos Electorales (COFIPE). 26,
125, 195
Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico National Autonomous University of Mexico.
It is the oldest university in Latin America, and also the largest. 24, 195
AEE Average Endowment Effect 50
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AFORES Administradoras de Fondos de Retiro 21, 22, 191, Glossary: Administradoras de
Fondos de Retiro
AIC Akaike Information Criterion 154, 157, 158, 162
Anderson-Rubin Test A joint test of instrument exogeneity and overidentification. For more
details see Anderson and Rubin (1949). 191
AR Anderson-Rubin Test 191, Glossary: Anderson-Rubin Test
ATE Average Treatment Effect 50, 65, 72, 178, 179, 182
ATEN Average Treatment Effect on the Non-treated 49, 58, 61, 65, 177, 178, 182, 183
ATET Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 49, 53, 58, 61, 63, 65, 87, 99, 103, 104, 111,
177–180, 182, 185
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CDF Cumulative Density Function 51, 103
CGOCM Confederacio´n General de Obreros y Campesinos de Me´xico 187, 191, Glossary:
Confederacio´n General de Obreros y Campesinos de Me´xico
CGT Congreso General de Trabajadores 152, 191, Glossary: Congreso General de Trabajadores
CLR Conditional Likelihood Ratio 191, Glossary: Conditional Likelihood Ratio
CNDP Comite´ Nacional de Defensa Proletaria 11, 191, Glossary: Comite´ Nacional de Defensa
Proletaria
COFIPE Co´digo Federal de Institucio´nes y Procedimientos Electorales 26, 27, 124, 125, 190,
191, Glossary: Co´digo Federal de Institucio´nes y Procedimientos Electorales
COM Casa del Obrero Mundial 191, Glossary: Casa del Obrero Mundial
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instrument exogeneity and overidentification. For more details see Moreira (2003). 191
COR Conferacio´n Obrera Regional 152, 191, Glossary: Conferacio´n Obrera Regional
CPI Consumer Price Index 42, 94
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CPS Current Population Survey 90, 113, 192, Glossary: Current Population Survey
CROC Confederacio´n Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos 192, Glossary: Confederacio´n
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos
CROM Confederacio´n Regional Obrera Mexicana 8–12, 152, 189, 192, Glossary: Confederacio´n
Regional Obrera Mexicana
CRT Conferacio´n Revolucionaria de Trabajadores 152, 192, Glossary: Conferacio´n Revolucion-
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CSUM Confederacio´n Sindical Unitaria de Me´xico 187, 192, Glossary: Confederacio´n Sindical
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CT Congreso del Trabajo 12, 13, 152, 175, 192, Glossary: Congreso del Trabajo
CTM Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico 5, 6, 10–15, 21, 152, 175, 176, 187, 188, 190,
192, Glossary: Confederacio´n de Trabajadores de Me´xico
Current Population Survey A USA household survey. 90, 192
EEC Expenditures for Employee Compensation 90, 91, 192, Glossary: Expenditures for Em-
ployee Compensation
ENESTYC Encuesta Nacional a Trabajadores de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa Y Capacitacio´n
en el sector manufacturero 16, 192, Glossary: Encuesta Nacional a Trabajadores de Em-
pleo, Salarios, Tecnolog´ıa Y Capacitacio´n en el sector manufacturero
ENEU Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano 127, 128, 132, 133, 135, 137, 144–146, 149–151,
188, 192, Glossary: Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano
ENIGH Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 16, 34, 39, 44, 45, 63, 192,
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ENOE Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo ix, 3, 16, 31, 34, 39, 40, 42–46, 53, 56, 62,
73, 74, 88, 92, 94, 95, 127, 128, 132, 133, 135, 137, 144–146, 149–151, 176, 178, 180, 192,
Glossary: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y Empleo
Expenditures for Employee Compensation A USA labour force survey 90, 192
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FAT Frente Autentico de Trabajo 2, 193, Glossary: Frente Autentico de Trabajo
FIML Full Information Maximum Likelihood 52, 81
FLL Ley Federal del Trabajo 1, 9–11, 14, 17–20, 22, 30–33, 41, 42, 88, 89, 96, 99–101, 109, 123,
124, 179–184, 193, Glossary: Ley Federal del Trabajo
IFE Instituto Federal Electoral 26, 124, 125, 130, 163, 176, 185, 193, Glossary: Instituto Federal
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IMF International Monetary Fund 12, 176
IMSS Instuto Mexicano de Seguro Social 20, 93, 189, 193, Glossary: Instuto Mexicano de
Seguro Social
INEGI Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica 16, 40, 42, 92, 94, 127, 128,
132, 188, 193, Glossary: Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica, Geograf´ıa e Informa´tica
INFONAVIT Instituto Nacional del Fondo de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores 21, 193,
Glossary: Instituto Nacional del Fondo de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores
ISSSTE Instituto de Seguridad Social y Servicios de Trabajadores del Estado 21, 193, Glossary:
Instituto de Seguridad Social y Servicios de Trabajadores del Estado
LATE Local Average Treatment Effect 87
LLR Local Linear Regression 140, 193, Glossary: Local Linear Regression
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NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 31, 91, 130, 193, Glossary: North American
Free Trade Agreement
National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men A USA survey 90, 193
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North American Free Trade Agreement A free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico
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PAN Partido Accio´n Nacional 6, 15, 22–25, 27, 119, 131, 140, 143, 147, 148, 152, 154, 162, 163,
176, 181, 194, Glossary: Partido Accio´n Nacional
PANAL Partido Nueva Alianza 194, Glossary: Partido Nueva Alianza
Panel Study of Income Dynamics A USA panel survey 90, 194
PCM Partido Comunista Mexicano 188, 194, Glossary: Partido Comunista Mexicano
PLC Partido Liberal Constitucio´nal 29, 194, Glossary: Partido Liberal Constitucio´nal
PLM Partido Laborista Mexicano 8, 9, 29, 187, 194, Glossary: Partido Laborista Mexicano
PNR Partido Nacional Revolucio´nario 9–11, 23, 29, 189, 190, 194, Glossary: Partido Nacional
Revolucio´nario
PRD Partido Revolucio´nario Democra´tico 15, 22, 25, 119, 131, 140, 143, 147, 148, 152, 154,
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140, 141, 143, 147, 148, 152, 165, 166, 175, 176, 183, 187, 188, 194, Glossary: Partido
Revolucio´nario Institucional
PRM Partido de la Revolucio´n Mexicana 11, 23, 24, 29, 30, 190, 194, Glossary: Partido de la
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PSID Panel Study of Income Dynamics 90, 194, Glossary: Panel Study of Income Dynamics
QES Quality of Employment Survey 90, 194, Glossary: Quality of Employment Survey
Quality of Employment Survey A USA labour market survey 90, 194
RD Regression Discontinuity 119, 138, 140, 143, 148, 152, 154, 165, 167, 181, 182
SME Sindicato Me´xicano de Electricistas 194, Glossary: Sindicato Me´xicano de Electricistas
SNTE Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educacio´n 190, 194, Glossary: Sindicato
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